
Class 

Book 



THE 



WAR WITH SPAIN 






r LOI 







HARP1 !• . Bl 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER PAGE 

I. The Unsettled Question i 

II. The Coming of War 31 

III. Manila 45 

IV. The Blockade of Cuba 6S 

V. The Pursuit of Cervera 82 

VI. Santiago — The Land Fight 108 

VII. Santiago— The Sea Fight 134 

VIIJ. The Surrender of Santiago 153 

IX. The Campaign in Puerto Rico 168 

X. The Blockade of Manila and the Capture of Guam 191 

XI. How Peace Came 222 

APPENDIX A — Resolutions of Congress Demanding 

Withdrawal of Spain from Cuba 237 

APPENDIX B — Proclamation of the President. . 240 

APPENDIX C— Peace Protocol of August 12, 1898, 

and Correspondence 24S 

APPENDIX D— The Treaty of Peace 267 



ILLUSTRATIONS 



THE MAINE AT HER FINAL BERTH IN HAVANA HARBOR . Frontispiece 

THE VIRGINIUS OVERHAULED BY THE SPANISH GUNBOAT 

TORNADO Fac 

SENOR CANOVAS DEL CASTILLO 

GENERAL FITZHUGH LEE 

GENERAL STEWART L. WOODFORD 

SE550R DUPUY DE LOME 

THE MAINE OFF MORRO CASTLE 

CAPTAIN CHARLES D. SIGSBEE 

WILLIAM R. DAY 

SENOR PRAXEDES MATEO SAGASTA 

UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AF- 
FAIRS 

REDFIELD PROCTOR ... 

PRESIDENT MCKINLEY SIGNING THE ULTIMATUM . . . 

PLAZA DE FONDO, MANILA 

PRIESTS GATHERING TAXES IN THE PHILIPPINES . . . 

WRECK OF THE CRUISER ISLA DE CUBA 

WEST BATTERY, CAVITE, AFTER DESTRUCTION .... 

WRECK OF THE FLAG-SHIP, THE CRUISER REINA CRISTINA 

WRECK OF THE CRUISER ISLA DE LUZON 

RESIDENCE OF AGUINALDO 

THE SAILING OF THE AMERICAN FLEET FROM TAMPA . 

THE BOMBARDMENT OF MATANZAS 

THE SPANISH SQUADRON AT CAPE VERDE ISLANDS . . 

COLONEL DORST'S EXPEDITION IN THE GUSSIE — THE 
LANDING AT POINT ARBOLITAS 

CUTTING THE CABLES UNDER FIRE AT CIENFUEGOS . . 

THE HOME-COMING OF THE OREGON 

vii 



ngp. 10 
16 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

THE DAILY POSITIONS OF THE SPANISH SQUADRON UNDER 

ADMIRAL CERVERA Facing p. 84 

BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN 86 

THE DAILY POSITIONS OF FLEET IN CAMPAIGN AGAINST 

THE SPANISH SQUADRON " 88 

CAPTAIN EVANS OF THE IOWA SIGHTING THE CRISTOBAL 

COLON AND THE MARIA TERESA IN SANTIAGO HARBOR . " 94 

THE LAST OF THE MERRIMAC " IOO 

SOLDIERS OF THE CUBAN ARMY " IO4 

THE LANDING OF THE AMERICAN ARMY AT DAIQUIRI . 112 

GENERAL GARCIA AND BRIGADIER-GENERAL LUDLOW. . " II4 

JOSEPH WHEELER " Il6 

WILLIAM R. SHAFTER " IlS 

THE HOTCHKISS BATTERY IN ACTION AT LAS GUASIMAS . " 120 

THEODORE ROOSEVELT 122 

THE CAPTURE OF EL CANEY 1 24 

THE CAPTURE OF THE BLOCK-HOUSE, SAN JUAN ... 126 

GENERAL H. S. HAWKINS AT SAN JUAN " 128 

GENERALS IN THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN ... . . " I32 

PASQUALE DE CERVERA " 136 

NAVAL OFFICERS IN SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN " 138 

THE GLOUCESTER AND THE SPANISH TORPEDO-BOATS. . " I42 

THE LAST OF CERVERA'S FLEET " I48 

THE MEETING OF THE GENERALS TO ARRANGE THE SUR- 
RENDER OF SANTIAGO " 1 58 

RAISING THE AMERICAN FLAG ON THE CITY HALL OF 

SANTIAGO " 162 

NAVAL OFFICERS IN TUERTO RICAN CAMPAIGN .... l66 

SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO, FROM THE HARBOR .... l68 

AN ANCIENT GATEWAY, SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO. . . I70 

THE STREET OF THE CROSS, SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO . " 1 72 

THE LANDING AT GUANICA 174 

THE BANNER OF PONCE 1 76 

SPANIARDS SURPRISED BY COLONEL HULING'S REGIMENT 

IN THEIR FLIGHT FROM COAMO " 1 78 

GENERALS IN PUERTO RICAN CAMPAIGN l8o 

MAP OF PUERTO RICO lS2 

A VIEW OF THE MILITARY ROAD TO THE SOUTH OF THE 

SPANISH POSITION AT AYBONITO " 1 84 

THE EXPEDITION AGAINST LARES AND ARECIBO ... " l86 

THE MILITARY ROAD LEADING INTO YAUCO .... " 1 88 

ON THE ADJUNTAS TRAIL . , I90 

viii 



I L L U S T R A T ro N S 



GEORGE DEWEY F, 

THE OFFICIAL RESIDENCE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, 

MANILA . 

ELWELL S. OTIS 

HENRY GLASS 

THE CHARLESTON ENTERING THE HARBOR OF GUAM . . 

THOMAS M. ANDERSON 

FRANCIS V. GREENE 

MAP OF THE BATTLE OF MANILA 

THE ADVANCE TOWARD MANILA 

THE MONTEREY IN ACTION 

WESLEY MERRITT 

RESISTANCE FROM THE HOUSES IN MALA IE 

AFTERNOON ON THE LUNETA, NORTH OF THE ERM1TA 

SUBURB OF MANILA 

PUERTA REAL, OR THE KING'S GATE, IN THE OLD WALL 

OF MANILA 

NEWS OF THE PEACE PROTOCOL — GENERAL BROOKE 

STOPPING THE ARTILLERY IN ITS ADVANCE UPON 

AYBONITO 

THE OCCUPATION OF MAYAGUEZ 

JULES CAMBON 

PUERTA DE ESPANA, FROM THE CHURCH OF SANTO 

DOMINGO 

MOUTH OF THE PASIG RIVER, FROM THE CHURCH OF 

SANTO DOMINGO 

THE CATHEDRAL, MANILA 

ESCOLLA, MANILA 

THE PEACE COMMISSION 

ix 



icing p. I92 

194 
196 
200 
202 
204 
206 
20S 
2IO 
212 
214 
2l6 

218 



222 
224 
226 

228 

230 
232 

234 
266 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 



CHAPTER I 
THE UNSETTLED QUESTION 

Three hundred and fifty years ago the empire of 
Charles V circled the globe, and was the greatest mili- 
tary and political power among civilized men. Of that 
mighty fabric, the year 1898 has witnessed the unla- 
mented end. We of to-day have thus beheld the closing 
scene of one of the great dramas of history. The colo- 
nies planted in America by the English and the Dutch 
have risen to be a great nationj and that nation has fin- \ 
ished the work begun by the followers of William of 
Orange, when, amid'the dikes of Holland and upon the 
stormy waters of the English Channel, they struck at 
the power of Philip II even in its pitch of pride. Such 
events as these are not accidents, nor are they things 
of yesterday. The final expulsion of Spain from the 
Americans and from the Philippines p the fit conclusion 
of the long strife between the people who stood for civil 
and religious freedom, and those who stood for bigotry 
and tyranny as hideous in their action as any which - 
have ever cursed humanity. The work has been a long 
one, but Spain at last is confined practically to her 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

peninsula, where her people can do as they please with 
each other, but whence they can trouble the world no 
more. Spain has ceased to rule; her once vast empire 
has gone, because she has proved herself unfit to gov- 
ern, and for the unfit among nations there is no pity in 
the relentless world-forces which shape the destinies of 
mankind. 

The irrepressible conflict between Spain on the one 
side and England and Holland on the other, after the 
former had been crippled in Europe, was transferred 
from the Old World to the New. They seemed at first 
very remote from each other in the vast regions of the 
American continents, but nevertheless the two opposing 
forces, the two irrevocably hostile systems, were always 
drawing steadily together, with the certainty that when 
they met one of them must go down before the other. 
The Seven Years' War drove France from eastern 
North America, and fixed forever the fate of that re- 
gion. It was to be English, not French : 

The lilies withered where the lion trod. 

The expulsion of France not only removed the long 
standing northern peril to the English colonies, but 
swept away the last barrier between them and Spain. 
In the American Revolution, France, seeking her re- 
venge for the conquests of Pitt, forced Spain to become 
her ally against England ; but Spain had no love for the 
rebellious colonists. A treacherous, nominal friend, she 
tried to wrest advantage from their weakness, and to 
secure to herself in final possession the Mississippi val- 
ley and the great Northwest. Failing in this, she 
sought, after American independence had been won, by 



THE UNSETTLED QUESTION 

false and insolent diplomacy and by corrupting in- 
trigues among the Western settlers, to check the Amer- 
ican advance across the continent. It was all in vain. 
Through woodland and savanna, over mountain and 
stream, came the steady tramp of the American pioneer. 
He was an adventurer, but he was also a settler, and 
what he took he held. He carried a rifle in one hand, 
he bore an axe in the other, and where he camped he 
made a clearing and built a home. The two inevitable 
antagonists were nearing each other at last, for they 
were face to face now all along the western and south- 
ern borders of the United States. The time had come 
for one to stop, or for the other to give way. But 
there was no stopping possible to the Americans, 
and through the medium of French ownership the 
Louisiana purchase was made, the Mississippi be- 
came a river of the United States, and their pos- 
sessions were stretched across the continent even to the 
slopes of the Rocky Mountains. Still not content, the 
Americans pressed upon the southern boundary until, 
in 1 8 19, they forced Spain, in order to avoid war, to 
sell them Florida and the northern coast of the Gulf 
of Mexico as far as Louisiana. Meantime, inspired by 
the example of the United States in rejecting foreign 
dominion, and borne forward by the great democratic 
movement which, originating in America, had swept 
over Europe, the Spanish colonies rose in arms and 
drove Spain from Central and South America. 

A few years passed by, and then the restless Amer- 
ican advance pressed on into Texas, took it from Mex- 
ico, and a territory larger than any European state ex- 
cept Russia was added to the United States. Still the 

3 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

American march went on, and then war came with 
Mexico, and another vast region, stretching from Ore- 
gon to Arizona, became an American possession. All 
the lands of North America which had once called 
Spain master, which Cortez and De Soto, Ponce de 
Leon and Coronado, had bestowed upon the Spanish 
crown, had passed from the hands of the men who 
could not use them into those of the men who could. 
The expulsion of Spain from the Antilles is merely the 
last and final step of the inexorable movement in which 
the United States has been engaged for nearly a cen- 
tury. By influence and example, or more directly by 
arms and by the pressure of ever-advancing settle- 
ments, the United States drove Spain from all her con- 
tinental possessions in the Western Hemisphere, until 
nothing was left to the successors of Charles and Philip 
but Cuba and Puerto Rico. 

How did it happen that this great movement, at once 
racial, political, and economic, governed as it was by 
forces which rule men even in their own despite — how 
did it happen to stop when it came to the ocean's edge? 
The movement against Spain was at once natural and 
organic, while the pause on the sea-coast was artificial 
and in contravention of the laws of political evolution in 
the Americas. The conditions in Cuba and Puerto Rico 
did not differ from those which had gone down in ruin 
wherever the flag of Spain waved upon the mainland. 
The Cubans desired freedom, and Bolivar would fain 
have gone to their aid. Mexico and Colombia, in 1825, 
planned to invade the island, and at that time invasion 
was sure to be successful. What power stayed the on- 
coming tide which had swept over a continent? Not 

4 



THE UNSETTLED QUESTION 

Cuban loyalty, for the expression "Faithful Cuba" was 
a lie from the beginning, like many other Spanish state- 
ments. The power which prevented the liberation of 
Cuba was the United States; and more than seventy 
years later this republic has had to fight a war because 
at the appointed time she set herself against her own 
teachings, and brought to a halt the movement she had 
herself started to free the New World from the oppres- 
sion of the Old. The United States held back Mexico 
and Colombia and Bolivar, used her influence at home 
and abroad to that end, and, in the opinion of contem- 
porary mankind, succeeded, according to her desires, in 
keeping Cuba under the dominion of Spain. 

The reason for this action on the part of the United 
States is worse than the fact itself. The Latin mind is 
severely logical in politics, which accounts in a measure 
for its many failures in establishing and managing free 
governments. Being of this cast of mind, the Spanish- 
American states, when they rose to free themselves 
from Spain, also freed their own slaves, and in this in- 
stance they were not only logical, but right. The peo- 
ple of the United States, on the other hand, were at 
once illogical and wrong, for they held just then that 
white men should be free and black men slaves. So 
they regarded with great disfavor this highly logical 
outcome of South-American independence, and from 
this cause Southern hostility brought the Panama Con- 
gress, fraught with many high hopes of American 
solidarity, to naught. The sinister influence of slavery 
led the United States to hold Cuba under the yoke of 
Spain, because free negroes were not to be permitted to 
exist upon an island so near their Atlantic seaboard. It 

5 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

was a cruel policy which fastened upon Cuba slavery to 
Spain as well as the slavery of black men to white, 
when both might have been swept away without cost to 
America. Those who are curious in the doctrine of 
compensations can find here a fresh example. Lincoln, 
in the second inaugural, declared once for all that our 
awful Civil War was the price we paid for the sin of 
slavery; and the war of 1898 was the price paid at last, 
as such debts always are paid by nations, for having 
kept Cuba in bondage at the dictates of our own slave 
power. 

The United States had thus undertaken to stop the 
movement for the liberation of Spanish colonies at the 
point selected by itself, and had deliberately entered 
upon the policy of maintaining Spanish rule in its own 
neighborhood. This policy meant the assumption of a 
heavy responsibility, as well as a continuous effort to 
put to rest an unsettled question, by asserting stoutly, 
and in defiance of facts, that it really was settled if peo- 
ple would only agree pleasantly to think so. But in 
this, as in all like cases, the effort was vain. Cuba was 
held under Spanish rule, and the question which had 
received the wrong answer began almost at once to 
make itself heard, after the awkward fashion of ques- 
tions which men pretend to have disposed of, but which 
are still restlessly seeking the right and final answer, 
and, without respect for policies or vested interests, 
keep knocking and crying at the door. Some American 
statesmen saw that there was a real question in Cuba 
demanding a real settlement, and declared, like John 
Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, that Cuba must be an- 
nexed, and that it would become indispensable to the 

6 



THE UNSETTLED QUESTION 

integrity of the Union. Even then did Adams also as- 
sert that the transfer of Cuba to some other power was 
a danger obtruding itself upon our councils. But the 
plan of leaving the island with Spain prevailed. Cuba 
had come near to both independence and annexation, 
but both gave way before the slave power, and for 
twenty years the policy of 1825 had sway. As late as 
1843, indeed, Webster said that negro emancipation in 
Cuba would strike a death-blow to slavery in the United 
States, thus giving cynically and frankly the bad and 
true reason for the policy steadily pressed since 1825. 
Never at rest, however, the slave power itself, a few 
years after Webster's lucid definition of its Cuban pol- 
icy, changed its own attitude completely. From desir- 
ing to keep Cuba in the hands of Spain, in order that 
the Cuban negroes might remain slaves, it passed, as 
dangers thickened round it at home, to the determina- 
tion to secure Cuba, in order that more slave territory 
might be added to the United States. Hence a con- 
tinuous effort to get the island by annexation, and vari- 
ous projects, all fallen into more or less oblivion now, 
to bring that result about, were devised by American 
slaveholders and their allies. Their schemes ranged 
from Buchanan's offer to purchase, rejected with deep 
scorn by Spain the intelligent, to the Ostend Manifesto 
— a barefaced argument for conquest — and included at- 
tempts to bring about Cuban independence by exciting 
insurrections and landing filibustering expeditions. 
But the time was fast drawing near, even while the 
American slaveholders were thus seeking new territory, 
when the slave power would be thinking not of exten- 
sion, but of existence. In 1861 American slavery in- 

7 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

voked the ordeal of battle, and perished utterly. With 
it died its political power, and the policies, foreign and 
domestic, which it had so long imposed upon the United 
States. But slavery also left a number of debts to 
humanity which were not buried with it, but which re- 
quired payment at the hands of the American people, 
who had been responsible for slavery living, and could 
not avoid settling its debts when it was dead. Among 
these debts was Cuba. Nobody had thought of it much 
since the Ostend Manifesto. If anybody chanced to 
remember it during or after the Civil War, the thought 
probably was that Cuba at last was well out of the way, 
together with the slave power which had been forever 
meddling with it, and talking about it, and casting 
covetous eyes upon its rich lands and forests. 

None the less, although the slave power of America 
had undertaken to fix the destiny of Cuba, and, spurred 
by its own sense of weakness to eternal restlessness, had 
kept the question constantly alive, it was not the ques- 
tion itself. Cuba and Spain and Spanish oppression 
remained, even if American slavery was dead. More- 
over, the slaveholders who had caused the United 
States to force Cuba back under Spanish rule had gone 
a step beyond this, and had warned off all other na- 
tions. In a word, the United States had become re- 
sponsible for Cuba, and had drawn a ring-fence around 
the island to exclude all other nations. In this way we 
undertook and sought to maintain a wrong settlement 
of a great question, and wrong settlements are equiv- 
alent to none at all. So, after the inconsiderate fashion 
of unsettled problems, the Cuban question would not 
stay quiet. The slave power kept stirring it ; and when 

8 



THE UNSETTLED QUESTION 

the slave power perished and men thought it was all 
over, the ancienc wrong reared its head again, and 
turning to the power responsible for its existence, de- 
manded redress. 

This time the movement came from the island itself. 
Cuba, although uninvaded, had not been untouched by 
the revolutionary movement in the first quarter of the 
century. Societies were formed to support Bolivar and 
the Mexicans; and after the movement was checked, 
Spain, acting in her usual fashion, instead of ignoring 
the indications of revolutionary sympathy, proceeded 
to give the Captain-General the powers of the gov- 
ernors of besieged towns, or, in other words, put the 
whole island under martial law. With this piece of 
sweeping and needless tyranny, resistance to Spain be- 
gan in Cuba, and has continued at intervals to the pres- 
ent day, each successive outbreak becoming more for- 
midable and more desperate than the one which pre- 
ceded it. 

The first rising came at once. In 1826, only a year 
after the intervention of the United States, an insur- 
rection broke out, and its two chiefs were executed. 
Soon after came another, known as the "Conspiracy of 
the Black Eagle," which was also harshly repressed, and 
those engaged in it were imprisoned, banished, or exe- 
cuted. In 1837 the representatives of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico were excluded from the Cortes, on the ground 
that the colonies were to be governed by special law. 
In 1850 and 185 1 occurred an expedition for the libera- 
tion of Cuba, and the death of its leader, Narciso 
Lopez. There were also expeditions under General 
Quitman and others, and in 1855 Ramon Pinto was put 

9 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

to death, and many other patriots banished. These last 
raids were part of the slaveholders' movement intend- 
ed to bring about the independence of the island, and 
subsequent annexation to the United States, but they 
failed like their predecessors. After this, for a num- 
ber of years, the Cubans attempted by peaceful methods 
to secure from the government at Madrid some relief 
from the oppression which weighed upon them, and 
some redress for their many wrongs. All their efforts 
came to naught, and such changes as were made were 
for the worse rather than for the better. 

The result of all this was that in 1869 a revolution 
broke out under the leadership of Carlos Manuel de 
Cespedes, and the United States was aroused to the 
fact that the Cuban question was as unsettled as ever. 
The existence of slavery in Cuba dulled the edge of 
American sympathy, for the bitterness of our own con- 
flict was still upon us. Still there was much interest in 
the United States, and a strong feeling in behalf of 
men struggling for freedom. The old American senti- 
ment against the domination of Europe in the New 
World, which slavery for its own objects had for a time 
suppressed, woke again and found active and ardent 
expression. The revolutionists, it is true, did not suc- 
ceed in getting beyond the eastern part of the island, 
but they were successful in many engagements, they 
crippled still further the already broken power of Spain, 
and they could not be put dovvn by force of arms. At 
first the United States held carefully aloof ; but the war 
went on ; Spain was in the throes of revolution at home ; 
and the administration of President Grant, however re- 
luctant, was compelled to take notice of the fire burning 



v $'" 



w 




#ti Jk 



THE UNSETTLED QUESTION 

at our very doors. Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, re- 
verted to the old idea of purchase, and informally 
brought the proposition to the attention of the Spanish 
government. General Prim, the one very able man 
Spain has produced in recent times, saw at once the 
sense and advantage of this solution, but the scheme 
got noised about prematurely, there was an outbreak 
of silly passion which the Spaniards call pride, and 
Prim was obliged to declare vehemently against any 
alienation of the national territory. Then in 1873 came 
what was certain to come sooner or later, an outrage by 
Spain against the United States. The Virgiuius, a 
vessel of American register, was captured on the high 
seas, taken to a Cuban port, and some fifty of her of- 
ficers and crew, Americans for the most part, summa- 
rily shot. The wrath of the American people flamed 
out ; President Grant could have had war and ended 
everything in a moment; but the forces which cared 
nothing for humanity and a great deal for an undis- 
turbed money market prevailed. The register of the 
Virginius was opportunely proved to be fraudulent, we 
took money for our dead, and peace was preserved. 
The unsettled question had come very near a solution, 
and had shown, to all who cared to think, that Spanish 
tyranny was capable of dangerous crimes against others 
than its own subjects. 

Still the war dragged on. It was very annoying, 
especially to those who were afraid of being disturbed 
in their daily business, and the administration was 
forced to intimate, in 1875, that if Spain did not stop 
the war, the intervention of other powers might be- 
come necessary. The hint was not without effect, and, 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

coupled with Spain's increasing exhaustion, hastened 
the end. In two years more, after the insurrection had 
lasted ten years, peace was made with the insurgents, 
but only by a treaty in which Martinez Campos, in the 
name of Spain, promised to the Cubans certain reforms 
for which they had taken up arms. In consideration of 
these reforms the insurgents were to abandon their 
right for independence, lay down their arms, and re- 
ceive a complete amnesty. The insurgents kept their 
word. They laid down their arms and abandoned their 
struggle for independence. Spain unhesitatingly vio- 
lated the agreement. With a cynical disregard of good 
faith, her promise of amnesty was only partially kept, 
and she imprisoned or executed many who had been 
engaged in the insurgent cause, while the promised re- 
forms were either totally neglected or carried out by 
some mockery which had neither reality nor value. 
The result of this treachery, of the bloodshed which ac- 
companied it, and of the increased abuses in govern- 
ment which followed, was that the Cubans again pre- 
pared for revolt, and in February, 1895, Jose Marti 
landed in eastern Cuba and another revolution broke 
out. The unsettled question had again appeared, still 
demanding the right answer. 

There is no need to trace here the history of this last 
insurrection. The insurgents formed a government, 
carried on a vigorous guerrilla warfare, swept over the 
island from Santiago to the outskirts of Havana and 
into Pinar del Rio, and soon held sway over most of 
the provinces outside the towns. They fought better, 
and were better led, by partisan chiefs like Maceo and 
Garcia, than ever before. But the head and front of the 



THE UNSETTLED QUESTION 

Rebellion was Maximo Gomez, a man of marked ability 
and singular tenacity of purpose. His plan was to re- 
fuse all compromises, to distribute his followers in de- 
tached bands, to fight no pitched battles, but incessant 
skirmishes, to ravage the country, destroy the possibil- 
ity of revenue, and win in the end either through the 
financial exhaustion of Spain or by the intervention of 
the United States, one of which results he believed must 
come if he could only hold on long enough. His wis- 
dom, persistence, and courage have all been justified, 
for the results have come as he expected, and the rest 
of the story is to be found in the course of events in the 
United States. 

When the insurrection of 1895 broke out it excited, 
at first, but a languid interest among the people of the 
United States, who are only too well accustomed to 
revolutions in Spanish-American countries. It soon 
was apparent, however, that this was not an ordinary 
South- American revolution, that the Cubans were fight- 
ing the old fight of America to be free from Europe, 
that they were in desperate earnest, would accept no 
compromises, and would hold on to the bitter end. 
Then, too, a few months sufficed to show that this time 
the Cubans were well led, that their forces were united, 
that they were not torn with factional strife, and that 
they were pursuing an intelligent and well-considered 
plan. Interest in the United States began to awaken, 
and grew rapidly as the success of the Cuban arms be- 
came manifest. In the Ten Years' War the insurrection 
never spread beyond the hill country of the extreme 
east. Now, in six months, the province of Santiago, 
except for the seaports, had fallen into Cuban control, 

13 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

and the Cuban forces marched westward, taking pos- 
session of all the rural districts as far as Havana. 

This brave fight for liberty and against Spain pres- 
ently aroused the sympathy of the American people, 
which showed itself in the newspaper press and in pub- 
lic meetings, always with gathering strength. When 
Congress met, the popular sentiment sought expression 
in both branches. A minority desired the immediate 
recognition of Cuban independence, a large number 
wished to recognize belligerency, an overwhelming ma- 
jority wanted to do something, while the naturally con- 
servative elements were led by a few determined men 
who were opposed to any interference of the remotest 
kind, and a few of whom, even if they did not openly 
avow it, were bent Oh leaving Spain a free hand in the 
island. Out of this confusion came, as might have been 
expected, a compromise, in which the men in the small 
minority, who knew just what they wanted, got the 
substance, and the large, divided, and undecided ma- 
jority, who vaguelv desired "to do something for 
Cuba," obtained nothing but a collection of sympathetic 
words. The compromise took the form of a concurrent 
resolution, which, after much debate, delay, and con- 
ference, finally passed both Houses. 

This resolution merely declared that a state of war 
existed in Cuba, that the United States would observe 
strict neutrality, and that the President should offer the 
good offices of the United States with the Spanish gov- 
ernment to secure the recognition of the independence 
of the island. As the resolution was concurrent, it did 
not require the President's assent, and was nothing but 
an expression of the opinion of Congress. It therefore 

14 



THE UNSETTLED QUESTION 

had little weight with Mr. Cleveland, and none at all 
with Spain. Whatever was done by the administra- 
tion in offering our good offices to secure the recogni- 
tion of Cuban independence, there was no result, and 
the only part of the resolution which was scrupulously 
carried out was in observing neutrality, which was done 
by the President with a severity that bore heavily upon 
the Cuban side alone. 

The administration was in fact opposed to any inter- 
ference in Cuba, and the action of Congress left it free 
to follow its policy of holding rigidly aloof. Spain re- 
lied with entire confidence on the friendly attitude of 
Mr. Cleveland, and this confidence was not misplaced. 
But the unsettled question could not be put down in 
this fashion, or pushed into a corner. It kept on pro- 
claiming its ugly existence. The war did not die out, 
as the opponents of Cuba confidently predicted that it 
would, in the course of a month. On the contrary, it 
continued ; the insurgents were successful in their plan 
of campaign; they kept gaining ground and getting a 
more and more complete control of the interior of the 
island. On July 13, 1895, the battle of Bayamo was 
fought — the only considerable action of the war, for 
Gomez avoided steadily all stricken fields. At Bayamo, 
however, they won a decisive victory, and Martinez 
Campos, who barely escaped, was forced to resign, and 
was recalled, six months later. The retirement of 
Martinez Campos was an important advantage to the 
Cuban cause, for he was the wisest and most humane 
of the Spanish Captain-Generals. He had settled the 
last revolt, and by diplomacy and good management 
there was always danger that he would divide the iu- 

J 5 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

surgents again and bring about another compromise. 
He was, however, neither successful enough nor suf- 
ficiently ferocious to satisfy Spain, and hence his re- 
moval. The man who succeeded him, if, as events 
proved, equally unsuccessful in war, left nothing to be 
desired in the way of ferocity. Valeriano Weyler came 
to Cuba February 10, 1896, with an evil reputation for 
cruelty and corruption earned in the Philippines and 
in the suppression of the disorders at Barcelona, a repu- 
tation which he not only maintained, but enhanced in his 
new government. His military movements were farci- 
cal, consisting in marching columns out here and there 
from garrisoned posts, having an ineffective brush with 
the Cubans, and then and there withdrawing the troops, 
with as little effect as the proverbial King of France 
who marched up the hill. The insurgents continued 
their operations without serious check; they broke 
through the trochas, swarmed into Pinar del Rio, 
wandered at will about the country, and carried their 
raids even into the suburbs of Havana. Weyler, who 
seems never to have exposed himself to fire, but to have 
confined his operations in the field to building more 
trochas, made his few military progresses by sea, and 
preferred to stay in Havana, where he could amass a 
fortune by blackmailing the business interests, and 
levying heavy tribute on all the money appropriated to 
public uses by the bankrupt and broken treasury of 
Spain. If, however, Weyler was ineffective as a com- 
mander in the field and no lover of battle, he showed 
that he was energy itself in carrying out a campaign 
of another kind, which was intended to destroy the peo- 
ple of the island, and which had the great merit of be- 

16 




SENOR CAN'OVAS DEL CASTILLO 
Late Prime Minister of Spain 



THE UNSETTLED QUESTION 

ing attended with no risk to the person of the Captain- 
General. A large portion of the Cuban population in 
the country were peasants taking no part in the war, 
and known as "pacificos." They were quiet people, as 
a rule, and gave no cause for offence, but it was well 
known that their sympathies were with the insurgents, 
and it was believed that they furnished both supplies 
and recruits to the rebel forces. Unable to suppress or 
defeat the armed insurgents, the Spanish government 
characteristically determined to destroy these helpless 
"pacificos." Accordingly an edict, suggested apparent- 
ly by Weyler, was issued on October 21, 1896, which 
applied to Pinar del Rio, and was afterwards extended 
to ail the island, and which ordered the army to con- 
centrate all the pacificos, practically all the rural popu- 
lation, in the garrisoned towns. These wretched peo- 
ple were to be driven in this way from their little farms, 
which were their only means of support, and herded in 
the towns and in the suburbs of Havana, where they 
had nothing before them but starvation, or massacre at 
the hands 'of Spanish soldiers and guerrillas. Whether 
the idea of this infamous order originated in Havana 
or Madrid is not of much consequence. The Queen- 
Regent, for whom some persons feel great sympathy, 
because she is an intelligent woman and the mother of a 
little boy, set her hand to the decree which sent thou- 
sands of women and children to a lingering death, and 
the whole government of Spain is just as responsible 
for all the ensuing atrocities as Weyler, who issued the 
concentration edict, and carried it out with pitiless thor- 
oughness and genuine pleasure in the task. 

By March, 1896, Spain had sent 121,000 soldiers to 
2 17 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

the island, which gave her, at that time with the forces 
already in Cuba, 150,000 men. Her debt was piling up 
with frightful rapidity; the insurgent policy of prevent- 
ing the grinding of the sugar-cane was largely success- 
ful, had paralyzed business, and wellnigh extinguished 
the revenues. It was apparent to all but the most prej- 
udiced that even if the insurgents could not drive the 
Spaniards from Cuba, the island was lost to Spain. 
With 200,000 soldiers in 1897 Spain had utterly and 
miserably failed to put down the rebels, who never had 
in arms, in all parts of the island, over 35,000 men. The 
Spanish government could give protection neither to 
its own citizens nor to those of foreign nations, nor 
could it even offer security to business, agriculture, or 
property. So Spain, impotent and broken, but as sav- 
age and cruel as she had ever been in her most pros- 
perous days, turned deliberately from the armed men 
she could not overcome to the work of starving to death 
the unarmed people, old and young, men and women, 
whom she could surely reach. 

These facts began to grow very clear to the people 
of the United States in the spring of 1896, and the two 
great political parties, at their national conventions, 
passed resolutions of strong sympathy with Cuba, and 
demanded action. Even the excitement of the most 
bitterly fought election ever known in the United 
States could not wholly shut out Cuba, and when the 
election was over, the Cuban question came to the front 
again as soon as Congress met. Even the all-absorb- 
ing financial question could neither obscure nor hide it. 
There it was again, under discussion, and the reason 
for its reappearance was simply that the feeling of the 



THE UNSETTLED QUESTION 

American people was growing constantly keener and 
stronger, and forced the subject forward in Congress. 
Among those who sympathized with Cuba there was 
a general belief that it was not merely right to recog- 
nize the independence of the island, but that such ac- 
tion would enable the insurgents to raise money, fly the 
flag of the republic on ships of war, and open ports, 
and that they would then secure their independence 
without involving the United States in war with Spain. 
Subsequent events have shown that even recognition 
would not probably have strengthened the insurgents to 
such a degree that they could drive out the Spaniards. 
But it is equally clear now that recognition was the 
only chance of saving the United States from ultimate 
intervention and war. A majority of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations holding this opinion, Sen- 
ator Cameron reported from that committee on De- 
cember 21, 1896, a brief resolution recognizing the Re- 
public of Cuba, and setting forth the reasons for doing 
so in a very able and elaborate report. 

This resolution of the Foreign Relations Committee 
caused much excitement. Stocks fell, and the financial 
interests of the great Eastern cities rose in wrathful 
opposition. They declared, without any reservation, 
that war "would unsettle values" — a horrid possibility 
not to be contemplated with calmness by any right- 
thinking man. The error of the financial interests was 
in thinking that war would "unsettle values." That 
which "unsettled values" was the Cuban question, and 
so long as that remained unsettled, "values" would fol- 
low suit. There was but one way to remove this dis- 
turbing element, and that was for the United States to 

19 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

bring the Cuban War to an end. So long as it was per- 
mitted to go on, the damaging uncertainty and suspense 
were sure to continue, and sooner or later, out of the 
fighting in Cuba and the agitation in the United States, 
would come the overt act which would bring the sword 
from its scabbard. Nevertheless, financial interests had 
their way. Mr. Olney announced, in an interview in 
the Washington Star, that no attention would be paid 
to the joint resolution even if it passed both Houses 
over the veto, because the right of recognition pertained 
solely to the Executive, and the resolution would only 
be the opinion of certain eminent gentlemen. This was 
quite conclusive at the moment in regard to the Cuban 
war, for nothing can be plainer than that under our 
system of government no serious measures can be wise- 
ly undertaken, or indeed undertaken at all, against a 
foreign nation unless the Executive and Congress act 
together. This was entirely obvious to the Foreign Re- 
lations Committee of the Senate. It was doubtful if 
they could carry the resolution for recognition of the 
Cuban Republic through the Senate, and quite certain 
that it would be useless if they did. So the resolution 
slumbered on the calendar and was never called up, the 
wise financial interests prevailed, Cuban independence 
was not to be recognized, and we were to go on pre- 
tending that the war was not there, and that we had 
answered the unsettled question, when we really had 
simply turned our heads aside and refused to look. 

And then when the troublesome matter had been so 
nicely laid to sleep, the result followed which is usual 
when Congressmen and Presidents and nations are try- 
ing to make shams pass for realities. Only a few weeks 



THE UNSETTLED QUESTION 

went by, and the Cuban question was up again. It 
could not be kept out of the newspapers, or the minds 
of men, or the debates in Congress. We were engaged 
in enforcing the neutrality laws and preventing fili- 
bustering expeditions. If an expedition got out of our 
ports it was a success in almost every instance, for the 
Spanish were so inefficient that they could hardly ever 
prevent a landing, and the upshot was that the United 
States did the main work in checking the insurgents. 
In other words, the enforcement of neutrality meant in 
practice our being the ally of Spain. This fact came 
gradually into public view and gained general appre- 
ciation, with a consequent increase of feeling among 
the American people, who, horrified by the reports of 
the starvation of the "reconcentrados," did not at all 
relish being made even indirect participants in that 
odious crime against humanity. A still deeper source 
of irritation was in the treatment accorded to Amer- 
icans by the Spaniards. Cases were continually arising 
in which American citizens were seized, thrown into 
prison, kept in solitary confinement, and subjected to 
every kind of cruelty, in total disregard of both treaty 
and international rights. So long as these unfortunate 
men were of Cuban birth and had Spanish names, the 
opponents of Cuba felt that they had in these facts a 
complete answer, and that the additional fact that they 
held the naturalization papers of the United States 
could be entirely disregarded. Still the cases kept on 
coming to the surface, gave rise to sharp debates in 
Congress, and stimulated popular feeling. The Span- 
iards, however, emboldened by our government's ap- 
parent indifference to the rights and the protection of 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

American citizens, soon ceased to confine their out- 
rages to naturalized citizens of Cuban extraction, and 
proceeded to extend the same treatment to men whose 
names were as American as their birth-place. The ad- 
ministration could not plead ignorance of the situation, 
for General Lee, who had taken charge of the Consul- 
General's office in Havana on June 3, 1896, informed 
the State Department three weeks after his arrival that 
while the insurgents could not drive the Spaniards 
from the island, it was equally impossible for Spain to 
subdue the insurrection. The President therefore knew 
that without decided measures on our part there was 
nothing possible in Cuba but bloodshed, pillage, the 
wholesale destruction of life and property, and the 
gradual extermination of the inhabitants by starvation 
and massacre, but he remained entirely unmoved in his 
determination not to interfere even to the extent of 
putting pressure on Spain. As the winter of 1896-7 
wore away it also became generally understood that 
General Lee, whose good sense and firm courage had 
steadily won the confidence of the country, was not sus- 
tained by the administration as he should have been in 
some of the cases of American prisoners. The manner 
in which the consular reports were withheld, or only 
grudgingly or partially given out, augmented the pop- 
ular distrust, for the secrecy observed convinced every 
one that the publication of the official truth was feared 
by those who wished to hold aloof from Cuba and to 
pretend that there was no question there demanding 
settlement. The American people are justly sensitive 
in regard to the protection of American citizens, and 
the imprisonment of Scott, the murder of Ruiz, and 




GENERAL FITZHUGH LEE 
United States Consul-General in Havana 



THE UNSETTLED QUESTION 

the treatment of the Competitor prisoners, together 
with many other cases, especially when there were added 
to them the ill-concealed differences between the ad- 
ministration and General Lee, stirred popular feeling 
and excited popular anger to a high degree. The situ- 
ation growing out of the Spanish treatment of Amer- 
icans was fast bringing on a crisis which threatened 
to prove not only acute, but decisive. 

Just at this moment, when the unrighted wrong 
seemed about to force the inevitable decision, Mr. 
Cleveland went out of office, and with the interest 
awakened by a new administration, and the hopes of a 
changed policy, the immediate excitement subsided, and 
men who realized that however absorbing the tariff 
might be, the real and great question lay south of Flor- 
ida, were content to wait and give to the new authority 
every possible opportunity and assistance. The Repub- 
lican party, which now returned to power, had taken 
very strong ground at its convention in regard to Cuba, 
asserting practically that it would charge itself with the 
duty of compelling a final settlement of the question. 
President McKinley not only sympathized with the 
declaration of his party, but he felt profoundly the 
gravity of the Cuban situation, and cherished a deep 
desire to meet it successfully and conclusively. The 
question had been left in such an acute state, and so 
near to extreme action, by neglect of the cases of Amer- 
ican prisoners, that it was plain that something must 
be done at once or the new administration would find 
itself plunged into hostilities before it had fairly taken 
the reins of power into its hands. The crucial point 
was the American prisoners, and President McKinley, 

2 3 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

less sensitive than his predecessor in regard to injuring 
the feelings of Spain, immediately demanded prompt 
release and redress in every case. His tone was so 
firm that the Spaniards at once gave way, and by the 
end of April every American prisoner had been re- 
leased. With the removal of the immediate and crying 
evil the situation grew quieter, the crisis passed by, and 
the impending peril of war rolled back again into the 
distance. The cause of war would not come from 
Spanish outrages upon American citizens. So much 
was fixed by the President's decided action. But the 
question was still there, still moving and pressing, nev- 
er at rest. And just when every one who was against 
doing anything was saying again contentedly that all 
was nicely over, and that the sham was a reality, and 
that there was no Cuban question, out the question 
would break in a new quarter. May 20, 1897, the Sen- 
ate, without division, passed a joint resolution recog- 
nizing Cuban belligerency. This resolution, taking its 
usual course, had scarcely had time to reach the House 
and be sent by the Speaker to slumber in the Commit- 
tee on Foreign Affairs, because there was not and ought 
not to be a Cuban question, when in came a message 
from the President on that very subject. It appeared 
oddly enough, that war was still going on, and that 
under the reconcentration system American citizens, as 
well as natives of the island, were being starved to death 
in Cuba. This the President, thoroughly informed 
by the consular reports, thought that he could not 
permit, and he therefore asked Congress for $50,000 
to purchase and send supplies to these Americans who 
were being put to death by the methods of war em- 

24 




GENERAL STEWART I. WOODFORD 

United States Minister to Spain 



THE UNSETTLED QUESTION 

ployed by Spain. Congress gave the money at once, 
and the act was approved May 24, 1897. We de- 
manded and received the assent of Spain, and there- 
upon ships were chartered and food sent to all the 
American consuls, in order to feed starving Americans. 
The Americans were fed, and many others not Ameri- 
cans also, and the United States by this action had at 
last interfered in Cuba; for no more complete act of 
intervention than this, which tended to cripple the mili- 
tary measures and check the starvation campaign of 
the Spaniards, could be imagined. It was not admitted, 
certainly not generally realized, that the United States 
had finally broken from the old policy of holding aloof, 
and had entered on the new policy of intervention in 
Cuba; but, nevertheless, the true answer to the unset- 
tled question was beginning to draw visibly nearer. 

Meantime the President, after careful consideration, 
selected General Stewart L. Woodford for minister 
to Spain — the most important diplomatic post to be 
filled at this juncture. No one could have been chosen 
who was more conciliatory than General Woodford, 
or more desirous to obtain a peaceful solution of the 
ever-increasing differences with Spain. With such a 
minister at Madrid it was certain that no effort would 
be spared to soothe Spain and bring about an agree- 
ment calculated to gratify everybody, if such a thing 
were possible under the circumstances, which seemed 
unlikely, for it looked as if the question had gone be- 
yond the stage when it could be dealt with by soft and 
gentle handling. Nevertheless, until the new adminis- 
tration and the new President, through the freshly ap- 
pointed minister, could take up the thread of the nego- 

25 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

tiations with Spain, there came a pause in the con- 
troversy between the two nations. There was no 
pause in Cuba, no pause in starving to death the misera- 
ble "reconcentrados/' or in the desolating raids of both 
combatants, which were fast making the island a desert 
waste. There was no pause in the agitation in the 
United States, or in the growth of the popular feeling 
about Cuba and the horrid scenes there existent. The 
unsettled question kept moving on, even though ne- 
gotiations paused. Then came another delay, for be- 
fore General Woodford reached Spain on September 
i, Senor Canovas, the Prime Minister, was murdered, 
on Sunday, August 8, 1897, by an Italian anarchist. 
There was much alarm, a ministerial crisis, and then 
Senor Sagasta came in and formed a Liberal ministry. 
At last General Woodford was able to open his nego- 
tiations, and the demands of the United States were 
seriously pressed. We asked for the recall of Weyler, 
and, above all, for the revocation of the reconcentration 
edict. The new ministry made haste to comply in ap- 
pearance with every request, and to promise every- 
thing we demanded. Then they asked in turn that we 
should give them opportunity to try autonomy in Cuba 
— another wrong answer to the old question, absolutely 
useless, and quite gone by in the autumn of 1897. But 
after all the ostensible compliance of the Sagasta min- 
istry with our requests, the opportunity to try auton- 
omy could not well be refused. The trouble was that, 
with the exception of the recall of Weyler, on October 
9, 1897, about which no deception or postponement 
was possible, not one of these Spanish promises was 
worth the paper upon which it was written. It was all 

26 




SESOR III PI V DE LOME 
Spanish Minister to the United States 



THE UNSETTLED QUESTION 

entirely characteristic of Spanish diplomacy, much 
vaunted by Spaniards, and much admired in Europe, 
and consisted simply of lying, evading, and making 
promises which there was no intention of performing. 
As the representatives of the United States tried to tell 
the truth, they laid themselves open to much European 
criticism for their rude diplomacy, and for not under- 
standing the refined methods of older nations ; but they 
had one grave disadvantage in a failure to realize that 
Spanish diplomacy consisted chiefly of falsehood, as it 
had done for some centuries, and that no faith could 
be put in anything they alleged or promised. 

Meantime all agitation in the United States was 
restrained on the ground that after the Spanish con- 
cessions we were bound to give them a reasonable time 
to try autonomy, which was an entirely just view if the 
concessions had been real and autonomy either honest 
or practical. But as the weeks passed by it became ap- 
parent that autonomy was neither practical nor gen- 
uine; the atrocities and starvation went on despite the 
withdrawal of Weyler and the coming of the less brutal 
Blanco, and both Congress and people again began to 
grow restless. 

The situation of the Americans in Havana also began 
to cause uneasiness, and there was so much disquiet 
that the administration very wisely determined to send 
a ship of war to that port. The battle-ship Maine was 
selected for this duty, and reached Havana on the 
morning of January 24, 1898. We were at peace with 
Spain, and we had an entire right to send a ship to 
any Cuban port. If it had been done, as it ought to 
have been done, at the beginning of the Cuban troubles, 

27 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

it would have excited no comment ; but at this late date 
in the war it assumed an importance which did not 
rightfully belong to such an accident. The Spanish 
minister, Senor Dupuy de Lome, blustered in private 
and talked about war, but being informed quietly and 
decidedly by Mr. Day that the ship was going in any 
event, he quieted down in public, and the Spanish 
cruiser Vizcaya came to New York to demonstrate 
that the presence of the Maine at Havana was only a 
friendly visit. The sending of the Maine was received by 
the country with a sense of relief, and the action of the 
President was universally approved. Public atten- 
tion, however, was soon distracted from this subject 
by an incident which in a flash revealed the utter worth- 
lessness of all the Spanish concessions and promises. 
A letter of Senor Dupuy de Lome, dated December 25, 
1897, and addressed to a friend, Senor Canalejas, had 
been stolen in Havana by some one in the Cuban in- 
terest, and sent to the Cuban Junta in New York, which 
gave it to the press on February 9, 1898. This letter 
contained a coarse and vulgar attack upon President 
McKinley, which led to the immediate resignation 
and recall of the writer, who had served Spain well and 
unscrupulously. But far more important in its wider 
bearings than this disclosure of the character of Du- 
puy de Lome was the fact that the letter revealed the 
utter hollowness of all the Spanish professions, and 
showed that the negotiations in regard to autonomy 
and commercial relations were only intended to amuse 
and deceive the United States. The effect of this rev- 
elation was just beginning to make itself felt when 
the American people were stunned by an event which 

28 



THE UNSETTLED QUESTION 

drove everything else from their minds. On the morn- 
ing of February 16 came the news that on the previous 
evening the battle-ship Maine had been blown up and 
totally destroyed in the harbor of Havana. The ex- 
plosion occurred under the forward part of the ship, 
and 264 men and two officers were killed. The overt 
act had come. This gigantic murder of sleeping men 
in the fancied security of a friendly harbor was the 
direct outcome and the perfect expression of Spanish 
rule, the appropriate action of a corrupt system strug- 
gling in its last agony. At last in very truth the un- 
settled question had come home to the United States, 
and it spoke this time in awful tones, which rang loud 
and could not be silenced. A wave of fierce wrath 
swept over the American people. But a word was 
needed, and war would have come then in response to 
this foul and treacherous act of war, for such in truth 
it was. But the words of Captain Sigsbee, the com- 
mander of the Maine, whose coolness, self-restraint, 
and high courage were beyond praise, asking, even in 
the midst of the slaughter, that judgment should be 
suspended, were heeded alike by government and 
people. 

Scarcely a word was said in either House or Senate, 
and for forty days the American people and the Amer- 
ican Congress waited in silence for the verdict of the 
board of naval officers who had been appointed to re- 
port on the destruction of the Maine. To those who 
understood the American people this grim silence, this 
stern self-control, were more threatening than any 
words of sorrow or of anger could possibly have been. 
Spain, rushing ignorantly, arrogantly, on her doom, 

29 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

understood nothing. A generous sympathy, a prompt 
offer to make every reparation, while she disclaimed 
all guilt, and she could have turned the current of feel- 
ing and gone far to save herself and her colonies. In- 
stead of that, with incredible stupidity and utter mean- 
ness of soul, she announced, before any one had even 
looked at the wreck, that the ship was blown up from 
the inside, owing to the carelessness of the American 
officers. Her ambassadors abroad reiterated this min- 
isterial falsehood, and, not content with that, insulted 
the brave men who had the Maine in charge, while 
official Spaniards everywhere insinuated or declared 
that lack of discipline was what blew up the battle- 
ship. There was much anger, mostly of the very silent 
sort, in the United States as these charges flew on 
wires and cables about the world ; but the American re- 
ply to them was not given until some months later on 
May i and July 3 when certain proofs were given of 
the discipline and quality of American sailors which 
even Spain could not overlook. Still the Spanish at- 
titude in regard to the Maine had one undoubted merit 
— it moved the unsettled question forward, and made a 
wrong answer more difficult than ever. 



CHAPTER II 
THE COMING OF WAR 

As the weary days went by after the destruction of 
the Maine, public feeling grew tenser every instant, and 
the waiting became more intolerable, until at last the 
report of the American board appeared, closely fol- 
lowed by that of the Spaniards, which told the lie 
agreed upon forty days before, and which they had not 
even taken the trouble to back up with any substantial 
evidence, or with more than a perfunctory examination 
of the wreck. No one heeded the Spanish report ; pub- 
lic men, of course, read it, but the people knew Spain at 
last, and their instinct told them with entire certainty 
that here was a sham and an untruth, very patent and 
flagrant, upon which time was not to be wasted. The 
American report was based upon a most elaborate ex- 
amination of the wreck and of witnesses, and upon the 
most carefully sifted testimony. It was honest and cool, 
and said that the Maine had been blown up from 
outside. There was no mortal doubt after reading 
the report, and Captain Sigsbee's evidence before the 
Senate committee, that the outside engine of destruc- 
tion was a government submarine mine, and had been 
exploded without the authority or knowledge of the 
Spanish government, by men who wore the uniform 
of Spain. 

3i 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

The President transmitted the report of the board to 
Congress without comment. It was perhaps needless to 
make any, for Senate and House and country supplied 
all that was necessary. Moreover, the President, as 
became a chief magistrate, had been and still was using 
every possible effort to avert war by peaceful and dip- 
lomatic methods, and continued to hope against hope 
for a successful result. The American people like- 
wise were averse to war. An overwhelming majority 
would have so declared even after the report on the 
Maine had been submitted to Congress. On the other 
hand, an equally overwhelming majority were deter- 
mined that there should be atonement for the Maine, 
and that Spanish rule in Cuba — which had caused the 
destruction of the ship — and the horrors of the "re- 
concentrados" should end. These demands meant war 
even if those who made them did not realize it, and it 
was this public sentiment that drove Congress forward 
to meet the popular will, which members and Senators 
very well knew could be fulfilled by war and in no 
other way. Against the sentiment springing from 
the popular instinct which at the great crisis of Amer- 
ican history has always been true and right, an opposi- 
tion strong in purpose although in large measure con- 
cealed, was arrayed. The naturally timid and con- 
servative elements of the community shrank from war, 
and the powerful financial interests of the Eastern cities, 
too short-sighted to see that their selfish advantage was 
in the certainty of action and not in suspense, exerted 
their great force to stop every forward step along the 
inevitable path. For the result now was inevitable; 
had been so, in reality, since the fatal 15th of February, 

32 




CAPTAIN CHARLES D. SIGSBEE 
United States Battle-ship Mu'/ie 



THE COMING OF WAR 

although men did not understand it at the moment, and 
still thought that they could stay the current of events 
which had been gathering strength for seventy years 
and broken loose at last. 

The Maine message was sent in on March 28, and 
as men everywhere discussed the evidence, it became 
clear that although the President was reluctant to 
abandon hope, the resources of diplomacy had failed. 
What the exact course of the negotiations conducted 
by the President and the able Assistant Secretary of 
State, Judge Day, had been was unknown then, is not 
known now, and will not be thoroughly known until the 
time comes when the secret correspondence between 
Washington and Madrid is open to +1 historian. But 
it was perfectly well understood that Spain would not 
grant independence to Cuba, and that whether our min- 
ister had made the fact plain to the Spanish govern- 
ment or not, no peaceful settlement was possible on 
any other basis. Diplomats might plan, and twist, and 
devise, and exchange notes, and deal in all the forms 
so futile at a great crisis, but the American people had 
made up their minds that the only real and possible 
solution was the end of Spanish rule in Cuba. They 
had determined that the unsettled question must receive 
this time a right answer, that it should knock at their 
door no longer, and the American people were right. 

Meantime the tension and excitement steadily in- 
creased. The peace-at-any-price people fought hard 
but in vain against the sweeping tide of public senti- 
ment. It was understood that a message would come 
to Congress on Monday, April 4. Then it was given 
out that it would be sent in on Wednesday, April 6, 

3 33 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

and the Capitol was thronged in expectation of the 
great event. When the House met, there was delay, 
and then the leaders of the House and three Senators 
of the Foreign Relations Committee were summoned 
suddenly to the White House. There the President 
showed them a despatch from General Lee, saying that 
if the message went in that day he could not answer 
for the lives of the Americans in Havana, and that he 
ought to have until Saturday at least to get them out 
of Cuba. To this appeal there could be but one answer. 
The message must be held back, and the Senators and 
members returned and made the announcement to their 
respective Houses. 

Thereupon the tension, the excited suspense, 
the doubts, the rumors, were all renewed and 
intensified. It was generally believed that Spain 
would take advantage of this respite to make some 
new proposition, even if she had not already done so, 
and Saturday proved the correctness of the anticipa- 
tion. On that day word came that Spain proposed an 
armistice with the insurgents, and that her council had 
voted $600,000 for the relief of the "reconcentrados." 
Those who wished to be deceived by these offers were 
so deceived, but no one else. An armistice was im- 
possible without the assent of both parties to the war, 
and the Cubans, on the eve of victory, of course would 
not consent. Moreover, the armistice, as soon ap- 
peared, consisted merely in an invitation to the in- 
surgents to come in and lay down their arms. The 
proposition was not even a well-framed or judicious lie. 
As to the money for the "reconcentrados," it was an 
empty sham. There is no proof that a peseta was ever 

34 



WILLIAM R. DAY 



THE COMING OF WAR 

really appropriated ; and if it had been, as General Lee 
justly said, it would all have been absorbed by Spanish 
officials before it reached its destination. The Spanish 
case closed fittingly with these false and fraudulent 
promises. 

Anxious as the President was for peace, he could 
not and would not accept as realities such shams as 
these, and on Monday, April n, the fateful message 
on Cuban affairs at last came in, and was referred to the 
Foreign Relations Committees of both Houses. The 
reading of the message was listened to with intense 
interest and in profound silence, broken only by a wave 
of applause when the sentence was read which said, 
"In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, 
in behalf of endangered American interests which give 
us the right and duty to speak and to act. the war in 
Cuba must stop." The President led up to this declara- 
tion by a dispassionate review of the Cuban question, 
and by a strong and moving description of the condi- 
tions of the island, which he characterized as a wilder- 
ness and a grave. He asked Congress to empower him 
to end hostilities in Cuba, and to secure the establish- 
ment of a stable government, capable of maintaining 
order and observing its international obligations." He 
said that he had exhausted diplomacy, and therefore 
left the issue with Congress, while he referred to Con- 
gress for its consideration the statement that the 
Queen-Regent had ordered a suspension of hostilities. 
In the deep excitement of the moment many persons 
felt that the message was too gentle, and that the Presi- 
dent really did not desire as yet decided measures. But 
it was pointed out that when he asked Congress for au- 

35 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

thority to establish a government in Cuba "capable of 
observing international relations," he requested power 
to make Cuba independent, because only an independent 
people can maintain relations of that character. More 
decisive still, indeed absolutely conclusive, was the sim- 
ple fact that the President, having declared that he had 
exhausted diplomacy, had remitted the question to 
Congress. Congress has no diplomatic functions or 
attributes. With a foreign nation it has but one weapon 
— the war power; and when a President calls in Con- 
gress in a controversy with another nation, his action 
means that Congress, if it sees fit, must exercise its 
single power, and declare war. On this sound ground, 
which is constitutionally the only ground possible under 
such conditions, Congress proceeded to act. 

For more than a week a draft of a resolution to be 
passed by Congress had been in existence, and had been 
seen by some Senators and a few others, which pro- 
vided that the President should be authorized to in- 
tervene in order to stop the war in Cuba, to secure their 
peace, order, and a stable government established by 
the free action of the people, and to use the army and 
navy of the United States for these purposes. Whence 
this resolution came, or who drafted it, was not known, 
but some of those to whom it was submitted pointed out 
that it was utterly vague, that under its carefully loose 
terms the forces of the United States could be used to 
crush the insurgents, and that the government to be set 
up might be Spanish just as well as independent. 
Whether this resolution emanated from those opposed 
at all hazards to Cuba and to war, or not, it sank out 
of sight for a time, and then reappeared in the report 

36 




SENOR PRAXEDES MATEO SAGASTA 
Prime Minister of Spain 



THE COMING OF WAR 

of the Committee on Foreign Affairs made in the 
House on April 13. It read as follows: 

Resolved, That the President is hereby authorized and directed 
to intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba, to the end and with 
the purpose of securing permanent peace and order there, and 
establishing by the free action of the people thereof a stable and 
independent government of their own iii the island of Cuba; and 
the President is hereby authorized and empowered to use the land 
and naval forces of the United States to execute the purpose of 
this resolution. 

One very important change had been made in the 
original draft, without which, it is safe to say, it could 
not have passed the House committee. The alteration 
.was the insertion after the word "stable" of the words 
"and independent." This greatly improved the reso- 
lution, but it still remained dangerously loose and 
vague, and had the cardinal defect of not saying square- 
ly and honestly what the American people and Congress 
intended, which was the expulsion of Spain from Cuba. 
Nevertheless, after the Republican majority had voted 
down the Democratic proposition to recognize the in- 
surgent government, the resolution as reported by the 
committee passed by a vote of 324 to 19, and was sent 
to the Senate. 

The situation in the Senate was quite different. For 
a week before the message of April 1 1 came in, the 
Committee of Foreign Relations had been at work upon 
a resolution based upon one introduced by Senator 
Foraker of Ohio. The committee were determined 
that any resolution reported by them should be perfectly 
clear on the point that the object of the United States 
was to put an absolute end to Spanish rule in Cuba. 
With a preamble setting forth the treatment of the 

37 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

"reconcentrados" and the destruction of the Maine 
as the grounds of intervention, a resolution of this 
character was agreed to tentatively, and Senator Davis 
of Minnesota, the chairman of the committee, drafted 
a report to accompany it. Both the resolutions and the 
report were sent to the President for such suggestion 
and comment as he might see fit to make. After the 
message of April 1 1 came in, these resolutions were 
taken up for immediate action. There was a desire 
on the part of some members of the committee to come 
as near as might be to the general line taken in the 
House resolution, but the chief point of difference 
arose upon the question of recognizing the government 
of the insurgents. The President, with wisdom and 
foresight, had declared in his message against any 
such recognition. A majority of the Senate committee 
sustained the President's position ; and while the whole 
committee supported the main and essential resolution 
as to the withdrawal of Spain, a minority reported, as 
an amendment, a clause recognizing the insurgent gov- 
ernment. Senator Davis made the report for the com- 
mittee, and in that report the case of the United States 
against Spain and the grounds of armed intervention 
were stated not only in the best way, but with a force 
and power, both legally and historically, which left 
nothing to be desired. The resolutions of the commit- 
tee and the minority amendment submitted to the 
Senate on April 13 were as follows: 

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. 

Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more 
than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, 
have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, 

38 




' 7VH Cl'bHMAN K.I)AVI^ *V V' ^ UA\ ID R'KPIE ^T-'JVP' 'OIIN \V DANltl. ^7U 
)M| MINNESOTA $ ' V ■*4 INDIANA M- ?• *" -Ail VIRGINIA ItAr 




THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 



THE COMING OF WAR 

have been a disgrace to Christian civilization culminating as they 
have, in the destruction of a United States battle-ship, with 266 
of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of 
Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by 
the President of the United States in his message to Congress of 
April nth, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited; 
Therefore, 

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, 

First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right 
ought to be, free and independent. 

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, 
and the government of the United States does hereby demand, 
that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and 
government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and 
naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. 

Third. That the President of the United States be, and he 
hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval 
forces of the United States, and to call into the cctual service of 
the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent 
as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect. 

VIEWS OF THE MINORITY. 

The undersigned members of said committee cordially concur 
in the report made upon the Cuban resolutions, but favor the im- 
mediate recognition of the Republic of Cuba, as organized in the 
island, as a free, independent, and sovereign power among the na- 
tions of the world. David Turpie. 

R. Q. Mills. 

Jno. W. Daniel. 

J. B. Foraker. 

The amendment reported by the minority committee 
was to amend the first paragraph, by inserting, in line 
4, after the word "independent," the following: 

And that the government of the United States hereby recog- 
nize the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of 
that island. 

On the presentation of the resolutions to the Senate 
a very earnest and very able debate ensued, which 

39 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

turned almost entirely upon the question of recognizing 
the insurgent government, and scarcely touched at all 
the second resolution, which was the one really effect- 
ive and essential portion of the measure, which meant 
war, and could mean nothing else. The discussion 
lasted until Saturday evening, and then the Senate, 
with only one absentee, voted in the presence of 
crowded galleries and in the midst of intense excite- 
ment. The amendment of the minority of the Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations was adopted by a vote of 
51 to 37, thirty-three Republicans and four Democrats 
constituting the minority, and ten Republicans voting 
with the Democrats and the Populists in the majority. 
The amendment of Senator Teller of Colorado, dis- 
claiming any intention of seeking sovereignty or do- 
minion over Cuba, was accepted by the committee and 
agreed to without division. All other amendments 
were voted down, a few short speeches were made, 
chiefly by those opposed to the resolutions, the Senate 
resolutions were substituted for those of the House, and 
then the resolutions as amended were passed by a vote 
of 67 to 21, nineteen Republicans and two Democrats 
forming the minority, and twenty-four Republicans 
voting with the Democrats and Populists in the major- 
ity. The resolutions were then sent to the House with- 
out a request for a conference, and the Senate ad- 
journed until Monday. 

The Sunday which intervened was a day of rumors 
and excitement. There was a well-founded appre- 
hension that enough Republicans would break away 
and unite with the Democrats to carry concurrence 
in the Senate resolutions as they stood, including the 

40 




REDFIl LD PROCTOR 



Whose report of his observations of the results of Spanish rule in Cuba 
profoundly influenced public feeling in America 



THE COMING OF WAR 

recognition of the Cuban Republic. To prevent this 
the Republican leaders of the House put forth all their 
power, and made every exertion, with entire success, 
as the event proved, so far as recognition was con- 
cerned. When the House met on Monday, Mr. Ding- 
ley of Maine moved to concur in the Senate resolu- 
tions, with an amendment striking out the words "are 
and" in the first resolution, and the entire clause em- 
bodying the recognition of the insurgent government. 
This motion prevailed by a majority of 22. Thus did 
it come about that in the struggle over the question 
of recognition, forced into the resolutions by the ac- 
tion of the ten radical Republican Senators, every- 
thing else had been lost sight of, and in "everything 
else" was the one essential, vital resolution which de- 
manded the withdrawal of Spain from Cuba. This 
second resolution was the effective one, for it meant 
war, and to this the leaders of the House, in their 
eagerness to defeat recognition of the republic, had 
been forced to agree, and the House accepted it with- 
out debate. With the two Houses agreed on this reso- 
lution, the real issue was settled, but much remained 
to be done in order to end the controversy under which 
had been carried the one absolutely vital clause in the 
entire measure. 

So the amended resolutions came back to the Senate, 
the crowd rushed over from the House, pouring into 
the deserted galleries, there was a short debate, and then 
the motion of Senator Davis to concur was voted down 
by 46 to 32, and the resolutions went back to the House 
with the Senate's insistence and without a request for 
a conference. The excited crowds of onlookers swept 

41 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

over to the House, the resolutions were at once taken 
up, and the House, by a majority of 26, voted to insist 
on its amendments, and asked for a committee of con- 
ference. Again the crowds passed from the House to 
the Senate, and the resolutions were once more taken 
up. There was another debate, the ten dissenting Re- 
publicans announced that they would no longer insist 
upon recognition of the Cuban Republic, a conference 
was agreed to, and both Houses took a recess until 
eight o'clock. 

It was generally understood that on the Senate's re- 
ceding from its position in regard to recognition the 
House would recede from its first amendment striking 
out the words ''are and," and personal assurances 
were said to have been given to that effect. When 
Senators and members returned to the Capitol, there- 
fore, they expected an agreement to be reported from 
the conference, an immediate acceptance of the report, 
and an adjournment in a few minutes. To every one's 
surprise, and to the great indignation of the Senate, 
a disagreement was reported from the committee, be- 
cause the House refused to recede on its amendment 
to the first line striking out the words "are and." The 
point was not worth a contest on either side, for the 
whole phrase was purely rhetorical. It was rhetoric 
when Richard Henry Lee first read it to the Conti- 
nental Congress, it was rhetoric still, hallowed by time 
and association, when applied to Cuba. At the most 
it was merely a declaration of intention, which it was 
proposed to make good by converting the intention 
into a fact. But personal feelings had been aroused, 
and now began to run high. The Senate, justly or un- 

42 



THE COMING OF WAR 

justly, believed that it had been unfairly dealt with, 
while the House felt that the Senate was unreasonable. 
In this mood the House, by a majority of $2, voted to 
insist and asked for a further conference, which was 
agreed to by the Senate. Again the conferees with- 
drew and the two Houses waited. The hours wore 
drearily away, and rumors came thickly that there 
would be another disagreement and a deadlock. Sen- 
ator Morgan of Alabama sent a plain declaration of 
war up to the desk, and announced that at the proper 
time he would call it up. The hint was not without 
its effect. Senators hostile to Cuba crossed the Capitol 
and urged upon the Speaker that the House should 
give way. At this juncture the House conferees asked 
to withdraw from the conference and hold a consulta- 
tion apart. They then saw the Speaker, returned, and 
receded on the words "are and." After this an agree- 
ment was immediately reached, and reported to both 
Houses. Midnight had passed and a new day* begun. 
It was the 19th of April, a date very memorable in the 
history of the United States, when the Senate, by a 
vote of 42 to 35, and the House, by a vote of 311 to 6, 
accepted the conference report. The resolutions as 
finally agreed upon were precisely word for word those 
reported by the majority of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, with the single addition of Senator 
Teller's amendment, which the committee had accepted. 
The Congress of the United States had gone clear of 
all pitfalls, and had declared just what the American 
people meant it to declare, that Spanish rule in Cuba 



*The legislative day was still the 18th of April. 
43 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

must cease. In fact, if not in terms, it was a declara- 
tion of war. 

The resolutions thus adopted went at once to the 
President, who held them over one day and then signed 
them. He sent a copy, early on the morning of the 
2 1 st, to the Spanish minister, Senor Polo y Bernabe, 
who thereupon asked for his passports and left the 
country. Before this, the resolutions had been cabled to 
our minister at Madrid, but the despatch was there 
held back long enough to enable the Spanish ministry 
to send General Woodford his passports before he 
could present the resolutions, a feat which called forth 
much admiration on the Continent among those who 
love diplomatic futilities, but which was as silly as 
shams usually are in the presence of realities. For the 
reality was war, and the precise manner in which it 
was brought into existence was of trifling consequence 
except to the arid diplomatic mind of Europe. 

As soon as Spain severed her relations with the 
United States, on April 21, the American fleet, under 
the command of Admiral Sampson, was ordered to 
Havana, and the President proclaimed a blockade of 
that and certain other Cuban ports. On April 23, the 
guns of the Nashville cracked across the bows of the 
Buena Ventura, a Spanish merchantman; and Con- 
gress, on April 25, formally declared that war with the 
kingdom of Spain had existed since April 21. The 
pretences were over, the wrong which had lived on t for 
three-quarters of a century was now to be redressed, 
the restless unsettled question was to get its true and 
right answer at last. 

44 



CHAPTER III 
MANILA 

Fernao da Magalhaens, or Magalhaes, was a boy 
when the discovery of Columbus fired the imagination 
of western Europe, but he was also one of those whose 
adventurous spirit was kindled and roused by this won- 
der tale of new lands beyond the Atlantic. He was still 
young when, in 1505, he made one in an expedition 
from Portugal, his native land, which, coming from the 
West, discovered some of the famous Spice Islands. 
Not long after, wounded by an insult from the Portu- 
guese government, which impugned his honor as a man 
and a soldier, he left his country, solemnly and publicly 
renounced his allegiance to Portugal, was naturalized 
as a Spaniard, and took service with Charles V, who 
had the instinct of greatness in picking out able and ef- 
fective men to do his work. Magellan, as we call him, 
was imbued with the Columbian ideas, and also held 
that, despite the Columbian discoveries, a short route 
by water to the East could be found by sailing west- 
ward. It was a great conception, and a true one, ex- 
cept that the route was longer than that round the 
Cape of Good Hope. With an expedition splendidly 
equipped by the Emperor, Magellan set sail on August 
10, 1 5 19. He crossed the Atlantic, touched at the bay 
of Rio de Janeiro, made his way southward, repressed 

45 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

savagely a dangerous mutiny, and on October 21 en- 
tered the strait which bears his name. On November 
28 he passed out of it with only three of his five vessels 
left, and found himself and his rejoicing crews in the 
Pacific. He felt that he had succeeded, but he had mis- 
calculated the vast extent of the new ocean ; and sailing 
on for days and days, in some fashion missed the count- 
less islands of the Pacific, and did not see land until he I 
reached the little group which he called the Ladrones, 
because the inhabitants stole a boat from him. There 
he lingered a short time, either at Rota or in the cu- 
rious harbor of Guahan, destined, nearly four hundred 
years later, to receive the war-ships of a nation of 
whose future existence even those old believers in El 
Dorado never dreamed. From the Ladrones, which 
were discovered March 6, 1521, the weary voyage was 
continued until a new archipelago was reached, on the 
fifth Sunday in Lent. Gradually the magnitude of this 
new discovery became apparent, and Magellan named 
the new group in honor of St. Lazarus, on whose day 
it was discovered. They landed on Mindanao, made 
their way to Cebu, flattered themselves that they had 
converted and subdued the inhabitants, and then be- 
coming involved in a tribal war, Magellan was killed, 
and his chosen successor, Serrano, was left behind to 
death and torture. Two ships escaped, one going east, 
and one, the Victoria, under Elcano, which left Timor 
on February 1 1 , sailing still to the westward. On Sep- 
tember 6, 1522, after many hardships and perils, tjie 
Victoria reached Spain, and a great voyage, the first 
which circled the globe, second only to that of Colum- 
bus in conception, and beyond all in the daring 

46 



MANILA 

displayed and the distance traversed, came to an 
end. 

Thus was a new possession added to the dominion of 
Spain; yet, although her navigators discovered it, a 
fraud finally made it hers. By the treaty of 1494, as 
afterwards expounded, all the world beyond the merid- 
ian 1,080 miles west of the Azores was divided be- 
tween Spain and Portugal, the eastern half going to 
Spain. The Spaniards, however, made the maps, and 
putting Magellan's discovery twenty-five degrees east 
of its true position, brought it within the Spanish half, 
when it really belonged to the portion allotted to Por- 
tugal. Twenty years later Villalobos, sailing from 
South America, visited the islands of Magellan, and 
named them the Philippines, in honor of the Prince of 
Asturias, afterwards Philip II. Again twenty years 
passed, and in 1565 a great expedition went from Mex- 
ico, and Spanish rule was established by Legaspi in the 
Philippines — first in Cebu, and later in Luzon — which 
was destined to continue unbroken for more than three 
hundred years. 

Even in its last stage of decay, an empire which had 
once thus arrogated to itself the possession of half the 
world outside Europe still showed traces of its former 
grandeur in scattered fragments lying far apart on 
either side of the globe. When war came, and the 
LTnited States looked out to see where to strike its foe, 
it found Spain present not only at its own doors, but 
far away across the Pacific, and there in the distant 
East the first blow fell. 

The Navy Department, with watchful prevision, as 
the relations with Spain grew more strained, began to 

47 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

send out orders which would make all ready in case of 
war. Even in January the commander-in-chief of the 
European squadron was ordered to retain all men 
whose enlistments had expired ; the Helena was stopped 
at Funchal, the Wilmington in the West Indies, and at 
the end of the month orders were sent to assemble the 
European squadron at Lisbon. A month later orders 
went to all the squadrons to fill their bunkers with coal, 
and to be ready to move on the click of the wire. As 
early as January 27 the Asiatic squadron also had been 
directed to retain all men whose enlistments had ex- 
pired, and on February 25 a cable message was sent to 
Commodore Dewey by Mr. Roosevelt directing him to 
assemble his squadron at Kong-kong, retain the Olyni- 
pia, which had been ordered back to San Francisco, and 
be prepared in case of war for offensive operations in 
the Philippines. On the 3d of March the Mohican was 
sent with ammunition to Honolulu, there to await the 
Baltimore, which was to take the ammunition on board 
and proceed at once to join the Asiatic squadron. No 
wiser or more far-sighted precautions were ever taken 
by an administration than these, and it was all done so 
quietly that no one on the outside knew what was hap- 
pening. While the country was stirring to its depths 
with the events which were fast bringing our relations 
with Spain to the breaking point, while the air was 
filled with rumors and debates and the strife of con- 
tending forces, the Baltimore was speeding across the 
Pacific carrying ammunition to the Asiatic squadron, 
and Commodore Dewey was preparing very carefully 
and accurately for certain work which he saw before 
him. The order directing the Asiatic squadron to as- 

48 



MANILA 

semble at Hong-kong had gone on February 25, and on 
the following day another went telling the commodore 
to fill all the bunkers with the best coal to be had. By 
March 28 the squadron had assembled, and then came 
a period of waiting. Very dreary and very hot this 
waiting was, long drawn by constant strain and listen- 
ing. With much anxiety, and always on the alert all 
through the trying time of suspense, the commodore 
was constantly making ready. First he sent the fleet 
paymaster over to the consignees of the English steam- 
ship Nanshan and bought her as she was, with 3,300 
tons of good Cardiff coal on board. Then he bought the 
Zafiro, a steamship of the Manila-Hong-kong line, 
just as she was, with all her fuel and provisions, and on 
her was placed all the spare ammunition, so that she 
became the magazine of the fleet. On April 18 the 
McCulloch came in and joined the squadron. She was 
only a revenue cutter, it is true, but she was as good as 
a gunboat, being built of steel, having 1.500 tons dis- 
placement, and carrying four 4-inch guns and a crew 
of 130 men all ready to fight. The news coming now 
from the United States was fast removing every doubt 
as to the future, and on the 19th of April, the day of 
Concord, when the two Houses were passing the war 
resolution, the American sailors in Hong-kong went 
over the sides with their paint brushes, and in a few 
hours the white was gone, and the ships looked leaden 
and sombre in the dull dark drab of the war-paint. On 
the 2 1 st, when General Woodford was leaving Madrid 
and Sen6r Polo was slipping out of Washington, the 
Baltimore appeared, a powerful addition to the fleet, 
and bringing also her load of ammunition so that she 
4 49 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

was doubly welcome. Hardly had the new-comer found 
time to put on her war-paint when news came of the 
declaration of war, and then of the English proclama- 
tion of neutrality. This compelled a departure from 
Hong-kong on April 25 to the Chinese harbor of Mirs 
bay, a few miles to the north ; but there was not to be 
much more of the dreary waiting at this new anchor- 
age. On the following day the McCulloch, left behind 
at Hong-kong, came rushing up the bay bringing a 
despatch dated at Washington, April 24, and worth 
reading just as it was written, for it opened a new page 
in history, and has become famous from its results — 

Dewey, Asiatic Squadron: 

War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Pro- 
ceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, 
particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels 
or destroy. Use utmost endeavors. Long. 

It is a great thing to be ready and to be without 
doubts, and Commodore Dewey was both. Before 
the day closed the captains had all been called to consul- 
tation on the flag-ship, and at two o'clock on April 27 
the sailing-pennant went up, and the fleet steamed out 
of Mirs bay and steered southward across the 620 
miles of one of the roughest seas in the world which lay 
between them and the Philippines. On the morning 
of April 30 the fleet was off Bolinao bay, and looked 
in carefully. Nothing there. Then came Subig bay. 
More care here, for the last report from Manila — a 
report that had flown on the cables all over the world 
— was that the Spanish admiral had brought his fleet 
to Subig bay, and meant to give battle there. The 
Boston and Concord went ahead as scouts and exam- 

5° 



MANILA 

ined the harbor. No enemy here either. Only two 
little fishing-boats, from which not even information 
could be obtained. Quite clear now that the Spaniards 
had determined to make their stand at the gates of 
their capital, and thither the lieet must go. So, on Sat- 
urday afternoon, April 30, the fleet started slowly 
along the thirty miles which lay between it and Manila. 
The tropical sun sank red across the land, and the 
great yellow moon rose, on the other hand, out of the 
sea to light them on their way. 

Let us look at the squadron for a moment as it forges 
onward past the Luzon coast. There are nine ships in 
all, of which two the Nanshan, a collier, and the Za- 
Uro, a supply-ship, are non-combatants. Then there 
is the McCulloch, a revenue-cutter, but, as has been 
said, well enough built and armed to pass as a gunboat. 
Next is the Petrel, a true gunboat, but very small, only 
892 tons, and carrying four 4-inch and four small ma- 
chine guns. The Concord, also a steel gunboat, but 
with a displacement of 1,710 tons, carries six 6-inch 
guns, and a secondary battery of eleven machine-guns, 
and has her deck and conning-tower protected. The 
next step is a marked advance in power, and brings us 
to the Raleigh, a second-rate steel cruiser of 3,213 tons. 
Her armament consists of one rapid-fire 6-inch, and ten 
rapid-fire 5-inch guns, with a secondary battery of eight 
6-pounders, four 1 -pounders, and two Catlings. Her 
deck and conning-tower are protected with armor; she 
has a cellulose belt and steel sponsons. The Boston is 
another cruiser of the second rate, of 3,000 tons, a par- 
tially protected deck, two 8-inch, and six slow-fire 
6-inch guns, two 6-pounders, two 3-pound, two 

5* 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

i-pound rapid-lire, and four machine guns. The Bal- 
timore is a third steel cruiser of the second rate, with 
a displacement of 4,413 tons, and a protection of steel 
deck-plates and shields for all the guns and conning- 
tower. Her armament is heavy, and consists of four 
8-inch and six 6-inch guns, with two 6, two 3, and two 
1 pounders, all rapid-lire, and six machine guns. Last 
in the list comes the Olympia, the flag-ship, a first-class 
steel cruiser of 5,870 tons, protected by steel deck- 
plates, steel-covered barbettes, gun-shields, and con- 
ning-tower, and a cellulose belt thirty-three inches thick 
and eight feet broad. Her main battery is composed 
of four 8-inch guns, her secondary battery of ten quick- 
fire fives, and in addition fourteen 6-pounders, six 
1 -pounders, all rapid-fire, and four Gatlings. 

The speed of the ships varied from 21.5 knots for 
the Olympia, to 13.7 knots for the Petrel, the latter, 
or less, beirg of course the highest speed of the fleet. 
Speed, however, played no part in the action, and need 
not, therefore, be considered. From this summary it 
will be observed that although the American ships were 
all modern, and armed, as a rule, with the best modern 
guns, there was not a single armor-clad among them. 
They were all practically unarmored, and they were go- 
ing through channels which were said to be filled with 
torpedoes, to encounter, so far as they knew, a more 
numerous fleet, composed of old ships, it is true, but 
armed with modern guns, and backed, as was under- 
stood, by forts mounted with the finest and heaviest 
modern rifles. The prospect was serious, and it was 
faced by officers and men alike with quiet confidence. 
The night was still, and the fleet, as it drew near to Ma- 

52 



MANILA 

nila, waited until the moon set, and then rounding the 
last point, saw the entrance to the great bay, which 
runs nearly thirty miles into the land, open before it. 
A very splendid bay indeed it is — one of the finest har- 
bors, and one of the greatest of roadsteads; as a har- 
bor, in fact, one of the prizes of the world, quite unde- 
veloped, because it has been in feeble, incompetent, and 
corrupt hands ever since it was taken from its original 
owners. Twenty-six miles from the mouth is Manila. 
Some 250,000 people there, the vague Spanish statistics 
tell us. It is an interesting town, low-lying, and called 
the Venice of the East, because rivers intersect it. There 
is a new and also an old town, the latter beautifully 
walled in the manner of three hundred years ago, with 
moats, drawbridges, and portcullises, altogether very 
picturesque, and worthy of preservation. Ten miles 
nearer the bay's mouth, and on the same side, lies Ca- 
vite, a suburb of Manila, with some 5,000 people, a 
navy-yard, arsenal, and fortifications. At the entrance 
of the harbor lie two islands pretty well in the middle 
— one large, over 600 feet high, called Corregidor, one 
small, but over 400 feet in height. Between the islands 
is a narrow channel with eight fathoms of water at 
the narrowest part. Between Caballo and the little is- 
land of El Fraile three miles width of channel with 
eighteen fathoms of water, and known as the Boca 
Grande. On the other side, between Corregidor and 
San Jose point, a channel known as the Boca Chica, 
two miles wide and of ample depth. Taken together, 
they are very fit and stately entrances to the great bay 
beyond. There are forts on Corregidor and Caballo, 
as well as light-houses, and batteries also on El Fraile, 

53 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

which lies to the southward. More forts are on Lim- 
bones and San Jose points, heavily armed with the best 
Krupp guns, according to the information brought to 
Hong-kong. Nevertheless, they all were to be passed, 
and as the ships headed for the bay they saw the great 
light, the guardian of peaceful commerce, burning 
bright upon Corregidor. There was no light on the 
ships, but the throb of the engines shook the still air 
as they entered the Boca Grande, expecting each mo- 
ment a shot from the batteries. On they went, well into 
the channel now, and still no sign of life from the shore. 
The war-ships had all passed, when some enthusiast on 
the McCulloch flung coals upon the fires, there was a 
rush of sparks and black smoke from her funnel, and 
the Spaniards waked up. A shot from the south side 
of the channel broke the stillness, and then two more, 
the shells dropping into the water. The reply came 
from the Concord, and one of her 4-inch shells struck 
the fort with a crash, followed by a cry in the darkness. 
A shot from the El Fraile batteries was answered by 
the Raleigh. Then an 8-inch gun boomed out from the 
Boston, and the McCulloch snapped away with her 
4-pounders; there was more firing from the batteries, 
and then the islands and the mainland relapsed into 
profound quiet, and it was all as if nothing had hap- 
pened. The American fleet had passed the dreaded 
forts at the entrance, and was in the bay of Manila. 
On glided the ships, ever more slowly and quietly, 
until it seemed as if they hardly moved at all, and then 
with the sudden dawn of the tropics came day, and 
there ahead lay the Spanish fleet, close under the forts 
and batteries of Cavite. The moment had come. 

54 




VVREI K. UK THE CRUISER ISLA DE CUBA 



MANILA 

It came, fortunately, to a man who knew exactly 
what he meant to do — a most victorious quality, and 
one all too rare in a world given overmuch to uncer- 
tainty and stumbling. Commodore Dewey had his plan 
thoroughly laid out, and now proceeded to carry it into 
execution. Making a wide detour to the east to drop 
the supply-ships out of range, the fleet swept slowly 
along. As it passed, the batteries and ships at Cavite 
opened fire, the sharp crack of the modern rifle min- 
gling with the heavier roar of the older guns. The 
American fleet made no answer. 

As the ships turned and passed in front of Manila 
the sight-seers on the walls and the cathedral towers 
could be seen with a glass, and the guns of the Luneta 
flung some heavy shells far out and wide of the ships, 
and a steady and useless fire continued from these bat- 
teries throughout the engagement. The Concord re- 
plied, and up went the signal on the flag-ship, "Hold 
your fire until close in." So the fleet moved silently 
and steadily down toward Cavite. Suddenly, just 
ahead of the flag-ship, there came a quivering shock, 
and a great column of water leaped into the air; an- 
other quiver and another burst of mud and water fol- 
lowed, again too far away for harm. The dreaded 
mines were really there, then, and the fleet was upon 
them ; but no ship swerved, no man stirred, and, as 
sometimes happens, the brave were favored, and this 
was the last of the Spanish torpedoes. If there were 
others, they failed to explode, and those which had ex- 
ploded failed to check the American ships for an in- 
stant. On they went, still silently, holding their fire, 
the Spanish batteries and ships now beginning to pour 

55 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

out shot and shell as their enemy drew near. Closer 
and closer they came, until at last the distance was but 
little over five thousand yards. "If you are ready, 
Gridley, you may fire," said the commodore to the 
captain of the Olympia. It seemed that the captain 
was ready. The port 8-inch gun of the forward turret 
rang out, and the great shell sped over the water to the 
Spanish flag-ship. Up went the signal "Fire as con- 
venient," and the ships behind the Olympia opened at 
once. The Spaniards were not behindhand. From 
ships and forts there was a continuous roar, and the 
shells began to strike all about the American squadron. 
One burst so near the Olympia that its fragments cut 
the rigging, ploughed a furrow in the deck, and tore 
the bridge where the commodore stood. Still, none 
were hit, and on the order to "Open with all the guns," 
the American ships poured forth a fire which in volume, 
rapidity, and accuracy could not have been surpassed. 
Back they came from the second round, within four 
thousand yards this time, pouring in the same volume 
of concentrated fire from the starboard as before from 
the port batteries. The Boston and Baltimore were 
both hit, but not materially injured, and again they 
swung round in front of Manila, and again, nearer 
than before, steamed steadily down toward Cavite. On 
each turn they drew nearer to the Spanish fleet, and 
the heavy, well-aimed American broadsides became 
more and more deadly. The Spaniards were suffering 
severely, and at seven o'clock the flag-ship, Rcina Cris- 
tina, left her moorings and steamed bravely out, di- 
recting her course toward the Olympia. What the pur- 
pose of the Spanish admiral may have been no one 

56 




WSfr 






WEST BATTERY, CAVITE", AFTER DESTRUCTION 



MANILA 

knows, but word was at once passed to concentrate all 
fire on his advancing flag-ship. As she drew nearer, 
the storm of the American fire thickened about her. 
Her sides were torn, her bridge shot away; she could 
not stand the awful battering, and turned about to re- 
turn to her anchorage. As she swung round, an 8-inch 
gun of the Olympia sent a shell which struck her oppo- 
nent squarely in the stern. The great projectile raked 
the Rcina Cristina, tore up her decks, and exploded her 
after boiler, so that she could barely reel back to the 
shelter of the forts, with one hundred and fifty of the 
crew dead and ninety wounded on board. While the 
flag-ship was thus engaged, two gunboats equipped as 
torpedo-boats slipped out from Cavite, one making for 
the supply-ships. The Petrel rushed after the latter, 
opened with the 4-pounders, drove her ashore, and then 
blew her to pieces with her rapid-fire guns, which was 
the end of the first Spanish torpedo-boat. The second 
headed for the Olympia, kept on despite the fire of the 
secondary battery, and began to get ominously near, 
men thought, but coming under the fierce storm of the 
machine-guns in the tops, turned to fly. So her end 
came. A well-directed shell struck her fairly inside 
the stern railing. There was an explosion, the gunboat 
seemed to break in the middle, and down she went. 
Meantime the Baltimore had set the Costilla, the only 
wooden ship in the Spanish squadron, on fire, and she 
was soon a mass of flames. 

Kive times in all did the American ships turn and 
r we past their opponents, each time closer, and each 
time with a more deadly broadside. There had been 
now two hours' hot work under the rising tropical sun, 

57 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

and at a quarter before eight the commodore, errone- 
ously informed that ammunition for the 5-inch guns 
was running short, ran up the signals to cease firing and 
follow the flag-ship, so that he might consult with his 
captains, and if needful redistribute the ammunition. 
Something quite new and unheard-of, this stopping in 
the middle of a great naval action for any purpose. It 
is said that the American sailors, before they under- 
stood the meaning of it all, began to grumble at not be- 
ing allowed to go on and finish up their task. The Span- 
iards, battered as they were, set up a cheer as they saw 
their foe withdraw to the other side of the bay, and 
sundry telegrams flew over the cable to Madrid saying 
that the Spanish fire had "forced the American ships to 
manoeuvre" (the Spanish version of the skillful evolu- 
tions which had helped so much the American fight- 
ing), and that the enemy had now retreated to land 
their dead and wounded. Very characteristic and wor- 
thy of note these messages to Spain — no longer able to 
recognize facts, living among lies and delusions, and 
quite lost to that veracity of mind so essential, as Car- 
lyle has pointed out, to the successful existence of men 
and nations. The evolutions of the American fleet were 
all planned beforehand ; there were no dead and wound- 
ed, as the Americans found, not a little to their own 
astonishment, when the reports were made after this 
first round, and although several of the ships had been 
hit, no injury in the least serious had been done to any 
of them. Moreover, Commodore Dewey, as at the 
start, knew just what he meant to do. The Spanish 
fleet could not possibly escape. It had been disabled 
and crippled in the first round, but it still held the har- 

58 




WRECK UF THE FLAG-SHIP, THE CRUISER REINA CRISTINA 



MANILA 

bor, and the land batteries remained to be dealt with. 
The orders were to "capture or destroy." There must 
be none left ; none must escape to harass future opera- 
tions, or to try to cross the Pacific and alarm and per- 
haps attack the western coast of the United States. The 
work demanded could be most surely finished and made 
perfect if the men upon whom everything depended 
were kept in the best possible condition. So, after the 
withdrawal to the other side of the bay, there was a 
good rest for all the crews, a hearty breakfast eaten 
quite at leisure, a cleaning of decks and turrets, an ex- 
amination of all the guns, a fresh supply of ammuni- 
tion brought up, and then, at a quarter before eleven, 
after three hours thus occupied, up went the signals, 
the shrill whistles of the boatswains rang out, and off 
the fleet went for the second and last assault. 

This time the work was to be more direct. Again 
the fleet swung round in fron£ of Manila, and again it 
steamed down toward Cavite, the Baltimore in the lead. 
On it went, and first one Spanish shell, then another, 
struck the Baltimore, and men were wounded by the 
splinters. Still silence on the American ship, and no 
reply to the Spanish fire until at last the range was less 
than three thousand yards. Then the Baltimore poured 
her broadside into the Reina Cristina, whence the ad- 
miral had transferred his flag to the Isla de Cuba, and 
the former flag-ship, fatally wounded in the duel with 
the Olympia, went to pieces under the fierce fire of her 
new antagonist. Her magazines blew up, and she sank. 
Tben the Baltimore turned on the Don Juan de Austria, 
and was joined by the Olympia and Raleigh. While 
the Spanish ship quivered under the heavy fire, a shell 

59 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

from the Raleigh pierced her magazine and she blew 
up, tearing off also the upper works of a gunboat, which 
was then destroyed by the Petrel. The General Lezo, 
another gunboat, was driven ashore by the Concord 
and burned, the Velasco went down before the Boston, 
the burning Costilla was scuttled, and the Don Antonio 
de Ulloa, the last ship which was able to fight, sank 
under the fire of the Baltimore with her flag nailed to 
the mast. Meantime the Petrel, running into shoal 
water, set on fire and destroyed the Marques del Duero, 
Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon, and 
General Lezo. Just before this, Admiral Montojo, on 
his new flag-ship, the Isla de Cuba, with his guns si- 
lenced and his fleet gone, had run the gunboat ashore, 
hauled down his flag, left his vessel to its fate, and es- 
caped to Manila. Thus the Spanish fleet was complete- 
ly destroyed; but the shore batteries continued to fire, 
and one after another of them had to be silenced, which 
was done as fast as the American ships could close in 
upon them. They held out longest at Cavite, but a last 
and well-placed shell entered the arsenal magazine, a 
terrific explosion followed, the batteries all fell silent, 
and the white flag went up on the citadel. The battle 
of Manila had been fought and won. 

The next day the fleet went into Cavite, and a land- 
ing party destroyed the batteries. On May 3 the forts 
on Corregidor, at the entrance of the harbor, surren- 
dered to the Raleigh and Baltimore. At Cavite there 
was an effort to pretend that no white flag had been 
run up, and some cheap falsehood was indulged in, but 
facts were a little too strong even for Spaniards. The 
Spanish commander ran up the white flag again before 

60 




WRECK OK THE CRUISER ISLA DE LUZON 



MANILA 

eleven o'clock, and departed with his men, whereupon 
the American marines landed, and having assured the 
priests and nuns that they were not going to massacre 
the wounded in hospitals, as the Spanish had stated, 
established a guard, and took possession of the arse- 
nal and dock-yards of Cavite. Commodore Dewey, 
through the British consul, announced the blockade of 
Manila ; and as the Spaniards, still unable to recognize 
more than one or two facts at a time, refused to let him 
control the cable, he promptly cut it, and thus held the 
great harbor and city firmly in his grasp, stripped of all 
means of communication with the outside world which 
he did not allow. 

The rapidity, brilliancy, and completeness of the 
American victory at Manila riveted the attention of 
the world. In Europe, where hostility to the United 
States was everywhere felt and expressed, the news was 
received either in the silence which is sometimes the 
sincerest flattery, or with surprised expressions of won- 
der and grudging admiration. England, which from 
the beginning manifested a genuine and cordial friend- 
ship, praised Dewey's work generously and freely. Yet 
both on the Continent and in England, after the first 
shock had passed, critics appeared who sneered at the 
battle, called it a butchery, exaggerated the American 
force and diminished that of Spain. One English critic 
called it marvellously easy, and a well-known English 
journal said Dewey had merely destroyed a few old 
wooden ships. The last allegation was, of course, 
merely a wilful falsehood, for there was only one wood- 
en ship, the Costilla, in the Spanish fleet, and the fact 
that the others also burned proved nothing, for all Cer- 

61 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

vera's ships, the very latest productions of European 
dock-yards, took fire, in the Santiago fight, just like the 
older types at Manila. As to "its being so easy," it 
certainly looked easy after it was all done, and so did 
setting an egg on end seem easy after Columbus had 
shown how to do it. Such criticisms are really beneath 
contempt, but it is important to bring the facts clearly 
together and examine them, for on those facts Dewey's 
victory can stand without fear, and take its place in 
history. 

The greatest naval action in which the victor came 
down upon his enemy anchored in a harbor was Abou- 
kir. Of the splendor of Nelson's performance, and of 
the victory which he won, there can be no question. Let 
us try Dewey by that high standard. 

The Bay of Aboukir is an almost open roadstead. 
All that was necessary was to keep clear of the shoals 
which make out from Aboukir point and island, and 
then, if the wind were fair, as Nelson's was, to bear 
down on the hostile fleet. The French fleet was an- 
chored at Aboukir, and so were the Spaniards at Ma- 
nila, with the additional protection of a boom at Ca- 
vite. The distance to be traversed by Nelson from the 
open sea to the French fleet was trifling. He had no 
channels to come through, no entrance-forts to pass, no 
mines to fear. Dewey had to pass through a wide chan- 
nel, with powerful forts armed with modern guns on 
either side, in order to enter the bay. He then had to 
steam sixteen miles before he came opposite Cavite, 
while, from the best information received, he expected 
mines to be all about him, and two actually exploded in 
his near neighborhood. Nelson's fleet was numerically 

62 



MANILA 



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THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

the same as that of his opponent, but all the English 
fighting-ships were seventy-fours, while the French had 
three heavier, one of 120 guns and two of 80 each. It 
has been said freely and frequently that the Spanish 
were so hopelessly inferior that they could only hope to 
die, and that Dewey's sole glory was in the rapidity 
with which he and his captains and men did their work 
without injury to themselves. There is scarcely more 
foundation for this statement than for the wholesale 
falsehood of the English weekly that all the Spanish 
ships were made of wood. The statistics on this point 
are worth consideration and study. 

Commodore Dewey had six fighting-ships, and the 
revenue-cutter McCulloch, acting as convoy to the sup- 
ply-ships, and not taking part in the action. These six 
ships have already been described, but for a better un- 
derstanding, their tonnage, armament and state of con- 
struction are given in the table on page 63. 

Numerically the Spaniards had ten fighting-ships 
and two torpedo-boats against the American six. Com- 
modore Dewey had no armored ships at all, and no 
more protection against shell than his opponent. The 
Spanish ships, compared to the American,- were older 
and of inferior types, but as they fought from an an- 
chorage, speed and engines did not count, and they 
were armed with modern guns, which was by far the 
most important qualification. The Spaniards had 5 2 
classified big guns* and J2 rapid-fire and machine guns ; 
the Americans 57 classified big guns, and 74 rapid-fire 
and machine guns. The Americans had 10 eight-inch 
guns, while the largest Spanish guns were 6.2 inches. 

*Argos guns estimated at three. 
64 




RESIDENCE OF AGUINALDO 



MANILA 

Commodore Dewey therefore had the advantage in 
weight of metal and in heavy guns, and his flag-ship, 
the Olympia, far outclassed anything opposed to him. 
Nelson at Aboukir was slightly inferior to his antago- 
nist in weight of metal and number of guns, and had 
no ship as powerful as L'Orient. On the other hand, 
he equalled his foe in number of ships, while the Span- 
iards outnumbered Dewey two to one, and had 1,796 
men against the American 1,678 engaged in action. A 
far more important difference was that, while Nelson 
had only the French fleet to deal with, the Spaniards 
at Manila were supported by powerful, strongly 
manned shore batteries mounted with modern rifled 
guns, some of very large calibre. This last fact, too 
much overlooked, made the odds against Dewey very 
heavy, even after the two mines had exploded without 
result. 

Both Dewey and Nelson hunted down the enemy, 
and engaged them at anchor where they found them. 
Nelson entered an open roadstead by daylight, began 
his action at sunset, and fought on in the darkness. 
Dewey ran past powerful entrance-forts and up a deep 
bay in the darkness, and fought his battle in daylight. 
Neither took the enemy by surprise, for Admiral Mon- 
tojo's report shows that he had tried Subig bay and 
given it up, and that he then made every preparation 
possible to meet the Americans at Cavite under the 
shelter of the batteries. Nelson practically destroyed 
the French fleet, but Admiral Villeneuve escaped the 
next morning, with two ships of the line and two 
frigates, and there was only one English ship, the Zeal- 
ous, not enough for the purpose, in condition to follow 
5 65 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

them. Dewey absolutely destroyed every Spanish ship, 
including the transport Mindanao, and captured the 
other transport, the Manila. He silenced all the land 
batteries and took Cavite. Aboukir had its messengers 
of death in the escaping French ships ; Manila had none. 
Absolute completeness like this cannot be surpassed. 
The Spaniards admitted a loss of 634 killed and wound- 
ed in ships and forts, while the Americans had none 
killed and only eight wounded, all on the Baltimore. 
The American ships were hit several times, but not one 
was seriously injured, much less disabled. This has 
been attributed to the extremely bad marksmanship of 
the Spaniards, and has been used to explain Dewey's 
victory. It is easy to exaggerate the badness of the 
Spanish gunnery. They seem, as a matter of fact, to 
have shot well enough until the Americans opened upon 
them. The shells which struck the Baltimore effect- 
ively were both fired before that ship replied in the sec- 
ond round. But when the American fire began, it was 
delivered with such volume, precision, and concentra- 
tion that the Spanish fire was actually smothered, and 
became wholly wild and ineffective. The great secret 
of the victory was in the accuracy and rapidity of the 
American gunners, which have always been character- 
istic of the American navy, as was shown in the frigate 
duels of 181 2, of which the United States won against 
England eleven out of thirteen. This great quality was 
not accidental, but due to skill, practice, and national 
aptitude. In addition to this traditional skill was the 
genius of the commander, backed by the fighting ca- 
pacity of his captains and his crews. True to the great 
principle of Nelson and Farragut, Dewey went straight 

66 



MANILA 

after his enemy, to fight the hostile fleet wherever 
found. In the darkness he went boldly into an unfa- 
miliar harbor, past powerful batteries the strength of 
which his best information had magnified, over mine 
fields the extent and danger of which he did not and 
could not know. As soon as dawn came he fell upon the 
Spanish fleet, supported as it was by shore batteries, 
and utterly destroyed it. The Spanish empire in the 
East crumbled before his guns, and the great city and 
harbor of Manila fell helplessly into his hands. All this 
was done without the loss of a man or serious injury 
to a ship. The most rigid inspection fails to discover a 
mistake. There can be nothing better than perfection 
of workmanship, and this Dewey and his officers and 
men showed. The completeness of the result, which 
is the final test, gives Manila a great place in the his- 
tory of naval battles, and writes the name of George 
Dewey high up among the greatest of victorious ad- 
mirals. 



CHAPTER IV 
THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 

To the American fleet which through many weary 
weeks had been waiting for action in grim impatience 
at Key West the news of the resolution of Congress and 
of the President's order to sail brought great relief. 
The order came in the late afternoon of April 21, but 
there were still some ships to coal, some more detailed 
instructions to be received from Washington, and it 
was not until the next morning at half past six o'clock 
that they got under way and steamed slowly off" toward 
Havana. The blockade proclaimed by the President 
covered Havana and all ports east and west between 
Cardenas and Bahia Honda, as well as Cienfuegos on 
the south coast, from which a railroad ran to the capital 
city. It was generally believed at the outbreak of the 
war that Havana, which drew most of its supplies from 
the United States, would soon be starved into surrender 
when cut off from the continent and with nothing but a 
desolated country behind it to turn to for relief. Events 
showed that this conception, a perfectly natural one at 
the time, was absolutely unfounded. Either Havana 
had vast stores on hand, or the surrounding country 
and the blockade-running through the southern ports 
were able to supply the city, or all three sources com- 
bined were sufficient for that object. Whatever the ex- 

68 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 

planation, certain it is that although there was a great 
deal of suffering in the capital, there is no indication 
that at the end of the war it was, as a military position, 
much nearer to surrender on account of starvation than 
at the beginning of hostilities. Nevertheless, with the 
theory then prevalent as to the desperate condition of 
the city whose fall meant the end of Spanish rule in 
Cuba, the American blockade closed tightly over Ha- 
vana, and in the opening days of the war Spanish ves- 
sels and steamships plying to the blockaded port fell 
rapidly into the hands of the Americans, until this com- 
merce was practically stopped or destroyed. 

Blockading and prize-taking were not, however, the 
sole duties of the American fleet. It was obvious that 
any attempt to get into the harbor of Havana through 
its narrow channel crammed with mines would be at 
once mad and useless. But it was at the same time very 
desirable to keep open and unprotected, so far as possi- 
ble, the other harbors, because at that moment the 
theory was that we should either land a large army to 
proceed against Havana, or important expeditions to 
co-operate with the insurgents in a movement to cut off 
the capital from the interior. This theory, whether 
strongly or lightly held, was soon set aside by events 
and never acted upon — a very fortunate thing, for it 
rested upon a gross underestimate of the strength of 
Havana and of the Spanish forces, and upon an equally 
gross over-estimate of the numbers and efficiency of the 
insurgents. In the early days of the war, however, it 
had sufficient strength to affect the naval operations 
near Havana, but very luckily led, practically, only to 
work which it would have been well to do in any event. 

69 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

The first affair growing out of these conditions, 
and the first action of the war, occurred at Matan- 
zas. It was discovered that the Spaniards were es- 
tablishing batteries and raising new fortifications at 
that port, and on April 27 Admiral Sampson's flag- 
ship, the New York, supported by the monitor Puritan 
and the unarmored cruiser Cincinnati bombarded the 
defences. The Spanish shooting was very bad, only 
three shots coming near the New York, and none hit- 
ting the Cincinnati, which was much exposed. The 
American shooting, on the other hand, was good, from 
the guns of the Puritan to the rapid-fires of the 
Cincinnati. The Spanish batteries and earth-works 
were badly shattered and broken up, and many 
guns dismounted. As the Captain-General of Cuba 
announced that only one mule was killed, we may con- 
clude with almost absolute certainty that there must 
have been a very considerable loss of life among the 
troops exposed to the American fire. Except as a warn- 
ing to the Spaniards, and as a test of American marks- 
manship, the affair of April 2J at Matanzas was of tri- 
fling importance, although great attention was given to 
it at the moment because it was the first action of the 
war by land or sea. But while the fleet was thus carry- 
ing out its orders by its vigorous blockade, by opening 
a bombardment on the lesser ports, and by harassing 
the coast batteries and garrisons, events were occurring 
elsewhere which determined the future course of the 
war. , 

On April 23 the President called for 125,000 volun- 
teers, and on April 25 Congress adopted a formal dec- 
laration of war, which stated that war had existed since 

70 







R 



i? 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 

April 21 — an unquestioned truth. On the 26th the 
President announced that the United States, although 
not a signatory, would adhere to theagreement of Paris, 
and permit no privateers. The wisdom of this prompt 
and righteous declaration was seen at once in the ap- 
proval which it received abroad, and in the embarrass- 
ment which it caused to Spain, where hopes were enter- 
tained that, all social and national efficiency being dead, 
something might still be done by legalized piracy. In- 
ternational opinion was still further conciliated by our 
giving thirty days to all Spanish ships to leave our 
ports. Thus, while Congress was voting money and 
preparing a bill for war revenue, while the call for vol- 
unteers was going through the land, while camps were 
being formed, men mustered in, the regulars brought 
together from all parts of the country and mobilized at 
Tampa, we were settling rapidly and judiciously our 
relations with the other powers of the earth. There 
was never a moment when any European power could 
or would have dared to interfere with us, although col- 
umns of speculations, predictions, and mysterious warn- 
ings filled the newspapers on this subject. And as there 
was no danger that any one power would interfere, so 
after Manila there was no peril to be apprehended from 
any combination of powers. That was the crisis, and 
when England refused to join the concert of Europe 
in interfering with us in the Philippines — an act not to 
be forgotten by Americans — all possible danger of in- 
terference from any quarter was at an end. Neverthe- 
less, as we adjusted our relations to the rest of the world 
wisely and quickly, when we caught Spain by the throat, 

7i 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

so the rest of the world made haste to define their rela- 
tions, both to us and to our antagonist. 

England declared her neutrality on April 23, the 
same day on which the Governor-General of Hong- 
kong requested Commodore Dewey to leave English 
waters within forty-eight hours — a polite invitation 
fraught with much meaning to what remained of 
Charles V's empire in the East. But we were not the 
only people who had a fighting fleet in neutral waters. 
For some time past Spain had been collecting a torpedo- 
boat flotilla and a squadron of armored cruisers. The 
fleet thus brought together had come to the Canaries, 
and thence had proceeded to the Cape Verde Islands. 
In the days after the Maine explosion, when relations 
between the two countries were straining to the break- 
ing point, the movements of these Spanish ships excited 
intense interest. It was rumored that they were to 
come to Puerto Rico, and had they done so their arrival 
would have precipitated war. But they did not start ; 
they remained quietly at the Cape Verde Islands, and 
when war came they still lingered. It may well be 
doubted whether they would have moved at all if they 
had been in a Spanish harbor, but, unluckily for them, 
the Cape Verde Islands were Portuguese, and al- 
though Portugal was entirely friendly to Spain, 
she was obliged to issue a proclamation of neu- 
trality on April 29. Thereupon the Spanish fleet 
departed, under orders from Madrid. The light tor- 
pedo boats, unprotected cruisers, and transports went 
north to the Canaries, and thence to Spain. The fight- 
ing-squadron was lost sight of steering westward. 
This squadron consisted of the Colon, the Almirante 

72 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 

Oquendo, the Viscaya, and the Maria Teresa, armored 
cruisers of the first class, all new, all the best work of 
European dock-yards, with heavy batteries of the finest 
modern rifles, eight inches of armor, and a contract 
speed of over twenty knots, and of three large torpedo- 
boat destroyers, the Furor, Pluton, and Terror, just out 
of English yards, the last expression of Scotch and 
English building, and with a contract speed of thirty 
knots. The squadron, as it appeared on paper and in the 
naval registers, was, as a whole, powerful in armament, 
fast, and very formidable. There it was, then, loose on 
the ocean, and the question which at once arose and 
overshadowed all others was where Admiral Cervera 
and his ships were going, for they represented the Span- 
ish sea power. When they were found and destroyed, 
the campaign on the Atlantic side would be over, and 
the expulsion of the Spaniards from the American hem- 
isphere could be effected at the pleasure of the United 
States. Until they were destroyed no movement could 
be safely or conclusively undertaken against either Cuba 
or Puerto Rico. It was the old, ever-recurring prob- 
lem of the sea power, as crucial and decisive to the 
United States in the spring of 1898 as it was to Rome 
when Hannibal faced the legions, or to the English 
when Napoleon banded all Europe together against 
Great Britain. 

The Spanish fleet was somewhere in the mid- Atlantic ; 
that was all that was known, and speculation was rife as 
to its destination. The people of the Atlantic seaboard 
thought that a descent upon the coast towns was at 
hand — an obviously impossible solution, because in the 
waters of New England the Spaniards, far removed 

73 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

from any base, would have courted destruction. So 
this opinion was rejected by the Navy Department. 
Another opinion was that Cervera was steaming away 
southward to cut off the Oregon. Here, unfortunately, 
there was much greater probability of truth than in the 
chimera of the descent on the Atlantic coast towns. 
But the Strategy Board wisely decided that to divide 
or scatter the fleets in an efifort to protect the Oregon 
would be a mistake of the first order. The great bat- 
tle-ship must take her chance. Either she would slip 
by her enemies safely, or, if she met them, she would so 
cripple them that their effectiveness would be gone. 
So the Oregon was left to her fate. 

Thus two possibilities for the Spanish fleet were con- 
sidered and set aside. A third was that, after making 
a wide turn, the fleet would return to Spain, and rumors 
of its reappearance at Cadiz kept coming until the mo' 
ment when the truth was known. Such a proceeding 
as this, however, seemed too absurd, even for a Span- 
iard, to a world which had not yet seen Admiral Camara 
go back and forth through the Suez Canal ; and the au- 
thorities in Washington, in consultation with Admiral 
Sampson, decided that Cervera was intending to do the 
sensible thing from a naval standpoint and make for a 
port from which he could operate toward the relief of 
Havana. It was further conjectured, and on all the 
known facts and conditions very wisely conjectured, 
that the Spanish fleet would come to Puerto Rico, the 
natural and only strong Spanish base for operations 
directed toward Cuba. On the speed to be fairly esti- 
mated for such a fleet the time of their arrival at Puerto 
Rico could easily be determined. So it came about, on 

74 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 

this theory of the conditions, that soon after noon on 
May 3 the battle-ships Iowa and Indiana left Key West, 
whence the flag-ship New York followed them at night. 
The rendezvous was at Juruco Cove about twelve miles 
east of Havana. There they were joined by the two 
monitors Terror and Amphitrite, from the blockading 
squadron, the two unarmored cruisers Detroit and 
Montgomery, the torpedo-boat Porter, the tug Wom- 
patuck, and a collier. Then they started east to find the 
Spanish fleet. A more ill-assorted squadron it would 
have been difficult to imagine, and the necessity which 
made it so came from the insufficient, unsystematic 
naval authorizations of Congress running back over 
many years. In the two essential qualities of the 
modern fleet, homogeneity of type and evenness of 
speed, they were painfully deficient. The squadron 
was composed of the most discordant types, and varied 
in speed from the twenty knots or more of the New 
York to the monitors' maximum of less than ten. The 
monitors, in fact, were nothing but a perilous incum- 
brance. Their low speed and limited coal capacity 
made it necessary to tow them, and they thus reduced 
the speed of the fleet to about seven knots. In any sort 
of seaway it was impossible to fight their guns, and if 
an enemy had been encountered in the open ocean, they 
would have been a hindrance and a danger, not a help. 
Thus burdened with ships fit only for the smooth waters 
of a harbor, and with a fleet-speed of seven knots, Ad- 
miral Sampson, thanks to the parsimony of Congress, 
set forth in pursuit of a powerful squadron of homo- 
geneous armored cruisers, with a uniform contract 
speed of twenty knots. 

75 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

His departure was the end of the crude idea with 
which the war opened, that we were to batter down the 
Morro Castle and the Cabanas forts, land a few thous- 
and troops, and take Havana out of hand. Before the 
war a high authority was reported to have said that in 
ten days we could have 40,000 men ready for operations 
in Cuba. April 23 the President called for 125,000 
volunteers, and a month later for 75,000 more. It was 
at once discovered that but very few of the regiments 
furnished by the States were fully equipped ; most 
of them were only partially prepared, and many were 
not equipped at all. Instead of being able to mobilize 
40,000 soldiers in ten days, it was found that it was not 
possible to even muster them in that time. While 
sundry newspapers were clamoring for an immediate 
advance on Havana, it was becoming quite clear to all 
men, even in those confused days, that it would take 
weeks and months, rather than days, to make these 
really fine volunteers into an army ; that the machinery 
of transportation, supplies, hospital service, and the rest 
was utterly inadequate for the strain suddenly put upon 
it, even if it had been good, and that it was not good, 
but bad and rusty. On May 14, ten days after Samp- 
son's departure for Puerto Rico, there were only a little 
over 10,000 men at Tampa, and the wise men who had 
said from the beginning that we ought to move on 
Puerto Rico, the Spanish base, and not begin in early 
summer on Havana, ultimately carried their point be- 
cause of facts more potent than the best reasoning. 

But no military movement being possible until we 
had command of the sea, the pursuit of Cervera's fleet, 
from both the military and the naval point of view, was 

76 




M 






THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 

the one thing to which all else had to he subordinated. 
So while the generals and admirals of civil life were 
laying out and discussing campaigns in the newspapers, 
facts were putting the real war into the right channels ; 
and while the prepared navy was off after Spain's sea 
power, the unprepared army was occupying the time 
thus fortunately given in getting ready with an energy 
and speed most remarkable when one understood the 
wretched system imposed upon it by Congress, and the 
weight of needless clerks, endless red-tape, and fear of 
responsibility which had grown up in choking luxuri- 
ance during the long, neglectful peace. 

But although the direct attack on Havana so confi- 
dently looked for at the outset was thus practically 
abandoned the work of blockading the island and cut- 
ting it off from all outside communication went dili- 
gently forward. Various expeditions were undertaken 
to open connection with the Cuban insurgents and sup- 
ply them with arms and ammunition, as the exagger- 
ated estimate then existing of their numbers and 
efficiency made the belief general that they could be 
developed into a powerful offensive force, and be used 
with effect against the Spaniards. Then and later 
various expeditions were sent forth in the Lcyden, 
Gussie, and Florida, but they had no result. The 
earlier landings, managed and conducted in large 
measure by Captain Dorst of the regular army, a most 
gallant and accomplished officer, were effective some- 
times in the face of a sharp fire. The first skirmishing 
took place on one of these expeditions, much courage 
was shown, some blood was shed, arms were landed, 
and communication opened with the insurgents, but 

77 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

that was the end of it. There was no trouble about the 
expeditions, but nothing was developed by them among 
the insurgents. 

More serious work was that entailed by the blockade 
and by attacks upon the lesser ports to break down the 
defences and destroy any lurking gunboats. Before 
the New York went eastward she had broken up some 
parties of Spaniards who, with strange absence of hu- 
mor, had opened on her with Mauser rifles at Mariel, 
but she was drawing very near to San Juan when, on 
May ii, a far more serious affair than any which had 
yet taken place occurred at Cardenas. Off that port 
the gunboats Machias and Wilmington, the torpedo- 
boat Winslozv, and the converted revenue-cutter Hud- 
son were maintaining the blockade. After a time it 
was learned that there were three Spanish gunboats 
in the harbor, and on the 8th of May an attempt was 
made to decoy them out of the harbor, which so far suc- 
ceeded that one came within range of the Machias, got 
a 6-pounder shell landed upon her, and quickly re- 
treated. It was obvious, after this, that to fight the 
Spaniards it was necessary to go after them wherever 
they might be, a discovery which became later an ac- 
cepted principle of the war. Acting on this theory, the 
Wilmington, Winslozv, and Hudson, on May n, made 
their way into the bay along an unused channel, which 
was free from mines, until they were within a mile and 
a half of the wharves where the enemy's gunboats were 
lying. Then the water became too shoal for the Wil- 
mington, and the Winslozv was ordered ahead to at- 
tack. It was a most reckless piece of work to under- 
take, for the Winslozv was a torpedo-boat, not a fight- 

78 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 

ing-ship, her sides were not over a quarter of an inch 
thick, and she was going to meet ships carrying 12- 
pounders. Her daring commander, Lieutenant Berna- 
dou, and his officers and men, were, however, only too 
eager to make the attempt. On they went, opening 
vigorously with their 1 -pounders to. which the Span- 
iards replied fiercely. Presently they found themselves 
among some red buoys, which, as it proved, marked 
ranges, and the shots from the batteries and the gun- 
boats began to come home. Ten struck the unpro- 
tected boat ; Lieutenant Bernadou was badly wounded, 
but managed to keep his feet, the steering-gear was 
smashed, and one engine. Then came the eleventh 
shot, which killed Ensign Bagley and four men. The 
brave little boat was now floating helplessly in full 
range of the Spanish guns. Her destruction seemed 
certain, but the Hudson, really nothing more than an 
armored harbor tug, but commanded by a gallant rev- 
enue officer, Lieutenant F. H. Newcomb, came bravely 
to the rescue. The Hudson had crept slowly after the 
Winslow, and firing rapidly on the Spaniards, now 
started, in the midst of a storm of projectiles, to bring 
off the disabled torpedo-poat. Twice she got a line to 
the Winslow, and twice it parted. Then the Hudson 
got alongside, and towed the wounded boat, with her 
blood-stained decks and broken sides, out of range and 
into safety. There were five killed and five wounded 
out of the Winslow' s complement of twenty-one officers 
and men, a terrible percentage, and the heaviest loss 
incurred by the American navy in any action of the 
war. It was a rash undertaking, but most gallantly 
faced and brilliantly attempted, a proof, to those who 

79 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

rightly interpreted it, of a very high and victorious 
spirit in the navy of the United States, waiting only for 
a large opportunity to win corresponding triumphs. 
Nor did the blow dealt the Winslow go unavenged. 
When the Hudson and her consort were out of the way, 
the Wilmington drew in, destroyed the Spanish gun- 
boat which had been engaged, and smashed and si- 
lenced all the shore batteries, with a heavy loss to the 
garrisons. There was nothing more to be feared from 
the gunboats or defences of Cardenas. 

The same day that the Winslow, the Hudson and 
the Wilmington were having their action at Cardenas, 
far away on the southern coast of Cuba another fight 
was taking place, in the progress of the work of sepa- 
rating the great island from the rest of the world. On 
the night of May 10, Captain McCalla of the Marble- 
head called for volunteers to protect the cable-cutters 
in their work. The roll was soon filled, and the next 
morning the steam-launches of the Marblehead and 
Nashville, towing the two sailing-launches under com- 
mand of Lieutenants Winslow and Anderson, started 
into the harbor of Cienfuegos about quarter before 
seven. They carried a squad of marines picked for 
proficiency as marksmen, and a machine-gun in the bow 
of each boat. The Nashville and Marblehead then 
opened fire on the Spanish batteries, and under cover 
of this, and that of the steam-launches, the crews of 
the other boats went to work. It was a perilous 'busi- 
ness, but the sailors grappled and cut successfully the 
two cables they had been ordered to destroy. They also 
found a third small cable, but the grapnel fouled the 
bottom and was lost. Meantime the Spanish fire grew 

80 







CUTTING THE CABLES UNDER FIRE AT CIENFUEGOS 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 

hotter and hotter, pouring out from the batteries and 
machine-guns, and the boats began to suffer. The 
well-directed fire from the rifles of the marines and 
from the one-pounders kept the Spaniards from reach- 
ing the switch-house which controlled the submarine 
torpedoes, but launches could not contend with bat- 
teries at close range, and when the work for which they 
came, and which had all been performed under a heavy 
fire, was done, they withdrew to the ships. Nine men, 
including Lieutenant Winslow, had been wounded, 
some seriously, and three, as was reported later, mor- 
tally. It was a very gallant exploit, coolly and thor- 
oughly carried through, under a galling fire, and it 
succeeded in its purpose of hampering and blocking in 
the enemy at the important port of Cienfuegos, which 
was the road to Havana from the southern coast. It 
was another twist in the coil which the United States 
was tightening about Cuba. 



CHAPTER V 
THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA 

Meantime the ill-assorted fleet under Admiral 
Sampson was making the best way it could eastward, 
and the pursuit of Cervera's fleet had fairly begun. It 
was known when the Spaniards had sailed, but whither 
they had gone could only be a matter of guess. They 
might be going to harry the New England coast, or at 
least, as has been said, some persons thought this possi- 
ble. More reasonable was the second theory already 
alluded to that they intended to intercept the Oregon. 
The great battle-ship had arrived on March 9 at San 
Francisco, and on the 19th, with Captin Clark in com- 
mand, she started on her long voyage round Cape Horn, 
to join the North Atlantic Squadron. On April 7 she 
left Callao, where she coaled, for Sandy Point, run- 
ning steadily on through heavy seas, and maintaining 
high speed. On April 16 she reached the strait, and 
rode out a severe gale at her anchors, at Port Tamar. 
The next day the battle-ship was at Sandy Point, where 
she coaled again, and picked up the gunboat Marietta. 
On the 2 1 st the ships ran through the strait by which 
Magellan passed to found Spain's empire in the East, 
and turned northward in Atlantic waters. Here came 
the shadow of a new danger, for the Spanish torpedo- 
boat Temerario was at Montevideo, menacing an at- 

82 




*4 

i 




A 



THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA 

tack in the night. But there was no change in speed or 
direction. On the ships forged, with guns shotted, the 
rapid-fires ready, and lights screened at night. Offi- 
cers and men stood double watches, and those carried 
insensible from the fire-room begged to return as soon 
as they came to themselves. Luckily for her, the Tem- 
erario never became visible, and on April 30 the Ameri- 
can ships were at Rio. Here they met a cprdial recep- 
tion, and once more were coaled. Here too came news 
of the existence of war, and of the sailing of the Span- 
ish fleet with an unknown destination. Four power- 
ful armored cruisers and three torpedo-boats, some- 
where, perhaps on the track to the north : heavy odds 
these for one ship. But Captain Clark leaves Rio on 
May 4, drops his slower consorts, the Marietta and 
Nictheroy, off Cape Frio, and there is no quiver in his 
despatch of May 9, from Bahia. He says, quite simply, 
"The Oregon could steam fourteen knots for hours, 
and in a running fight might beat off and cripple the 
Spanish fleet," and those who read these words think 
of Sir Richard Grenville in the years gone by, and 
know that the sea spirit of the north, drawn from a far- 
distant past, is still burning strong and clear in this 
American captain and his crew. So he leaves Bahia, 
and on May 18 he is at Barbadoes, and then comes an- 
other space of anxiety, deeper among men on land than 
among those on the battle-ship, and then the country 
hears, on May 24, that the Oregon is at Jupiter Inlet, 
Florida, her great voyage done. A pause, and then the 
world knows that the Oregon, after her 14,000 miles 
through all seas and weather, is on her way to join the 
fighting-line, not a rivet, nor a bolt, nor a gearing 

83 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

broken or out of place. It appears very sharply in this 
fashion that, despite wise critics in Europe, American 
battle-ships can make great voyages and face the seas 
as well as fight, and that there is a capacity for true 
and honest workmanship ' in the United States very 
comforting to think on. Very clear, too, is the still 
greater fact that the American seamen, captain and 
crew, are filled to-day with the old spirit of the sea- 
conquerors shining undimmed and strong. 

So the Spanish fleet did not seek the Oregon, and 
would have been crippled and shattered if it had made 
the attempt, and the department very wisely left the 
battle-ship to take care of herself, and would not divide 
the fleet. And it was also decided, as has already been 
said, that the enemy would not go to New England, 
but that, on the assumption (a very violent one, as ap- 
peared later) of intelligent action, they would go to 
the obvious and all-important Spanish base of Puerto 
Rico. So thither went Admiral Sampson, warned at 
Cape Haitien from Washington not to risk damage to 
his ships in a bombardment, and on May n, when the 
Winslow was fighting desperately at Cardenas, and 
other American sailors were cutting cables at Cien- 
fuegos, the fighting-fleet was drawing near to San Juan. 
It was still dark when the lights of the town became 
visible the next morning, and when the sun rose the 
city lay before them. The admiral's flag was shifted to 
the Iozva, the tug W ompatuck was anchored to mark 
the ten-fathom line, and then the ships, with the De- 
troit leading, went in and opened fire, while the Mont- 
gomery ran by and silenced the batteries of Fort Canelo, 
on the other side of the bay. The Spanish gunnery 

84 



THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA 

was bad, the American, improving after the first round, 
very good. The forts were seriously damaged, but 
neither destroyed nor silenced. Some shells passed 
over into the town, wrecking and setting fire to certain 
buildings. In the third round both the New York and 
Iozva were hit, but not seriously, and one man was 
killed and seven wounded. The best reports ob- 
tainable put the Spanish loss at forty killed and 
seventy wounded. After three hours of this work 
the signal was made to cease firing, and the bom- 
bardment of San Juan was over. It had answered en- 
tirely its purpose, which was merely that of a recon- 
noissance in force. That it was a mistake to send the 
fighting-ships on such an errand is probably true but at 
least it had been demonstrated that the Spanish fleet 
was not there, which was of high importance, and that 
the surrender of the city could be compelled, know- 
ledge, of which no advantage was taken at any time, 
and which was useless at the moment, as we had no 
landing force. Such were the results of the affair of 
San Juan to the Americans ; but there was another out- 
come, which affected only the Spaniards. 

The authorities at Washington were striving to 
guess accurately the probable destination of the Spanish 
fleet, and they very naturally based their reasoning on 
what was publicly known of the character and quality 
of the enemy's ships, and upon the proposition that 
they had a plan, and would endeavor to do the best and 
most effective work possible. We know now that the 
Spaniards had no plan whatever, that their ships were 
defective in guns and ammunition, and that, instead 
of having a homogeneous and high speed rate, they 

85 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

were in poor condition, and the Vizcaya in such a state 
that, in Admiral Cervera's words, she was "a boil on 
the fleet." All calculations, therefore, based upon the 
contract speed of the Spanish cruisers, and upon the 
theory that the Spaniards had a plan, were quite idle 
in regard to an enemy with ships in bad condition and 
no plan at all. So while Washington was carrying the 
Spanish fleet rapidly over the ocean at ten to twelve 
knots an hour toward a well-defined objective-point, in 
reality they were creeping along at seven knots an hour 
and making vaguely for some point in the West Indies, 
to do they did not know what. On May 12, without 
any apparent reason, they brought up at the friendly 
French port of Martinique, and there they heard of the 
bombardment of San Juan, which had its last result 
in convincing the Spaniards that, whatever happened, 
they would not go to Puerto Rico and run into the arms 
of Admiral Sampson. So, leaving behind the Terror, 
which had been damaged by the voyage they went on 
in purposeless fashion to the Dutch island of Curacoa, 
like Martinique, within touch of cables, so that the 
wastes of ocean no longer sheltered them, and their 
whereabouts was published to the world. This fact and 
the laws of neutrality made a stay impossible, and on 
May 15 the poor, aimless, vaguely wandering fleet, af- 
ter getting a little coal, set forth again and went to 
Santiago de Cuba, for no better reason, seemingly, than 
that it was the nearest port under the Spanish flag 
where they could hope to coal and refit. 

This haven, the last they were ever to enter, was a 
typical Cuban harbor. A narrow entrance, with a chan- 
nel only a hundred yards wide, cuts sharply between 

86 



THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA 

high hills, one of which is crowned by the picturesque 
"Morro Castle." An island faces the entrance chan- 
nel, which, dividing, passes on either side, and then 
opens out in a broad and beautiful bay, with the city 
lying at the foot of the encircling hills. Everything 
in the harbor is quite invisible from the open sea. No 
more secure place could be imagined; for no hostile 
fleet, unsupported by an army could pass that narrow 
channel sown with mines ; while on the other hand, no 
harbor could be more readily blockaded, and to go out 
unperceived in the face of an alert and watchful enemy 
was impossible. 

Here, at all events, was a chance to rest. There was 
no military or naval purpose to be served in Santiago, 
which had no communication with Havana except by 
telegraph, but it was better than helpless wandering. 
Coal, slow in delivery, as well as provisions, was to be 
had there, and it was a very inviting hiding-place if 
not trusted in too long. In this wise, at all events, 
whatever their reasons, the Spaniards hid themselves, 
and the more active part of the game was meantime 
carried on by the Americans, whose one object now 
was to seek and find. This was a very difficult task. 
We knew when the Spaniards reached Martinique, we 
knew again when they left Curacoa, and then the veil 
dropped, and Washington went to guessing and con- 
jecturing, much hampered by the difficulty of getting 
news and orders to the fleets before the former had 
been superseded by fresh information and the latter 
had become obsolete. Nevertheless the department did 
its best in all the confusion of reports and conjectures. 
On May 13, the day after the arrival of the Spaniards 

87 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

at Martinique, the Flying Squadron under Commodore 
Schley, consisting of the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, and 
Texas, which had been kept for this contingency in 
Hampton Roads, sailed for Key West, and every effort 
was made to convey information to the Puerto Rican 
expedition. 

The same day Admiral Sampson, knowing now that 
Cervera was not in San Juan, with prompt decision 
sailed for Havana, the central point to be guarded in 
case Cervera was aiming to break the blockade there, 
as he ought to have been. When Sampson reached 
Cape Haitien he received despatches announcing the ap- 
pearance of the Spaniards at Martinique, and then at 
Curacoa, with the subsequent departure from the latter 
island. Telegrams went at once to warn blockaders 
at Cienfuegos and to the scout Harvard. In the latter, 
dated May 15, the admiral said that the destination 
of the Spaniards was unknown, but was probably San- 
tiago or San Juan — an instance of sagacity and insight 
which is most remarkable, for at that time nobody had 
thought of Santiago, which on the face of things was a 
most unlikely refuge. This done, the admiral left his 
slow-going squadron, and in the Neiv York steamed 
as rapidly as possible to Key West. On the way he got 
tidings from a despatch-boat, which told him that 
Schley had sailed, and that Cervera had with him mu- 
nitions of war (which is now known to have been un- 
true), and that therefore his object must be to connect 
in some way with Havana. The statement as to the 
munitions pointed directly to Cienfuegos as the obvious 
destination of the Spanish fleet. Therefore, on ar- 
riving at Key West he sent the Flying Squadron, con- 



THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA 

sisting of the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, and 
Scorpion, on May 19, with orders to proceed as rap- 
idly as possible to Cienfuegos. The following day the 
Iozva, Castine, and the collier Mcrrimac, with over 
3,000 tons of coal on board, were despatched to re-en- 
force them. Although she did not leave until eleven 
o'clock on May 20th, twenty-seven hours after Com- 
modore Schley and looked in at Havana on her way, 
the Iozva when she reached Cienfuegos shortly after 
noon on May 22, had gained nearly twenty hours on the 
Flying Squadron. Commodore Schley in starting after 
the enemy went fifty miles wide of Cape San Antonio 
and did not reach Cienfuegos until after daybreak on 
May 22 consuming nearly seventy-two hours with 
every reason and incentive to hurry in traversing a dis- 
tance which Captain Evans in the Iowa had covered 
in fifty hours. The Iozva carried a note from the ad- 
miral to Commodore Schley repeating the information 
as to Cervera's munitions of war which seemed to make 
Cienfuegos their absolutely necessary destination and 
advising the close blockade of that port.* 



*Note. — Particular mention is made of this note because Ad- 
miral Schley produced it in his reply to the communication made 
to the Senate on February 6, 1899, by the Secretary of the Navy. 
He called especial attention to it with the object of apparently 
showing : first, that this important despatch had been suppressed 
by this department, an inference certain newspapers were quick to 
draw ; and second, that this despatch furnished a complete ex- 
planation and defence of his doings and his delays at Cienfuegos. 
The department did not suppress the "Dear Schley" note, for it 
had no knowledge of its existence on February 6th and did not 
receive a copy of it until February 9th. The note'existed only in 
the original in Commodore Schley's possession and he alone had 
the power to withhold or suppress it. It is impossible to suppose 
that he was so disingenuous as to intend to convey the impression 
that the Department or Admiral Sampson had suppressed some- 

89 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

Just after the Iozva and her consorts had gone word 
came from the department that press despatches re- 
ported the Spaniards at Santiago. The next day, May 
21, the press report corresponding with his own opin- 
ion, Admiral Sampson sent the Marblehcad with or- 
ders to Commodore Schley to go to Santiago if he was 
satisfied the Spaniards were not at Cienfuegos. Later 
in the day, after he had left Key West for Havana, and 
evidently growing more certain as to Santiago, he sent 
the Hawk with another message to Commodore Schley, 
ordering him imperatively and without qualification 
to go to Santiago, and, as the Hazvk would reach Cien- 
fuegos on May 23, to leave before daylight on the 24th. 

Turning now to the Flying Squadron it appears that 
Commodore Schley reached Cienfuegos on the 21st, 
and on the 22d he wrote that he could not say whether 
the Spanish fleet was there or not, and complained of 
the difficulty of coaling. On the 23d he wrote, in re- 
ply to the unqualified orders conveyed by the Hawk, 
that on account of the smoke visible in the harbor he 
believed that the Spaniards were there, that he doubted 
the report about Santiago, that he thought it unwise 
to chase a probability, and should remain where he was. 
In other words he said that he proposed to disobey the 
unqualified "Hawk" orders for the reasons he stated. 

thing not in their possession, but this impression got abroad, and 
once for all should be shown to be entirely false. As to the sec- 
ond point, the "Dear Schley" note furnished neither defence nor 
excuse for the de'ay at Cienfuegos, for on arriving on May 22nd 
at one o'clock it was superseded together with the original in- 
struction of May 19 at 7.30 A. M., on May 23d, when the Hawk 
arrived with imperative orders to proceed at once to Santiago, or- 
ders which were not obeyed by Commodore Schley until the late 
afternoon of May 24th. 

90 



THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA 

Later in the day he sent another despatch, saying that 
a steamship, the Adula, just in reported seven ships 
seventy miles south of Santiago, but that from the 
firing of guns which he had heard in the harbor, a 
salute of welcome, as he guessed, although obviously 
very belated, he still believed the Spaniards to be there. 
The next day May 24, at 8 A.M.,theMarblehead ar- 
rived and Captain McCalla at once asked permission to 
communicate with the Cubans in camp at Colorados 
point and find out from them whether the Spanish fleet 
was in the harbor or not. This was a sure means of 
getting absolute information as to the presence of Cer- 
vera in Cienfuegos but Commodore Schley had con- 
tented himself with guessing from the appearance of 
smoke or the sound of guns and had refrained from 
asking the simple direct question from those who knew 
because he considered that the surf was heavy and 
did not think that he could land boats to make the nec- 
essary inquiries. Captain McCalla was less anxious 
about the surf and having obtained the required author- 
ity ran in, opened communication with the Cubans, 
learned at once that Cervera was not in Cienfuegos and 
had never been there and before three o'clock Com- 
modore Schley had the information. He sent on that 
day a long despatch complaining of the difficulty of 
coaling where he was, and declaring that he could not 
coal off Santiago, but saying that he should start east- 
ward on the following day. But after the direct know- 
ledge obtained in quick and energetic fashion by Cap- 
tain McCalla there was no possible reason or excuse 
for further delay and at quarter before six on May 24 
the squadron started having lost two days, for if the 

9 1 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

Hawk orders had been obeyed they would have been 
at Santiago on May 24th as Sampson expected instead 
of just leaving Cienfuegos. So, on May 25, while 
Sampson, disturbed by Schley's reply to the Hawk des- 
patches, and by the delay he foresaw, when every hour 
was precious, was sending still another boat to Cien- 
fuegos with orders for Santiago more imperative than 
any which had gone before, the Flying Squadron, con- 
vinced at last by Captain McCalla's direct information 
from the insurgents that the enemy were not in Cien- 
fuegos, was steaming to the eastward very slowly in 
order to allow the little Eagle which was of no import- 
ance whatever to the fighting line to keep up. On the 
26th, at noon, they were forty-seven miles west-south- 
west of Santiago's Morro; at eight o'clock in the 
evening, twenty-two miles to the southward of the cas- 
tle. There the three scouts the Minneapolis, St. Paul 
and Yale were met and Captain Sigsbee of the St. Paul 
who had been there since the 21st of May reported 
that he had not seen the Spanish fleet but that he 
thoroughly believed it to be there and the Cuban pilot 
Nunez although of opinion that the Spanish vessels 
could not enter the harbor admitted that they might 
have got in with tugs.* Acting on this informa- 
tion and without an effort to find out whether Cervera 



*Note. — Admiral Schley in his letter to the Senate Committee 
states that Captain Sigsbee assured him that he did not believe 
that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago. Captain Sigsbee in his 
letter of February 24th to the Secretary of the Navy says that 
his belief constantly and openly expressed was the exact contrary 
of that attributed to him by Admiral Schley and that Nunez ad- 
mitted that Cervera's fleet might have got in by the aid of tugs, 
a statement Admiral Schley omits to repeat in giving the opinion 
of Nunez. 

92 



THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA 

was in Santiago, Commodore Schley then signalled, 
"Destination, Key West via south side of Cuba and 
Yucatan Channel as soon as collier is ready; speed, 
nine knots." For one week the door of Santiago had 
been open to Cervera, coaling slowly and feebly within, 
to issue forth and go where he pleased. At last an 
American fleet was in the neighborhood, and still the 
door stood open. Obeying the signal of the flag-ship, 
the fleet started slowly westward for Key West. On 
the morning of May 27th the retreating Flying Squad- 
ron which had gone some eighteen miles to the west- 
ward and was forty miles from Santiago when it 
stopped, met the Harvard and Captain Colton gave Ad- 
miral Schley the following order from the Navy De- 

V ' Washington, May 25, 1898. 

Harvard, St. Nicholas Mole, Haiti- 

Proceed at once and inform Schley, and also the senior officer 
present off Santiago, as follows: All Department's information 
indicates Spanish division is still at Santiago. The Department 
looks to you to ascertain facts, and that the enemy, if therein, does 
not leave without a decisive action. Cubans familiar with San- 
tiago say that there are landing places 5 or 6 nautical miles west 
from the mouth of harbor, and that there insurgents probably 
will be found, and not the Spanish. From the surrounding 
heights can see every vessel in port. As soon as ascertained, noti- 
fy the Department whether enemy is there. Could not squadron 
and also the Harvard coal from Merrimac leeward of Cape Cruz, 
Gonaives Channel or Mole, Haiti? The Department will send 
coal immediately to Mole. Report without delay situation at San- 
tiago de Cuba. Long. 

To this unqualified order Admiral Schley made the 

following reply. 

Kingston, May 28, 1898. 

Secretary of the Navy, Washington: (written May 27, 1898.) 
The receipt of telegram of May 26* is acknowledged. Deliv- 

93 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

ered by Harvard off Santiago de Cuba. Merrimac engines dis- 
abled ; is heavy ; am obliged to have towed to Key West. Have 
been unable absolutely to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen, 
Brooklyn from collier, all owing to very rough sea. Bad 
weather since leaving Key West. The Brooklyn alone has more 
than sufficient coal to proceed to Key West; can not remain off 
Santiago present state squadron coal account. Impossible to 
coal leeward Cape Cruz in the summer, all owing to southwester- 
ly winds. Harvard reports coal sufficient for Jamaica; leaves to- 
day for Kingston ; reports only small vessels could coal at 
Gonaives or Mole. Minneapolis only coaled for Key West; also 
Yale, which tows Merrimac. Much to be regretted, can not obey 
orders of Department. Have striven earnestly ; forced to proceed 
for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan passage. Can not as- 
certain anything respecting enemy positive. Obliged to send 
Eagle — admitted no delay — to Port Antonio, Jamaica; had only 
25 tons of coal. Will leave St. Paul off Santiago de Cuba. Will 
require 10,000 tons of coal at Key West. Very difficult to tow 

collier to get cable to hold. 

Schley. 

This telegram repeated to Admiral Sampson at Key West, 
May 29. 

This was direct and admitted disobedience of orders. 
Far from striving earnestly, he had made no effort 
further than to ask the opinion of the scouts to de- 
termine whether Cervera was in Santiago or not and 
now announced that he was forced to proceed to Key- 
West' for coal and that he was unable to coal at sea. 
Neither statement was correct. The coal supply on the 
ships was as follows. 

Extracts from logs of vessels for May 27. 
Massachusetts : Tons 

Coal remaining on hand at noon 5 to 6 days' supply. . . . 789 

Texas: 

Coal remaining on hand at noon 5 to 6 days' supply 394 

Brooklyn : 

Coal remaining on hand at noon 10 to 12 days' supply. . 940 

94 



THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA 

Marblehead : Tons 

Coal remaining on hand at noon 3 to 4 days' supply. ... 116 

Iowa : 

Coal remaining on hand at noon 8 to 10 days' supply. . . 762 

Merrimac : 

Coal at noon, on hand 4,300 

As to not being able to coal at sea from the Merri- 
mac with her 4,300 tons on board the ships were coaled 
from her at sea during the two following days. 

The Merrimac before this had broken down and the 
Squadron had drifted about while efforts were made to 
repair her and while the Yale was trying to take her 
in tow but after sending his despatch announcing that 
he could not obey the orders of the Department, Admi- 
ral Schley started again to the westward away from 
Santiago. The Squadron made about twenty-five miles 
and then stopped and remained where it was perform- 
ing the impossible feat of coaling at sea until between 
one and two o'clock on May 28th. Then being about 
forty-eight miles west of Santiago the door all this time 
having remained wide open to Cervera to go whither 
he pleased Admiral Schley apparently changed his mind 
once more and made a signal from the flag-ship to move 
to the eastward. Steaming slowly, the squadron reached 
Santiago that evening. The next morning, at quarter 
before eight, the Iowa made out the Colon and two 
other cruisers in the harbor. The game of hide-and- 
seek was at an end, and the Spanish fleet had been 
found at last. There was and could be no question 
now as to going away, and the squadron during May 
30 stood to and fro off Santiago, well out from the 
land with the Marblehead and Vixen patrolling 

95 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

nearer inshore. During that day the New Orleans ap- 
peared with the collier Sterling, and on the next day 
when night came the squadron went away out of sight 
from land giving Cervera ample opportunity to run out 
in the darkness; Admiral Schley's theory being appar- 
ently that a close blockade by daylight was sufficient. 
On May 31, the Massachusetts leading, with Admiral 
Schley on board, and followed by the New Orleans and 
Iowa, ran in and opened fire upon the ships and bat- 
teries in the harbor. The ranges began at 7.500 yards 
and were increased to 11,000, the bombardment lasting 
half an hour, the shots falling short, and no damage 
whatever being done to the Spaniards. Then the ships 
drew off to their station, well out from the land, to con- 
tinue during the daytime this somewhat remote block- 
ade and to retire out of sight from land at night.* Cer- 
vera's door was closing upon him. He could still come 
out at his pleasure more readily at night than by day 
but at the cost, perhaps, a fight. 

The anxiety in Washington and on board the flag- 
ship of the North Atlantic fleet during these perilous 
days, while the Flying Squadron was making its slow 
way eastward from Cienfuegos and drifting about some 
forty miles away from Santiago, was intense, and grew 
more feverish as the presence of the Spanish fleet be- 
came more assured and the despatches from Commodore 
Schley more uncertain. On May 27, after sending, as 

*Note. — The Marblehead at night remained within about six 
miles of the Morro, and the other ships steamed to and fro before 
the entrance, where they could make out the entrance clearly, but 
so far off that they could not be seen from land at all. See diary 
of Lieutenant Muller y Fejeiro, published by Bureau of Naval In- 
telligence, pages 16 and 17. 

96 



THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA 

has been said, imperative orders for the third time to 
leave Cienfuegos, Admiral Sampson received Commo- 
dore Schley's despatch of the 24th depicting the difti- 
culties of coaling and announcing his departure for 
Santiago. Thereupon he ordered Captain Folger, in 
the New Orleans, to proceed at once to Santiago, di- 
rect Commodore Schley to maintain the blockade there 
at all hazards, and to use the collier Sterling (a sten- 
ographer's mistake for the Merrimdc) for the obstruc- 
tion of the channel by sinking her in the narrowest part. 
The next day, May 28, at midnight, came news from 
Secretary Long of Schley's despatch of the 27th an- 
nouncing his departure from Santiago for Key West, 
which had made the day of its arrival the darkest of 
the whole war to the Navy Department. The Secre- 
tary asked if Sampson could go with the New York, 
Oregon, and Indiana to Santiago, and how long he 
could blockade. Sampson replied that he could block- 
ade indefinitely, and asked leave to go at once with the 
New York and Oregon. Permission came in the even- 
ing, and at eleven o'clock Sampson left Key West in 
the New York, was joined the next morning by the 
Oregon, the converted yacht Mayflower, and the tor- 
pedo-boat Porter, and set off at high speed for Santi- 
ago. On the way, filled with anxiety because the last 
news was that the Flying Squadron had left Santiago, 
the admiral met the Yale and the St. Paul, and re- 
ceived from Captain Sigsbee a despatch from Commo- 
dore Schley of May 29, announcing that the Spanish 
cruisers had been seen and that he was blockading the 
port. Greatly relieved, the admiral sped on, and at six 
in the morning of June 1 he saw the Colon inside the 
7 97 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

Morro point, and the Flying Squadron lying off the 
narrow entrance. All was well ; the Spaniards had been 
found, they were still in their hiding-place, and now 
the door was really to be closed by night as well as day 
so that Cervera would only be able to choose between 
capture in the harbor, or breaking open the door and 
rushing to destruction outside. 

The first movement of Admiral Sampson was to ob- 
struct the narrow channel. He did not hope to block it 
permanently, for he knew that any obstruction could 
sooner or later be removed by dynamite. But he be- 
lieved, and with reason, that he could obstruct it tem- 
porarily, and his object was to gain time for the ar- 
rival of the troops, whose coming was already an- 
nounced, and whose presence would be absolutely nec- 
essary to enable him to get at the Spaniards, either by 
forcing Cervera to leave the harbor, or by obtaining 
control of and clearing the mine-fields so that he could 
himself enter and attack. To attain this object he had 
decided to sink a collier in the channel, and gave orders 
to that effect to Captain Folger when he sent him off 
on May 27 to Santiago. On the 29th he opened the 
subject to Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson, a 
young naval constructor of marked ability and energy, 
and by the time the fleet reached Santiago on June 1 
Hobson had prepared his plan, which was so thorough 
and excellent that the admiral decided to place the peril- 
ous and important work wholly in the hands of that 
young officer. Thus far nothing had been done toward 
closely locking Cervera up in his retreat, but as soon 
as Admiral Sampson arrived the Mcrrimac was se- 
lected to be sunk in the channel, and the work of strip- 

98 



THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA 

ping her and making ready the anchors which were to 
hold her, and the torpedoes which were to shatter her 
bottom, went forward with hot haste under the direc- 
tion of Lieutenant Hobson. The call for volunteers 
was made by signal, and hundreds of the sailors came 
forward. Men begged to be taken, implored Hobson to 
choose them, and turned away utterly miserable be- 
cause they could not go on a desperate undertaking 
which every one believed meant certain death while 
those who were chosen thanked their officers weeks aft- 
erwards for kindly allowing them to go when so many 
were seeking this terrible chance. Here again was a 
very fine and noble spirit, telling what the American 
navy was, and why it was soon to be victorious — some- 
thing here quite worthy of the consideration of Spain, 
which had so insisted upon senseless war. 

Hobson finally selected from the crowd of appli- 
cants Phillips, Kelly, Mullen, and Deignan, of the 
Merrimac, because they were familiar with the ship; 
then he took Charette, a gunner's mate, and Montague, 
chief master-at-arms, from the New York, and thus 
completed his little crew. Captain Miller of the Mer- 
rimac was bitterly disappointed when the admiral told 
him he could not go, but that did not prevent him from 
giving every advice and help to the men who were go- 
ing on his ship. The preparations, although pushed 
with such intense energy, were so many that it was 
difficult to get them finished, and the night was far 
gone when all was done. At last the ship started, and 
then there was more delay in trying to tow the launch, 
which was to run in as near as possible and wait to 
rescue any survivors after the ship had sunk. When 

99 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

they finally set forth there was already a streak of light 
in the east, and as the Merrimac was steaming to the 
harbor entrance, the torpedo-boat Porter dashed up 
with an order of recall from the admiral. Back went 
the Merrimac, and a day of waiting and suspense fol- 
lowed, not easy to bear when men's nerves were strung 
to such work as lay before Hobson and his crew. Mul- 
len, utterly exhausted by his labors in preparing the 
ship, gave out, and his place was taken by Murphy, a 
coxswain on the Iowa. Robert Crank, the assistant 
engineer of the ship, with bitter disappointment, was 
ordered away at the last moment and not allowed to go. 
Finally the long day passed, night came, and at half 
past three in the morning the Merrimac started again, 
this time with an additional man, Clausen, who was 
coxswain of the barge, and had come on board with 
Ensign Powell. He asked permission to go, and was 
accepted by Hobson, thus getting his chance at the 
great prize of death in battle. This time there was no 
recall ; on she ran, every man at his post, the young 
lieutenant standing upright and alone on the bridge, 
Deignan at the wheel, steering coolly and taking every 
order with absolute correctness, and not a sailor mov- 
ing except at the word of command. Nearer and 
nearer the doomed ship went, with gradually slackening 
speed. Then the Spaniards saw her, and there came a 
storm of shot and shell, fierce, resistless, like a torrent. 
Still on the ship steered, still slackening in speed — goes 
too far, as the event proved, her steering-gear having 
been shot away, and the lashings of Montague's anchor, 
which dropped too soon — and then, torn by her own 
torpedoes and by those of the enemy, she sinks far up 

ioo 




' 



THE LAST OF THE MERRIH 



THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA 

in the channel. The parting of the anchors, the loss 
of the steering-gear, and consequent running in too far, 
the sweep of the current, combine, and she goes to the 
bottom, lying lengthwise, and not across. The crew, 
every task performed, lie at the appointed place upon 
the deck in the storm of projectiles, the torpedoes ex- 
ploding beneath, and go down with the reeling ship into 
the whirl of dark waters. They have done their duty. 
The Mcrrimac, as she lies now, makes the entrance 
perhaps a little more difficult, but does not block it. So 
far the attempt fails, but the brave deed does not fail, 
for such gallantry is never a failure. It rouses and up- 
lifts the American people, for these men are theirs; it 
appeals to the lovers of daring the world over; it is a 
shining and splendid feat of arms ; it tells to all what 
the American navy is; it ranks Hobson with dishing 
when he pushed his torpedo against the Albemarle, 
with Decatur when he fired the Philadelphia. And the 
men who did the deed cling, chilled and spent in the 
water, to the raft which is fast to the sunken ship, and 
in the darkness are not hit or found, but in the morning 
are taken off by Admiral Cervera, who greets them as 
"valiente." On the American side, brave young 
Powell, creeping about with his launch, in the midst of 
a heavy fire from the batteries, on the chance of res- 
cuing Hobson and his men, comes out at last, much fired 
at, but with none of the Mcrrimac crew on board, and 
when he closes his report, saying simply, "and no one 
came back, sir," the fleet fear the worst, and believe 
that the gallant deed has been paid for with eight lives. 
But later in the clay comes out a Spanish boat, with a 
flag from Admiral Cervera, to announce that Hobson 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

and his sailors are prisoners, alive and well, and little 
hurt. It is sad that for the sake of Spain they could 
not have remained with Admiral Cervera — -a brave 
man facing inevitable ruin with courage — but they were 
turned over to the military authorities on land, who 
placed them and kept them for some days in the Morro 
Castle, in range of the American bombardment — an 
act rather sullying to a people who are fond of talking 
about honor, but appear to think that in that connection 
words are enough. 

So closed the first move of Admiral Sampson to 
blockade the enemy. The second, which began at the 
same time, lasted for many weary days, and was neither 
suddenly brilliant nor vividly picturesque, but like much 
of what is best in the world, without show, with no 
chance of ever getting the due meed of praise, except 
from history and posterity did efficiently and well the 
work that was there to do. This second move was the 
establishment of the blockade of the harbor by the ships. 
Foreign experts doubted whether it were possible to 
blockade four cruisers and two fine torpedo-boat de- 
stroyers in any harbor. The latter, it was thought, 
would surely slip out in the darkness, and then would 
come in a moment's space the destruction of a battle- 
ship or two, and so an end of the blockade. But there 
was no darkness in the entrance of Santiago Harbor 
after the 8th of June. Two battle-ships, relieving 
and supporting each other, went in every night within 
four miles, and the rays of the powerful search-lights 
made the narrow channel as bright as day. So great 
was the glare that when the fatal moment came Admiral 
Cervera did not dare to issue forth into that zone of 



THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA 

white light, where he, blinded by the glare, would have 
been a helpless target for an enemy veiled in the dark- 
ness. At night also picket-launches ran in less than a 
mile from the shore, and there, within rifle range, toss- 
ing often on rough seas, watched through the long 
hours, ready to give warning of the slightest movement 
from inside the harbor. The close blockade by day 
begun on June I was kept up and constantly increased 
in stringency. The ships, at first stationed at six miles 
from the harbor mouth, were drawn in to four miles a 
little later, and the enemy thus hemmed in, so that at no 
hour in the twenty-four could he come forth without 
meeting the American fleet in carefully chosen posi- 
tions, ready for battle, and with orders which left no 
room for doubt as to just what they should do. In this 
blockade, where nothing was overlooked and nothing 
forgotten, Admiral Sampson, by strenuous honest 
work, by keen foresight, and by unwearying and un- 
ceasing vigilance, made not only possible, but humanly 
speaking, certain, the victory which was to come, a 
great feat in naval warfare, and a very fine and lasting 
service to the American campaign. 

The blockade was varied by a bombardment on June 
6, by an attack on the battery east of the Morro by the 
New Orleans on June 14, and by another general bom- 
bardment on June 16. In all these attacks the Ameri- 
can gunnery was excellent, and the batteries were for 
the time silenced. To these bombardments were added 
the assaults of the Vesuvius, which arrived on June 13, 
and began at once to run in at night and hurl her dyna- 
mite shells at the forts and harbor. The ship had a 
terrible weapon, but as she was unable to get direction 

103 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

or aim, the falling of her shells was largely a matter of 
accident. If by chance they struck near a battery, a 
ship, or a building, wreck and ruin followed, but wher- 
ever they dropped the explosion was so terrific, coming 
as they did silently out of the darkness, that they car- 
ried consternation and alarm, and had a moral effect 
wholly out of proportion to their actual results, tending 
in this way, no doubt, to prevent any attempts on the 
part of the Spaniards either to seek escape at night or to 
send out torpedo-boats. 

Only one point remained to be covered in order to 
assure the successful maintenance of the blockade, and 
that was to possess a safe harbor for shelter, coaling, 
and repairs. This indispensable adjunct Admiral Samp- 
son secured by sending the Marblehead and Yankee to 
Guantanamo, where they drove the Spanish gunboats 
to the inner harbor, which was protected by mines in the 
channel, and made themselves masters of the outer har- 
bor, which was excellently suited to the needs of the 
fleet. To make possession useful as well as complete, 
it became necessary to hold a position on shore and 
drive back the enemy, so that they could not annoy the 
ships and boats in the bay. For this work the first bat- 
talion of marines, which had left Key West on June 7, 
was employed, and on June 10 their transport, the Pan- 
ther, arrived in Guantanamo Bay. The marines, be- 
tween five and six hundred strong, landed immediately, 
and established themselves on a low hill where a Span- 
ish block-house had been destroyed by the guns of the 
Yankee. The next evening they were attacked by the 
Spaniards concealed in the chaparral, and two men on 
outposts were killed. The attack was renewed in the 

104 







SOLDIERS OF THE CUBAN ARMY 
From .1 photograph taken at the time of the landing of the American army 



THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA 

night by the unseen enemy and Surgeon Gibbs was 
killed and two privates wounded. The next day the 
camp was shifted to a better position, and some sixty 
Cubans came in and joined the Americans. The firing 
of the Spanish continued throughout the night, and 
Sergeant Good was killed, but on the 13th, with the aid 
of the Cubans, who knew the country, they were easily 
repelled. On the 14th the Americans took the offen- 
sive. Two companies of marines, supported by the 
Cubans, left the camp at nine o'clock to destroy the well 
at Cuzco, which was the only water-supply for the 
Spaniards within twelve miles. They failed to cut off 
the enemy, as they had hoped, but they drove the Span- 
iards steadily before them, reaching the intervening hill 
first, and carrying the crest under a sharp fire. As the 
marines descended into the valley the Spaniards broke 
cover and retreated rapidly, and at three o'clock the 
fight was over, the well filled up, and the heliograph 
signal station captured and destroyed. One lieutenant 
and seventeen men were taken prisoners, and they re- 
ported a Spanish loss of two officers and fifty-eight men 
killed, and a large number of wounded. On the Amer- 
ican side one marine was wounded, and about a dozen 
were overcome by heat. This was the end of the Span- 
ish attacks. They had had enough, and withdrew, 
leaving the American post undisturbed to the end of the 
campaign. The marines had done their work most ad- 
mirablv. For three days and nights they had met and 
repelled the attacks of a concealed enemy, never flinch- 
ing under the strain whch had been upon them without 
a moment's relief. Then they had taken the offensive, 
and had marched and fought for six hours under the 

105 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

tropical sun and through a dense forest and under- 
growth with the steadiness and marksmanship of ex- 
perienced bushfighters. It was a very brave, honest, 
and effective piece of work, showing admirable disci- 
pline and a surprising readiness to meet new and strange 
conditions. 

On June 1 5 the work of the marines was followed up 
by the Mavblchcad, Texas, and Suwanee going into 
Caimanera, silencing the batteries, and driving the 
Spaniards completely away. The ships penetrated so 
far into the channel of the inner harbor that they ran 
on to torpedoes, the Marblehead picking up one on her 
propeller, fortunately so thick with barnacles that it 
did not explode by contact, as it was intended to do. 
Thus the affair at Guantanamo Bay was finished, and a 
secure refuge, base, coaling and repair station were 
secured for the fleet, which assured its ability to con- 
tinue the blockade — a very important operation, per- 
formed with the thoroughness, foresight, and minute 
care which characterized all Admiral Sampson's work. 
But the best arranged and most systematic blockade, 
the most vigorous and sustained bombardments, the 
workmanlike establishment of a fine naval base — none 
of these things could bring the American ships along- 
side the Spanish cruisers. It was not the compara- 
tively feeble batteries of the Morro, the Socapa, or Es- 
trella Point which stood in the way. That which held 
back the American fleet was the mine-field at the en- 
trance of the harbor, sown thick with torpedoes and 
submarine mines, exploding either by contact or by 
electric wires leading to batteries on shore. The navy 
which offered hundreds of volunteers to accompany 

106 



THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA 

Hobson had plenty of officers and men who would 
have cheerfully dared all the dangers of that narrow 
channel, defying alike shore batteries and sunken mines. 
But such an attempt would have been not only perilous, 
and worthless, but a blunder of the first magnitude. 
Small ships, which perhaps might have slipped in, 
would have been utterly useless against the heavy Span- 
ish cruisers, and a battle-ship sunk by torpedoes in the 
narrow channel would have been a useless and crippling 
sacrifice, and would have blocked the entrance so that 
the Spaniards could never have been forced out and the 
American fleet could never have gone in. Once the 
mine field was cleared, the ships could enter, but the 
mines could not be reached or removed until the bat- 
teries at the entrance were taken and the garrisons 
driven away. For this land-work the fleet had no ade- 
quate force. To reach and destroy the sea power of 
Spain in the West Indies, upon which the whole cam- 
paign against both Cuba and Puerto Rico turned, an 
army was needed to support the fleet, to take the en- 
trance forts and thus permit the ships to enter, or else 
to capture the town itself and force the Spaniards out 
into the open. Thus it was that while Admiral Samp- 
son was perfecting his blockade at every point, he was 
urgently asking that land forces be sent to his support, 
and all the officers and men of the fleet were waiting 
impatiently for the coming of the army which should 
deliver the Spanish cruisers into their hands. 



CHAPTER VI 
SANTIAGO THE LAND FIGHT 

The American navy was ready, as ships of war must 
always be, and when the President signed the Cuban 
resolutions, the fleet started for Cuba without a mo- 
ment's delay. With the army, the case was widely dif- 
ferent. Congress had taken care of the army in a spas- 
modic and insufficient manner, consistently doing noth- 
ing for it except to multiply civilian clerks and officials 
of all kinds, who justified their existence by a diligent 
weaving of red-tape and by magnifying details of work, 
until all the realities of the service were thoroughly ob- 
scured. Thus we had a cumbrous, top-heavy system of 
administration, rusted and slow-moving, and accus- 
tomed to care for an army of 25,000 men. Then 
war was declared. An army of 200,000 volunteers and 
60,000 regulars was suddenly demanded, and the poor 
old system of military administration, with its coils of 
red-tape and its vast clerical force devoted to details, 
began to groan and creak, to break down here and to 
stop there, and to produce a vast crop of delays, blun- 
ders, and what was far worse, of needless suffering, 
disease, and death, to the brave men in the field. There- 
upon came great outcry from newspapers, rising even 
to hysterical shrieking in some cases, great and natu- 
ral wrath among the American people, and much anger 

108 



SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT 

and fault-finding from Senators and Representatives. 
Then came, too, the very human and general desire to 
find one or more scapegoats and administer to them 
condign punishment, which would have been eminently 
soothing and satisfactory to many persons — just in 
some cases, perhaps, unjust in most, but in any event of 
little practical value. There was undoubtedly a certain 
not very large percentage of shortcomings due to indi- 
vidual incapacity, which should have been sharply 
rooted up without regard to personal sensibilities. But 
the fundamental fact was that the chief and predomi- 
nant cause of all the failures, blunders, and needless 
suffering was a thoroughly bad system of military ad- 
ministration. An inferior man can do well with a good 
system better than a superior man with a bad system, 
for a good administrative organization will go on for 
generations sometimes, carrying poor administrators 
with it. But a really bad system is wellnigh hopeless, 
and the men of genius, the Pitts, the Carnots, and the 
Stantons, who, bringing order out of chaos and strength 
out of weakness, organize victory, are very rare, and are 
produced only by the long-continued stress of a great 
struggle, and after bitter experience has taught its 
harshest lessons. At the outset of our war we had a 
bad system, and men laid the blame here and there for 
faults of system and organization which were really 
due to the narrowness and indifference of Congress, 
of the newspaper press, and of the people, running back 
over many years. To-day the system stands guilty of 
the blunders, delays, and needless sufferings and deaths 
of the war, and war being over, reforms are resisted 
by patriots who have so little faith in the republic that 

109 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

they think a properly organized army of 100,000 men 
puts it in danger, and by bureau chiefs and their friends 
in Congress who want no change, for reasons obvious 
if not public-spirited. 

Thus much by the way of preface, essential to the 
comprehension of even the barest outline of our mili- 
tary operations in the war of 1898, and to make clear 
not merely why there were shortcomings, which any 
account must notice, but also the fact that the wonder 
of it all lies not in the blunders and failures of organi- 
zation, but in the indomitable energy and force of the 
American people which made the rusty, clumsy ma- 
chine work in some fashion, and in the ability and bra- 
very of American officers and soldiers which brought 
unbroken victory out of such conditions. 

On April 23, 125,000 volunteers were called for, and 
a month later, on May 25, 75,000 more. It was soon 
found that it was one thing to call out volunteers, and 
quite another to make them into an army, which, 
strangely enough, appeared to surprise the country. 
Even the mobilization of the regulars was not rapid, 
and the middle of May had passed before they were 
assembled at Tampa. By the beginning of June, how- 
ever, the regulars were gathered ; but of all the volun- 
teers, slowly mustering in different camps and in vari- 
ous stages of unreadiness, only three regiments were 
sufficiently prepared to join the forces at Tampa. These 
three were the Seventy-first New York, the Second 
Massachusetts, and the First United States Volunteer 
Cavalry. It was to this army of regulars and volun- 
teers that the government turned when it became evi- 
dent that troops were needed at Santiago, and the com- 



SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT 

mand of the expedition was given to General Shafter, 
a brave Michigan soldier of the war of the rebellion 
and an officer of the regular army. 

On the night of June 7 orders came from Washing- 
ton that the army should leave the next morning, and 
then was displayed a scene of vast confusion. The 
railroad tracks were blocked for miles with cars filled 
with supplies tightly shut by red-tape, at which men 
unused to responsibility and to the need of quick action 
gazed helplessly. The cars not only kept the supplies 
from the army, but they stopped movement on the line, 
and hours were consumed where minutes should have 
sufficed in transporting troops from Tampa to the Port. 
Once arrived, more confusion and a widening of the 
area of chaos. No proper arrangement of transports — 
no allotment at all in some cases, and in others the same 
ship given to two or three regiments. Thereupon much 
scrambling, disorder, and complication, surmounted at 
last in some rough-and-ready fashion, and the troops 
were finally embarked. Then came orders to delay de- 
parture. There was a false report brought of a Spanish 
cruiser and torpedo-boats seen by the Eagle and Nash- 
ville. Admiral Sampson put no faith in the report, 
guessed accurately that the Eagle had been misled in the 
darkness by certain ships of our own ; but unfortunately 
he was at the other end of the line, and in the United 
States the false but definite report of hostile ships was 
accepted, and the army waited, sweltering on board 
the crowded transports, many of them lying near the 
wharves in the canal or channel, which was festering 
with town sewage. A very heavy price this to pay for 
a mistaken vision of the night, and for hasty acceptance 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

of its truth. But the long hot days, laden with suffering 
and discomfort to the troops, finally wore by, and at last 
the transports, on June 14, made their way down the 
bay, pushed on the next day, were joined near Key 
West by some dozen ships of war as convoy, and then 
on the 1 6th were fairly on their way to Santiago. Far 
pleasanter this than broiling in Tampa Harbor, and the 
spirits of the troops improved. Yet the movement, so 
infinitely better than the hot, still waiting, was deliber- 
ate enough. Some of the transports were very old and 
very slow, and as they set the speed, the fleet crept 
along about eight knots an hour over a sapphire sea, 
with beautiful star-lit nights, and glimpses by day of the 
picturesque shores and distant mountains of Cuba. On 
Sunday, June 19, they were off Cape Maisi, and at day- 
break the next morning they came in sight of the wait- 
ing war-ships and of Santiago Harbor. Then came 
consultations between General Shafter and Admiral 
Sampson and the Cuban generals Garcia and Castillo. 
The plan of capturing the Morro and the other entrance 
batteries, as the admiral desired, so that the mine-field 
could be cleared, the fleet go in, destroy the Spanish 
cruisers, and compel the surrender of Santiago, was 
abandoned. General Shafter decided to move directly 
upon the city, and orders were given to make the land- 
ing at Daiquiri. The army had neither lighters nor 
launches. They had been omitted, forgotten, or lost, 
like an umbrella, no one knew exactly where; so the 
work of disembarking the troops fell upon the navy. 
Under cover of a heavy fire from the ships, the land- 
ing began, and was effected without any resistance from 
the enemy. On an open coast, without any harbor or 



SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT 

shelter, with nothing but an iron pier so high as to be 
useless, smoothly, rapidly, efficiently, through a heavy 
surf, on the beach and at an unfloored wooden wharf, 
the boats and launches of the navy landed 15,000 offi- 
cers and soldiers, with a loss of only two men. It was 
a very excellent piece of work, thoroughly and punc- 
tually performed, exciting admiration among foreign 
onlookers, who had just beheld with amazement the 
very different performances connected with the em- 
barkation at Tampa. 

The next morning General Wheeler, commanding 
the division of dismounted cavalry, under direct orders 
from General Shafter, rode forward, followed by two 
squadrons of the First volunteer cavalry, and one each 
of the First and Tenth regular cavalry. When General 
Wheeler reached Juraguacito, or Siboney, he found 
that the Spaniards had abandoned the block-house at 
that point, retreated some three miles toward Sevilla, 
and had there taken up a strong position, their rear 
having been engaged by some 200 Cubans with little 
effect. By eight o'clock that night the cavalry division 
reached Siboney, and General Wheeler, after consul- 
tation with General Castillo, determined to advance 
and dislodge the enemy lying between the Americans 
and Santiago. The next morning before daylight the 
movement began. The troops marched along two roads, 
which were really nothing more than mountain trails. 
The First and Tenth regular cavalry, under the im- 
mediate command of General Wheeler, and General 
Young who had with him some Hotchkiss guns, 
marched by the main or easterly road to Sevilla. Along 
the westerly road went the First volunteer cavalry, 

8 113 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

nearly five hundred strong. This regiment, enlisted, 
officered, disciplined, and equipped in fifty days, may 
well be considered for a moment as it moves forward 
to action only two days after its landing. It is a very 
typical American regiment. Most of the men come 
from Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, where the 
troops were chiefly raised. There are many cowboys, 
many men of the plains, hunters, pioneers and ranch- 
men, to whom the perils and exposure of frontier life 
are a twice-told tale. Among them can be found more 
than two score civilized but full-blooded Indians — 
Americans by an older lineage than any of those who 
are fighting just now for the final domination of the 
New World. Then there are boys from the farms and 
towns of the far-western territories. Then, again, 
strangest mingling of all, there are a hundred or more 
troopers from the East — graduates of Yale and Har- 
vard, members of the New York and Boston clubs, men 
of wealth and leisure and large opportunities. They 
are men who have loved the chase of big game, fox- 
hunting and football, and all the sports which require 
courage and strength and are spiced with danger. Some 
have been idlers, many more are workers, all have the 
spirit of adventure strong within them, and they are 
there in the Cuban chaparral because they seek perils, 
because they are patriotic, because, as some think, every 
gentleman owes a debt to his country, and this is the 
time to pay it. And all these men, drawn from so many 
sources, all so American, all so nearly soldiers in their 
life and habits, have been roughly, quickly, and effec- 
tively moulded and formed into a fighting regiment by 
the skillful discipline of Leonard Wood, their colonel, 

114 




GENERAL GARCIA AND BRIGADIER-GENERAL LUDLOW 
Taken during their conference at the time of the landing of the American army 



SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT 

a surgeon of the line, who wears a medal of honor won 
in campaigns against the Apaches ; and by the inspira- 
tion of Theodore Roosevelt, their lieutenant-colonel, 
who has laid down a high place in the administration 
at Washington and come hither to Cuba because thus 
only can he live up to his ideal of conduct by offering 
his life to his country when war has come. 

These Rough Riders, as they have been popularly 
called, marched along the westerly trail, so shut in by 
the dense undergrowth that it was almost impossible to 
throw out flankers or deploy the line, and quite impos- 
sible to see. And then suddenly there were hostile vol- 
leys pouring through the brush, and a sound like the 
ringing of wires overhead. No enemy was to be seen. 
The smokeless powder gave no sign. The dense chap- 
arral screened everything. Under the intense heat men 
had already given way. Now they began to drop, some 
wounded, some dead. The Rough Riders fire and ad- 
vance steadily, led onward by Colonel Wood and Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Roosevelt. A very trying place it was 
for perfectly new troops, with the burning tropical heat, 
the unseen enemy, the air filled with the thin cry of 
the Mauser bullet. But there was no flinching, and the 
march forward went on. 

Along the eastern road the regulars advanced with 
equal steadiness and perfect coolness. They do not draw 
the public attention as do the volunteers, for they act 
just as every one expected, and they are not new, but 
highly trained troops. But their work is done with 
great perfection, to be noted in history later, and at the 
time by all who admire men who perform their allotted 
task bravely and efficiently in the simple lineof dailyduty. 

115 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

Thus the two columns moved forward constantly, along 
the trails and through the undergrowth, converging to 
the point at which they aimed, and Colonel Wood's 
right flank finds the anticipated support from the ad- 
vancing regulars. The fire began to sweep the ridges 
and the strong rock forts on the ridge. Spaniards were 
seen at last apparently without much desire to remain in 
view ; the two columns pressed forward, the ridge was 
carried, the cross-road reached, and the fight of Las 
Guasimas had been won. 

There was no ambush or surprise about it, as was 
said by some people in the first confusion, and by others 
later without any excuse for the misstatement. The 
whole movement was arranged and carried out just as 
it was planned by the commanding general of the divi- 
sion. It had been a hot skirmish, and victory had come 
to the steady American advance, unchecked by the 
burning heat, the dense, stifling undergrowth, and the 
volleys of an unseen enemy. That night the Spanish 
soldiers said in Santiago : "Instead of retreating when 
we fired, the Americans came on. The more we fired 
the more they advanced. They tried to catch us with 
their hands." The Spanish official report stated that 
they had repulsed the Americans and won, but as the 
Americans had 10,000 men they had retreated, which 
was, perhaps, to the Spanish mind, dwelling these many 
centuries among mendacities, and thereby much con- 
fused, a satisfying explanation. The plain truth was 
that the entire American force amounted to 964 officers 
and men. The Rough Riders suffered most severely, 
having 8 killed and 34 wounded. The regulars lost 8 
killed and 18 wounded. The Spanish accounts give 

116 




;ht, i . by Ainu, Dupont 



JOSEPH WHEELER 



SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT 

their own force in various figures from 2,500 down to 
1,400, the last statement being made long after the bat- 
tle, when the number of Americans who had defeated 
them could no longer be concealed. A comparison of 
their varying statements and all the best evidence would 
seem to indicate that the Spanish troops engaged were 
not less than 2,000. Forty-two Spaniards were found 
dead on the field; 77 were reported in the Santiago 
newspapers the next clay to have been killed, and after 
the surrender General Toral admitted to General 
Wheeler a loss of killed and wounded of 265 at Las 
Guasimas and in the brushes with the Cubans of the 
two preceding days. 

This action, in which, in less than an hour, American 
regulars and volunteers had driven a superior Spanish 
force from a strongly intrenched position on high 
ground, put the army in high spirits. It also encour- 
aged the mistaken idea which Admiral Sampson had 
expressed at first, and which General Shaf ter apparently 
held to firmly, that the soldiers of the United States 
had nothing to do but to press forward, drive the Span- 
iards from them, and take the town in forty-eight 
hours. If the Americans had gone on at once, there is 
every reason to believe that they might have gone 
through successfully to the city itself. But to take the 
town in forty-eight hours in the first advance was one 
thing, and to attempt to take it on the forty-eight-hours 
plan after a week's delay was another and widely dif- 
ferent business. In a short time it was to be proved 
that a strong line of defences, constructed for the most 
part while the advance begun at Las Guasimas was 
halted, lay between the Americans and Santiago, and 

117 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

that the Spaniards, after their fashion, would fight hard 
and stubbornly under cover of entrenchments and 
block-houses. Nevertheless, it was with such views 
prevailing that the army finally moved forward. Law- 
ton's and Chaffee's brigades came up to the front the 
day of the fight at Las Guasimas, and the other troops 
advanced during the following days to the high ground 
around Sevilla, which the victory of the cavalry divi- 
sion had brought within American control. During 
three days there seems to have been great confusion in 
the movement of troops, and still more in the trans- 
portation of supplies. The narrow trails, bad at the 
best, were soon torn up by wagons, and were choked 
by the advancing regiments, which moved slowly and 
with difficulty. The army stretched back for three 
miles from El Pozo, where an outpost was sta- 
tioned, and whence the Spaniards could be seen hard at 
work, the line of entrenchments and rifle-pits length- 
ening continually along the hills of San Juan, and the 
defences of El Caney constantly growing stronger. 
Yet during these days of waiting no battery was 
brought to El Pozo to open on the Spanish works, no 
effort was made to interfere with the enemy in 
strengthening his position, which meant the sacrifice 
of just so many more lives by every hour that it went 
on unimpeded. There was no attempt during these 
comparatively unoccupied days to make new roads 
through the forest and undergrowth, so that the troops 
could emerge all along the line of woods instead of in 
dense narrow masses from the two existing trails. 
There were officers who saw, knew, and suggested all 
these things, but they were not done. So, too, the val- 

118 




WILLIAM K. SHAFTER 



SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT 

ley or basin which lay between the heights we held and 
the heights of San Juan remained silent, impenetrated, 
unexplored. There does not appear to have been any 
reconnoitring done at all, except by General Chaffee, 
who, with the skill and coolness of an experienced In- 
dian fighter, explored the ground in front of his com- 
mand thoroughly, even to the Spanish lines at El Caney, 
a village lying toward the northeast of Santiago, and 
very strongly defended by block-houses and a fort. 

It was at this point, finally, that it was determined to 
make an attack, and this was, so far as can be judged, 
the only operation that was planned beforehand. All 
the rest of the fighting which ensued came about largely 
by chance. The movement against El Caney was in- 
trusted to Generals Lawton, Chaffee, and Ludlow, 
brave, skilful, and gallant soldiers, in command of the 
Second Division, with the addition of an independent 
brigade under General Bates, in all a trifle over six 
thousand men. The plan was that they should capture 
El Caney, which it was calculated would consume about 
half an hour to an hour, and then, swinging to the left, 
cut off and take in the flank the Spaniards on San Juan 
hill, against which the main army was then to move in 
direct assault. So, on the afternoon of June 30, the 
order came at three o'clock that the whole army was to 
move at four, and then began a slow advance as the 
troops crushed and crowded into the narrow trail. Part 
of Lawton's division got off first, then the rest, and they 
all marched on silently during the night, making their 
way over the ground General Chaffee had reconnoitred 
through woods and underbrush. By dawn they were 
in position and it was arranged that Chaffee's brigade 

119 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

was to attack from the north and east, and Ludlow's 
from the south and west, and so carry the position. 
But to take a strongly fortified town with infantry 
quickly and without needless loss it is absolutely essen- 
tial to clear the way by a powerful and destructive ar- 
tillery fire. For this all-important object the division 
had only Capron's battery of four guns, so absurdly in- 
adequate to its task that the fact needs only to be stated. 
This meagre battery opened on the Fort at El Caney 
with a deliberate fire at half past six, producing little 
more effect than to very slowly crumble the walls. 
Moreover, the battery was not only grossly inadequate, 
but it used black powder, and immediately established 
a flaring target for an enemy concealed and perfectly 
familiar with the ranges. Why were there no more 
guns ? Why were they left at Tampa or in the trans- 
ports? The fact requires no committee of investiga- 
tion to prove it, and somebody was responsible for the 
scores of men shot at El Caney because there were only 
four guns there to open the way. Why was the powder 
black, so that a target of smoke hung over the Ameri- 
can position after every discharge? Any smokeless 
powder was better than none. Even poor, broken- 
down Spain had smokeless powder for her artillery. 
Why did not we have it ? While the War Department 
had been passing years in trying to find a patent powder 
just to its liking, our artillery was provided with black 
powder and went to war with it, and men died need- 
lessly because of it. No need of a committee to establish 
this fact, either. Who was responsible? One thing 
is certain — a system of administration which is capable 
of such protracted inefficiency is little short of criminal, 

I20 



I 

3S 




SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT 

and the Congress and the people who permit such a sys- 
tem to exist, now that it has been found out, will share 
in the heavy responsibility of a neglect for which men's 
lives have dearly paid if they do not promptly rem- 
edy it. 

But these reflections did not help matters at El Caney 
that July morning, and the feeble battery, the slow fire 
and the target-smoke soon disposed of the pleasant 
headquarters plan of taking the village in the course of 
an hour. There was nine hours' savage work ahead 
before the desired consummation could be reached. 
The Spaniards, although without artillery or siege- 
guns, numbered about eight hundred men; were en- 
tirely protected and under cover in a stone fort, rifle- 
pits, and strong block-houses; knew perfectly and ac- 
curately all the ranges ; could not retreat without rush- 
ing on destruction after our troops surrounded them 
— a sharp incentive to desperate resistance. So, while 
the slow artillery fire went on, the infantry began to 
suffer seriously from the deadly Spanish fire. They 
worked their way forward, creeping from point to point, 
but it was very slow, and equally costly. At half past 
one the situation looked badly. The Americans were 
holding their own, but losing far more heavily than 
the Spaniards. An order from General Shafter at 
this moment to neglect El Caney and move to the as- 
sistance of the troops at San Juan must have seemed 
like a grim satire, and was disregarded. But the evil 
hour had really passed. The artillery fire was quick- 
ened, and the fort began at last to go rapidly to pieces 
under the steady pounding. Colonel Miles's brigade 
joined General Ludlow in pressing the attack on the 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

south ; and then at last General Chaffee, whose men had 
been enduring the brunt of the fight, gave the order 
to storm, and the Twelfth regiment sprang forward at 
the word, eager for the charge. Up the ravine they 
went to the east side, then swung to the right, broke 
through the wire fences, rushed upward to the top of 
the hill, and the fort was theirs. The enemy who had 
fought so stubbornly at rifle range could not stand the 
American rush; they had no desire to be taken "by the 
bare hands." The price paid had been heavy, but the 
dearly bought fort, in the words of an eye-witness, was 
"floored with dead Spaniards," a grewsome sight. Yet, 
even as the wild cheers went up, it was seen that they 
were still exposed, and a heavy fire came from the 
block-houses. Lining up in the fort, the Americans 
poured volley after volley into these other strongholds ; 
and the other brigades pressing home their charge, the 
Spanish gave way, even retreat seeming less hopeless 
now than resistance, and fled from the village, drop- 
ping fast as they went under the shots of Ludlow's men. 
By four o'clock the firing had died away, and El Caney, 
at a cost which proper artillery would have greatly re- 
duced, had been won by the unyielding, patient gal- 
lantry of the American regular infantry. 

The Spaniards had less than a thousand men at El 
Caney, but they were under cover, strongly fortified, 
and knew the ranges. Shut in, desperate, and almost 
surrounded as they were, they appeared at their best, 
and fought with a stubborn courage and an indiffer- 
ence to danger which recall the defence of Saragossa 
and Gerona. Worthless as the Spanish soldiers have 
too often shown themselves to be, behind defences and 




THEODORE ROOSEVELT 



SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT 

penned in by enemies, they have displayed a fortitude 
worthy of the days, three centuries ago, when the in- 
fantry of Spain was thought the finest in Europe. Of 
this tradition El Caney offered a fresh and brilliant 
illustration. The Spaniards lost nearly five hundred 
men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, much more 
than half their number, and among the killed was the 
commander, General Vara del Rey, his brother, and 
two of his sons. On the American side the killed num- 
bered 4 officers and 84 men ; the wounded, 24 officers 
and 332 men — the loss falling chiefly on Ludlow's and 
Chaffee's brigades, comprising the 4,000 men who were 
actively engaged throughout the day. The force was 
composed entirely of regulars, with the exception of 
the Second Massachusetts Regiment, in Ludlow's bri- 
gade. These volunteers, never in action before, be- 
haved extremely well, coming up steadily under fire, 
and taking their place in the firing-line. But the mo- 
ment they opened with their archaic Springfields and 
black powder, which they owed to the narrow parsi- 
mony of Congress, and to the lack of energy and ef- 
ficiency in the system of the War Department, they be- 
came not only an easy mark for the Spanish Mausers, 
but made the position of more peril to all the other 
troops. In consequence of this they had to be with- 
drawn from the firing-line, but not until they had suf- 
fered severely and displayed an excellent courage. ^The 
lack of artillery and the black powder made the assault 
on El Caney a work to which infantry should not have 
been forced. Yet they were forced to it, and supported 
by only four guns, but splendidly led by Lawton, Chaf- 
fee, and Ludlow, they carried the position at heavy 

123 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

cost by sheer courage, discipline, and good righting, 
manifesting these great qualities in a high degree, and 
one worthy of very lasting honor and remembrance. 

Lawton and Chaffee and Ludlow had gone to El 
Caney with a well-defined purpose but it is difficult, 
even after the most careful study and repeated reading 
of the official reports, to detect any plan whatever in 
the movements of the rest of the army. The troops had 
been moved up the narrow trail the night before, and 
at seven in the morning Captain Grimes's battery 
opened from El Pozo hill. Black powder again, and a 
magnificent target, so that the Cubans in the farm- 
house, Rough Riders in the yard, and the First and 
Tenth Cavalry, all thoughtfully massed by some one 
in the immediate neighborhood of the battery, where 
they could be most easily hit, began to suffer severely. 
Then the two brigades of the cavalry division under 
General Sumner, the First, commanded by Colonel 
(now General) Wood, leading, moved down the road 
to Santiago. When the Rough Riders reached the 
ford of the San Juan, they crossed and deployed in 
good order. Then a captive observation-balloon was 
brought along and anchored at the ford where the 
troops were crossing and were massed in the road. As 
one reads the official statement of this fact, comment 
and criticism alike fail. That such a thing should have 
been done seems incredible. The balloon simply served 
to give the Spaniards a perfect mark and draw all the 
rifle and artillery fire to the precise point where our 
men were densely crowded in a narrow road. Fortu- 
nately the balloon was quickly destroyed by the enemy's 
fire, but it had given the place and the range, and there 

124 



SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT 

the troops remained for nearly an hour, exposed to 
heavy fire from the forts and block-house, and from 
guerillas in trees, who here and elsewhere devoted them- 
selves especially to picking off surgeons, wounded men, 
and Red Cross nurses. z There the men staid, drop- 
ping under the shots of the Spaniards, able to do noth- 
ing, waiting orders. Np_ orders from headquarters 
came; the situation was intolerable; retreat meant not 
only defeat, but useless and continual exposure to a 
slaughtering fire. No other resource remained, ex- 
cept to take rifle in hand and, with infantry alone, 
carry strong intrenchments and block-houses, defended 
by well-covered regulars supported by artillery. Still 
no orders, and at last the division, brigade, and regi- 
mental commanders acted and ordered for themselves. 
Colonel Roosevelt led his Rough Riders forward from 
the woods, and asking the men of the Ninth to let him 
pass through, the regiment of regulars rose and fol- 
lowed him, and then the whole cavalry division went 
out and on up the first hill, where there was a red- 
roofed farm-house, whence they drove the enemy. A 
pause here, a taking breath, exposed all the time to a 
heavy fire from the strong main intrenchments now in 
plain view. Again Colonel Roosevelt calls on his men, 
starts, comes back because they had not heard, and off 
they go again over the long open space, more than 
half a mile, which separates them from the Spanish 
post. The line of blue figures looks very thin and very 
sparse to those who are watching it. It seems to move 
very slowly. But it is moving all the time. Men stag- 
ger and drop, but the line goes on and up. It nears the 
top, the Spaniards break and run, and the cavalry di- 

125 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

vision — six regiments — all mingled now, finds itself 
with the heights carried, and the intrenchments on the 
right in its firm but tired grasp. With it has gone the 
Gatling battery under Captain Parker, who in really 
splendid fashion has kept his guns right at the front, 
a powerful ally and support in these trying moments. 
Colonel Roosevelt, who rode at first, has left his horse 
at a wire fence, and now finds himself the senior offi- 
cer present and in command of all that is left of the 
six gallant regiments, having led dauntlessly and un- 
hurt one of the most brilliant charges in our history. 

Meantime over on the left the regular infantry are 
repeating against the fort of San Juan — the strongest 
of all the Spanish positions, and on a larger scale — the 
splendid work of the dismounted cavalry. This divis- 
ion, consisting of eight regiments of regulars and one 
of volunteers, was admirably commanded and led by 
General Kent. They moved up the road on the after- 
noon of June 30, and started again early on the next 
morning as soon as Captain Grimes's battery opened 
at El Pozo, with the First Brigade, under General Haw- 
kins, in the lead. Their orders were to keep their 
right on the main road to Santiago. They too were held 
back by the crowd in the narrow trail, and still further 
delayed by waiting for the passage of the cavalry divi- 
sion, who were given the right of way. As they began 
at last to advance slowly they too came under the Span- 
ish fire, they too received the punishment brought upon 
the army by the luckless balloon, and thus crowded to- 
gether, at a halt almost, suffered severely. The enemy's 
fire steadily increased, the shrapnel poured in where 
the balloon had marked the position, and the sharp- 

K. 
■ 



SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT 

shooters in the trees busied themselves, as they were 
doing already with the cavalry division. General Kent 
attempted to send the Seventy-first New York through 
a by-path, so as to bring them out in their proper posi- 
tion with the First Brigade, but when they came under 
the heavy fire of the enemy the first battalion broke, 
and were only held from a panic by the exertions of 
General Kent's staff-officers. The other two battal- 
ions remained steady, for the regiment was of first- 
rate material, and the trouble arose from their being 
badly officered and besides being endowed with a col- 
onel who apparently did not come on to the field of 
action. In the end they rallied, and many went for- 
ward in the final charge with the regulars, notably the 
company under the gallant lead of Captain Rafferty. 
But at the moment the confusion in the New York regi- 
ment still further checked the already impeded advance. 
The First Brigade had gone on without the volun- 
teers, and the Third regiment was hurried forward by 
General Kent into the blocked road, and finally pushed 
through the New York regiment. As they came out 
and crossed the lower ford Colonel Wikoff was killed, 
and two lieutenant-colonels who succeeded him in com- 
mand of the brigade were quickly shot down, all in 
the course of ten minutes. Yet nothing could shake 
the nerve or break the discipline of this splendid brig- 
ade. Following orders, making all the formations, 
operating in companies, battalions, and regiments, on 
they went through the heavy under-growth, waist- 
deep through the streams, and across barbed-wire de- 
fences. Nothing could break them as they went 
steadily and fiercely onward. The Second Brigade, 

127 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

finely led by Colonel Pearson, was pushed through in 
the same way beneath a galling fire, out of the narrow 
trail and across the ford. Two regiments of Pear- 
son's men went to the support of the Third Brigade, 
one to that of the First. Meantime the Third 
Brigade, connecting with the First on the right and 
sweeping round through a heavy fire, turned the ene- 
my's right, and shared with the First in the assault. 
On they went up a steep hill 125 feet above the level, 
tangled with barbed wires, and crowned with deep 
trenches and the strong brick fort of San Juan. No 
artillery to help them. Regular infantry, rifle in hand, 
were going to take this high and heavily fortified posi- 
tion. Steadily and quickly they went at it, General 
Hawkins, a noble figure, white-haired, and with all 
the fire of youth in his gallant heart, leading the 
charge at the head of his two regiments. To those who 
watched, it seemed to take a long time. But it was 
twenty minutes past twelve when the Third Brigade 
followed the First out of the death-trap in the woods, 
and at half past one the steady, strong-moving mass of 
infantry had cleared an outlying knoll, crossed the val- 
ley, scaled the rough steep hill, and with Hawkins at 
their head, and the men of the Third Brigade sweeping 
up on the left, stood triumphant on the crest, where they 
fell to intrenching themselves, and sent the Thirteenth 
Infantry off to support the cavalry division, while the 
Twenty-first regiment pushed on 800 yards farther 
and took an advanced position. Altogether a very 
splendid feat of arms, very perfectly performed. 

One other movement was made on July 1st at the 
extreme left. General Duffield Was ordered to move 

128 



SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT 

along the railroad by the coast and make a demon- 
stration at Aguadores, in order to keep the Spaniards 
engaged at that point and prevent their attacking our 
left. General- Shafter especially ordered General Duf- 
field not to sacrifice his men, but to "worry the 
enemy." When he reached the river at the point of 
crossing, he found that the bridge had been in part 
destroyed. The river also was deep, and, according 
to General Duffield's estimate, 600 to 700 feet wide. 
He therefore made no attempt to cross, but kept 
the enemy under fire until three o'clock, engaging 
them again the next day, and carrying out in this 
way his orders to the entire satisfaction of General 
Shafter, who recommended him for gallantry and good 
conduct at Aguadores. The total loss in their skir- 
mishes, when the Thirty-third Michigan behaved very 
well, was two killed and fifteen wounded. 

The battle of San Juan, as it is called, consisted 
really of two detached attacks on the hill of that name 
and the separate action of El Caney. There were 6,464 
officers and men at El Caney, and 7,919 engaged at 
San Juan, apart from the small brigade (323 all told) 
of light artillery. There were among them three regi- 
ments of volunteers, but the Second Massachusetts, after 
suffering severely, had to be withdrawn from the firing- 
line on account of its black powder, and the Seventy- 
first New York was only partially engaged. Deducting 
these two regiments, there were 12,507 officers and 
men engaged, including, of volunteers, only the Rough 
Riders, who, like the regulars, were armed with mod- 
ern magazine rifles, and who showed themselves on 
that day the equal of any regulars in desperate fight- 
9 129 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

ing; but they numbered only 583 of the more than 12,- 
000 men brought into action. The battle of San Juan, 
therefore, was pre-eminently the battle of the Ameri- 
can regulars, of the flower of the American standing 
army. With scarcely any artillery support, armed 
only with rifles, they were set to take heights and a 
village strongly held by regular soldiers and defended 
by forts, intrenchments, batteries, and a tangle of 
barbed-wire fences. This is something which the best 
military critics would declare well-nigh impossible and 
not to be attempted. * The American army did it. That 
is enough to say. They lost heavily, largely through 
the awkward manner in which they were crowded and 
delayed at the start. J There were 21 officers and 220 
men killed, and 93 officers and 1,280 men wounded, 
the percentage of the officers being remarkably high, 
except at Aguadores, where none were injured. On 
the Spanish side it is almost impossible to get any 
figures of the slightest value, even their official reports 
being filled with obvious falsehoods and contradic- 
tions. General Wheeler gives the number at El Caney 
as 460; the official Spanish report puts it at 520, of 
whom only 80 returned unwounded. Captain Arthur 
Lee, of the British army, who has written by far the 
best account of El Caney, says there were somewhat 
less than 1,000 Spaniards in the works, and that at 
least half were killed and wounded. As his estimate 
of the losses agrees with the Spanish report, I have 
accepted it. The Spanish statement of their numbers 
at El Caney is so absurd, on their own report of 
losses, that Captain Lee's dispassionate estimate of 
the total force must also be accepted. The case at San 

130 



SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT 

Juan is much more difficult. According to Lieutenant 
Muller y Tejeiro, quoting what professes to be official 
reports, there were only 3,000 men defending Santiago, 
including the sailors, and only 250 men at San Juan 
heights. This is so grotesquely false that it is easy to 
throw it aside, but it is not easy to reach the truth. 
Muller gives 520 men at El Caney and 250 at San 
Juan, and in one placegivesthe total killed and wounded 
as 593, and in another as 469, both manifestly absurd 
losses for 770 men. The Spaniards said at different 
times that they had as few as 1,400 and as many as 
2,500 at Las Guasimas, which hardly coincides with the 
statement that there were only 3,000 men in the city. 
Deducting Escario's force, which came in on July 2, 
there were 13,000 rifles, Mausers and Remingtons, 
surrendered in Santiago city when it capitulated, which 
indicates a total force of that number, unless we assume 
that each of Lieutenant Muller' s 3,000 soldiers carried 
four rifles. As a matter of fact, the Spaniards had ul- 
timately 12,000 to 13,000 men in Santiago; they had 
over 9,000 along the line of defences on the east side 
confronting the Americans* ; and the works at San 
Juan were strongly held by at least 4,000 men, as stated 
by Mr. Ramsden, the British consul, a thoroughly 
trustworthy witness. Their actual losses it is not 
easy to detect through the clouds of falsehood in the 
official reports ; but as we know that they were heavier 
than the American at El Caney, and also at Las Guasi- 
mas, we may safely assume that the case was nearly 
the same at San Juan, although they had all the advan- 

* General Wood puts the number of men on the whole eastern 
line of defences at 9,600. 

131 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

tage of cover and position. It is certain that when 
the city surrendered they had more men in hospital 
than the Americans. The Spaniards stood their ground 
bravely, fired heavily in volleys, and bore their punish- 
ment unflinchingly, but nowhere did they face the 
American rush and onset when they came close upon 
them. It was a hard-fought battle, and both sides 
suffered severely, but the steady and irresistible Ameri- 
can advance won. 

After the victorious charge there was still no rest 
for the men who had climbed the steep sides of San 
Juan. Worn and weary as they were, they went to 
work to make intrenchments, and with scant food — 
Colonel Roosevelt's men feeding on what the Span- 
iards had left behind — they all toiled on through the 
night. At daylight the Spaniards attacked, opening 
a fire which continued all day. Yet, despite the fire 
and the drenching rain, the men worked on, and the 
new intrenchments, now frowning down toward the 
city, grew and lengthened. At nine o'clock in the even- 
ing another attack by long range firing was made by the 
Spaniards, and repulsed. The losses on the American 
side during this fighting on the 26. were not severe, as 
they were protected by breastworks, and the Spaniards 
were utterly unable to take the hill they could not hold, 
from the men who had driven them from it when they 
had every advantage of position. Nevertheless, the 
situation was undoubtedly grave. With 3,000 men 
only on the extreme ridge at first, we were confronted 
by 9,000 Spaniards. Our men were exhausted by bat- 
tle, marching, and digging. They were badly fed, 
transportation was slow, and supplies scarce, and they 

132 



"^v- . ^ 







GENERALS IN THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 



SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT 

were at first unsheltered. Under these conditions 
some officers thought about and urged withdrawal, 
while General Wheeler, backed strongly by many of 
the younger officers and later by Lawton and Sumner, 
opposed any such movement. The spirit which car- 
ried the heights of San Juan held them, but to General 
Shafter, away from the front and the firing-line, the 
voices of doubt and alarm came with effective force. 
During the day he fluctuated from doubt to confidence. 
He wanted Sampson to try at once and at all hazards 
to break in, and he proposed to General Wheeler to 
move against the entrance forts of the harbor, thus 
giving a tardy adhesion to the wise plan of Sampson 
and Miles, which he had abandoned. Early on the 
morning of July 3 there came a despatch from him, 
written under the first depressing influences, to the 
War Department, saying that he had Santiago well in- 
vested, but that our line was thin, the city strongly de- 
fended, and not to be taken without heavy loss ; that he 
needed re-enforcements, and was considering with- 
drawal to a position which an examination of the map 
showed to mean a retreat to the coast, f This news — 
the first received in twenty-four hours — came upon 
those in authority at Washington with a depressing 
shock. General Shafter was urged to hold the San 
Juan heights, and in a confused hurry every effort was 
made to get together more transports — none having 
been brought back from Santiago — and to drive for- 
ward the departure of troops. It was the one really 
dark day of the war, and the long hot hours of that 
memorable Sunday were heavy with doubt, apprehen- 
sion, and anxiety. 

*33 



CHAPTER VII 
SANTIAGO THE SEA FIGHT 

By one of the dramatic contrasts which fate de- 
lights to create in human history, at the very time when 
the Shafter despatch was filling Washington with 
gloom, the sea-power of Spain was being shot to death 
by American guns, and her ancient empire in the West 
Indies had passed away forever. It matters little now 
why Cervera pushed open the door of Santiago Har- 
bor and rushed out to ruin and defeat. The admiral 
himself would have the world understand that he was 
forced to do so by ill-advised orders from Havana and 
Madrid. Very likely this is true, but if it is, Havana 
and Madrid must be admitted to have had good grounds 
for their decision. It did not occur to the Spaniards, 
either in Santiago or elsewhere, that the entire Ameri- 
can army had been flung upon El Caney and San Juan, 
and that there were at the moment no reserves. Their 
own reports, moreover, from the coast were wild and 
exaggerated, so that, deceived by these as well as by 
the daring movements and confident attitude of the 
American army, they concluded that the city was men- 
aced by not less than 50,000 men. Under these con- 
ditions Santiago would soon be surrounded, cut off, 
starved, and taken. It is true that Admiral Cervera 
had announced that if the Americans entered Santi- 

i34 



SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT 

ago he would shell and destroy the city, and he would 
probably have done so, with complete Spanish indif- 
ference to the wanton brutality of such an act. But 
it is difficult to see how this performance would have 
helped the army or saved the fleet. With the American 
army on the heights of San Juan, and extending its 
lines, the ultimate destruction or capture of the entire 
squadron was a mere question of time. The process 
might be made more or less bloody, but the final out- 
come could not be avoided, and was certain to be com- 
plete. On the other hand, a wild rush out of the har- 
bor might result possibly in the escape of one or more 
ships, and such an escape, properly treated in official 
despatches, could very well be made to pass in Spain 
for a victory. In remaining, there could be nothing 
but utter ruin, however long postponed. In going out, 
there was at least a chance, however slight, of saving 
something. So Cervera was ordered to leave the har- 
bor of Santiago. He would have liked to go by night, 
but thanks to the precautions of Admiral Sampson the 
narrow entrance glared out of the darkness brilliant 
with the white blaze of the search-lights, and beyond 
lay the enemy, veiled in darkness, waiting and watch- 
ing. The night was clearly impossible. It must be 
daylight, if at all. So on Sunday morning at half past 
nine the Spanish fleet with bottled steam came out of 
the harbor with a rush, the flag-ship Maria Teresa lead- 
ing; then the other three cruisers about 800 yards 
apart; then, at 1,200 yards distance, the two crack 
Clyde-built torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and Pliiton. 
As Admiral Sampson was to meet General Shafter that 
morning at Siboney, the Nezv York had started to the 

'35 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

eastward, and was four miles away from her station 
when, at the sound of the guns, she swung round and 
rushed after the running battle-ships, which she could 
never quite overtake, although she came up so fast that 
she was able to get two shots at the torpedo boat de- 
stroyers before they went down which was only twenty 
minutes after they had emerged from the harbor en- 
trance. It was a cruel piece of ill fortune that the ad- 
miral, who had made every arrangement for the fight, 
should, by mere chance of war, have been deprived of 
his personal share in it. Equally cruel was the fortune 
which had taken Captain Higginson and the Massa- 
chusetts on that day to Guantanamo to coal. These 
temporary absences left (beginning at the westward) 
the Brooklyn, Texas, Iowa, Oregon, Indiana, and the 
two converted yachts Gloucester and Vixen lying near 
inshore, to meet the escaping enemy. Quick eyes on 
the Iowa detected first the trailing line of smoke in the 
narrow channel and signal was made at 9.34 "Enemy 
Escaping" which was acknowledged on the Brooklyn 
at 9.35. Then all the fleet saw them and there was no 
need of any other signals. Admiral Sampson's order 
had long since been given : "If the enemy tries to es- 
cape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possi- 
ble and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to 
run ashore." Every ship was always stripped for ac- 
tion, each captain on the station knew by heart this or- 
der which was posted in every conning tower, his crew 
needed no other, and the perfect execution of it was 
the naval battle at Santiago. 

The Spanish ships came out at eight to ten knots' 
speed, cleared the Diamond Shoal, and then turned 

136 



,' .'/. ■■■■.....■■. . .,. 






■ ■■■■■ 




Copyright, 1898, by G. R. Duffham 
PASQUALE DE CERVERA 



SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT 

sharply to the westward. As they issued forth they 
opened a fierce, rapid, but ill-directed fire with all guns, 
which shrouded them in smoke. The missiles fell 
thickly and seemed to come in a dense flight over all 
the ships. Around the Indiana the projectiles tore the 
water into foam, and the Brooklyn, which the Span- 
iards are said to have had some vague plan of disa- 
bling, because they believed her to be the one fast ship, 
was struck several times, but not seriously injured,* 
The Spanish attack, with its sudden burst of fire, was 
chiefly in the first rush, for it was soon drowned in the 
fierce reply. The American crews were being mus- 
tered for Sunday inspection when the enemy was seen. 
They were always prepared for action, and as the sig- 
nal went up the men were already at quarters. There 
was no need for Admiral Sampson's distant signal to 
close in and attack, for that was what they did. 

This signal had no importance so far as the action 
was concerned for it was merely a repetition of the 



*Note. — Through the kindness of the Hon. Charles H. Allen, 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I have been able to procure the 
exact amount expended to repair the damage caused by the Span- 
ish shots in the battle of July 3d. The statement is as follows : 

Cost of Repairing Damage Caused by Spanish Guns in Battle of 
July 3d : 

Oregon. None 

Texas $ 752.32 

Brooklyn 1,303.15 

Indiana 4,078.58 

Iowa 4.993-65 

This table is instructive and seems to dispose of the proposition 
that the Brooklyn suffered more than the other ships, bore the 
brunt and was the especial object of Spanish attack. 

137 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

standing order posted up in the conning towers. But it 
has importance in another respect because it was a sig- 
nal made by the commanding admiral. Technically Ad- 
miral Sampson was in command of the fleet through- 
out the action for he was never out of signal distance. 
The signal which he made when he started for Siboney 
"Disregard movements of flag-ship" never implies re- 
linquishment of command and did not then. So long as 
he was within signal distance he was in command and 
he remained within that distance constantly shortening 
it, from beginning to end of the action. His first signal 
when seeing the enemy coming out, he turned his ship 
was neither needed nor heeded but his orders to the 
Iowa later to stop by the Vizcaya and similar orders 
to other ships were seen and obeyed as the Nczv York 
rushed along after the Oregon and Brooklyn. He was 
within easy signal distance when the Colon surren- 
dered and her surrender was at once reported to him. 
As it is undoubtedly true that Admiral Sampson was 
technically in command throughout it is equally true 
that Admiral (then Commodore) Schley the next in 
rank was never technically in command for a single 
moment. As to actual command the case is equally 
clear. At 9.35 the Brooklyn acknowledged the Iowa's 
signal "Enemy escaping." The signal-book of the 
Brooklyn shows that she then made signal "Clear for 
action" which was superfluous when addressed to ships 
which had been cleared for action for thirty days. She 
then made signal to close with the enemy a mere repe- 
tition of Sampson's standing order which all the ships 
were carrying out to the fullest extent. The Brook- 
lyn's signal-book also shows that these signals were 

138 




^Robley D. Evar.^ j^John W. P hilip «j ' «. - 



.NAVAL OFFICERS IN SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 



SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT 

not acknowledged and as a matter of fact they were 
never heeded or noticed and probably were never seen 
by the other ships. In a word Admiral Schley neve, 
controlled or directed in the slightest degree the move- 
ments of any ship but the Brooklyn and exercised no 
general command whatever. There was no fleet action. 
Each ship followed the standing order and fought 
under it for its own hand. The result was harmonious 
but it was a captain's fight without a single fleet move- 
ment directed at the time by anybody. 

Each ship following the standing order to close 
put its helm to starboard and bore down on the enemy. 
The Brooklyn alone disobeyed not only the standing 
order but the order which she herself had just set 
directing the other ships to close. The Brooklyn 
put her helm to port came round in the reverse of 
the other ships, with her stern to the enemy and after 
this wide sweep away from them bore on to the west- 
ward parallel to and outside the Spanish ships. Ad- 
miral Schley had signalled to the other ships to close 
but he made no signal when he reversed his own order 
by putting his helm to port. -Tn this unexpected move- 
ment he not only took himself out of the way of the 
enemy but he checked the advance of the Texas. Had 
he put his helm to starboard and borne down like the 
other ships or even if he had not held the Texas back 
the Spanish ships would probably never have been able 
to clear the shoal and turn to the westward. They 
would in all probability have been headed and never 
got out of the pocket in which they were and which was 
opened for them by the movement of the Brooklyn and 
the consequent checking of the Texas. 

i39 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

Admiral Schley's first explanation of his movement 
was that he was afraid of being rammed it being under- 
stood that the Spaniards were especially anxious to 
dest/oy the Brooklyn because she was so fast. His 
second explanation of his turning away from the enemy 
in a direction contrary to that taken by the other ships 
was that he wished to avoid blanketing their fire. For 
the ship in the lead, and with the highest speed to 
blanket ships in the rear seems difficult on its face but 
for the leading ship to blanket the fire of four battle- 
ships strung out over a mile that fire being directed 
against four ships strung out over an equal or greater 
distance appears practically impossible. 

This necessary definition as to the command with 
proof that the captains fought the action for them- 
selves under the standing order of Admiral Sampson* 
together with the closely related description of the 
exceptional and isolated movements of the Brooklyn 
have led us away from the general narrative of the 
battle itself. 

The only disadvantage to the Americans at the out- 
set was that they were under low steam, and it took 
time to gather way, so that the Spaniards, with a full 
head of steam, gained in the first rush. But this did 
not check the closing in, nor the heavy broadsides which 

*Note.— See report of Captain Clark of the Oregon addressed to 
Admiral Sampson in which he says : "Acting under your orders" 
i. e. 

Under Sampson's standing orders which Admiral Schley re- 
peated by signal from the Brooklyn and then disobeyed. That is, 
he did not follow his own order and gave no notice or signal to 
the other ships that he was going to do just the opposite to what 
he had ordered them to do; namely, "close with the enemy." 

540 



SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT 

were poured upon the Spanish ships as they came by 
and turned to the westward. Then it was that the 
Maria Teresa and the Oquendo received their death- 
wounds. Then it was that a 13-inch shell from the 
Indiana struck the Teresa exploding under the quarter- 
deck ; and that the broadsides of the Iowa, flung on 
each cruiser as it headed her in turn, and of the Oregon 
and Texas, tore the sides of the Oquendo, the Vizcaya, 
and the flag-ship. The Spanish fire sank under that 
of the American gunners, shooting coolly as if at target 
practice, and sweeping the Spanish decks in a manner 
which drove the men from the guns. On went the 
Spanish ships in their desperate flight, the American 
ships firing rapidly and steadily upon them, always 
closing in, and beginning now to gather speed. The 
race was a short one to two of the Spanish ships, fatally 
wounded in the first savage encounter. In little more 
than half an hour the flag-ship Maria Teresa was 
headed to the shore, and at quarter past ten she was a 
sunken, burning wreck upon the beach at Nima Nima, 
six miles from Santiago. Fifteen minutes later, and 
half a mile further on, the Oquendo was beached near 
Juan Gonzales, a mass of flames, shot to pieces, and a 
hopeless wreck. For these two, flight and fight were 
alike over. 

At the start, the Brooklyn as has been said putting 
her helm to port, had gone round, bearing away from 
the land, and then steamed to the westward, so that, 
as she was the fastest in our squadron, she might be 
preserved to head off the swiftest Spanish ship. In 
the lead with the Brooklyn was the Texas, holding 
the next position in the line and checked temporarily 

141 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

by the Brooklyn's movement. But the Oregon was 
about to add to the laurels she had already won in her 
great voyage from ocean to ocean. With a burst of 
speed which astonished all who saw her, and which 
seemed almost incredible in a battle-ship, she forged 
ahead to the second place in the chase, for such it had 
now become. The Teresa and the Oquendo had gone 
to wreck, torn by the fire of all the ships. The Vizcaya 
had also been mortally hurt in the first outset, but she 
struggled on, pursued by the leading ships, and under 
their fire, especially that of the Oregon, until, at quarter 
past eleven, she too was turned to the shore and beached 
at Asseraderos, fifteen miles from Santiago, a shat- 
tered, blazing hulk. Meantime the two torpedo-boats, 
coming out last from the harbor, about ten o'clock, had 
made a rush to get by the American ships. But their 
high speed availed them nothing. The secondary bat- 
teries of the battle-ships including that of the New York 
as she came driving past were turned upon them with 
disastrous effect, and they also met an enemy especially 
reserved for them. The Gloucester, a converted yacht, 
with no armor, but with a battery of small rapid-fire 
guns, was lying inshore when the Spaniards made their 
break for liberty. Undauntedly firing her light shells 
at the great cruisers as they passed, the Gloucester 
waited, gathering steam the while for the destroyers. 
The moment these boats appeared, Lieutenant-Com- 
mander Wainwright, unheeding the fire of the Socapa 
battery, drove the Gloucester straight upon them at top 
speed, giving them no time to use their torpedoes, even 
if they had so desired. The fierce, rapid, well-directed 
fire of the Gloucester swept the decks of the torpedo- 

142 



SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT 

boats, and tore their upper works and sides. Shattered 
by the shells from the battle-ships, and overwhelmed 
by the close and savage attack of the Gloucester, which 
fought in absolute disregard of the fire from either 
ships or shore, the race of the torpedo-boat destroyers 
was soon run. Within twenty minutes of their rush 
from the harbor's mouth the Furor was beached and 
sunk, and the Pluton had gone down in deep water. 
At the risk of their lives the officers and men of the 
Gloucester boarded their sinking enemies, whose decks 
looked like shambles, and saved all those who could be 
saved. There were but few to rescue. Nineteen were taken 
from the Furor, 26 from the Pluton; all the rest of the 
64 men on each boat were killed or drowned. It is 
worth while to make a little comparison here. The 
Furor and Pluton were 370 tons each, with a comple- 
ment together of 134 men. They had together four 11- 
pounders, four 6-pounders, and four Maxim guns, in 
addition to their torpedoes. The Gloucester was of 800 
tons, with 93 men, four 6-pounders, four 3-pounders, 
and two Colt automatic guns. The Spanish boats were 
fatally wounded by the secondary batteries of the bat- 
tle-ships, but they were hunted down and destroyed 
by the Gloucester, which, regardless of the fire of the 
Socapa battery, closed with them and overwhelmed 
them. There is a very interesting exhibition here of 
the superior quality of the American sailor. The fierce 
rapid, gallant attack of the Gloucester carried all before 
it, and showed that spirit of daring sea-fighting with- 
out which the best ships and the finest guns are of little 
avail, and which has made the English-speaking man 
the victor on the ocean from the days of the Armada. 

i43 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

When the Vizcaya went ashore at quarter past 
eleven, only one Spanish ship remained, the Cristobal 
Colon. She was the newest, the fastest, and the best 
of the squadron. With their bottled steam, all the 
Spanish cruisers gained at first, while the American 
ships were gathering and increasing their pressure, but 
the Colon gained most of all. She did, apparently, 
comparatively little firing, kept inside of her consorts, 
hugging the shore, and then raced ahead, gaining on 
all the American ships except the Brooklyn, which 
kept on well outside to head her off. When the Viz- 
caya went ashore, the Colon had a lead of about six 
miles over the Brooklyn and the Oregon, which had 
forged to the front, with the Texas and Vixen following 
at their best speed. As the Nczv York came tearing 
along the coast, striving with might and main to get 
into the fight, now so nearly done, Admiral Sampson 
saw, after he passed the wreck of the Vizcaya, that the 
American ships were overhauling the Spaniard. The 
Colon had a contract speed five knots faster than th( 
contract speed of the Oregon. But the Spaniard's bes 
was seven knots below her contract speed, while tin 
Oregon, fresh from her 14,000 miles of travel, wa 
going a little faster than her contract speed, a ver; 
splendid thing, worthy of much thought and considera 
tion as to the value of perfect and honest workmanshi' 
done quite obscurely in the builder's yard, and of th 
skill, energy, and exact training which could then g< 
more than any one had a right to expect from both shi 
and engines. On they went, the Americans comin 
ever nearer, until at last, at ten minutes before one, tl 
Brooklyn and Oregon opened fire. A thirteen-inc 

144 



SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT 

shell from the great battle-ship, crushing her way at top 
speed through the water, fell in the sea beyond the 
Colon while the eight-inch shells of the Brooklyn began 
to drop about her. But the big shell from the Oregon 
turret was enough ; and without waiting for another of 
those grim messengers from the battle-ship, without 
firing another shot, the Spaniard hauled down her flag 
and ran at full speed ashore upon the beach at Rio Tar- 
quino, forty-five miles from Santiago. Captain Cook 
of the Brooklyn boarded her, received the surrender, 
and reported it to Admiral Sampson, who had come up 
just in time to share in the last act of the drama. The 
Colon was only slightly hurt by the shells, but it was 
soon found that the Spaniards, to whom the point of 
honor is very dear, had opened and broken her sea- 
valves after surrendering her, and that she was filling 
fast. The New York pushed her in nearer the shore, 
and she sank, comparatively uninjured, in shoal water. 
So the fight ended. Every Spanish ship which had 
dashed out of the harbor in the morning was a half- 
sunken wreck on the Cuban coast at half past one. The 
officers and men of the Iowa, assisted by the Ericsson 
and Hist, took off the Spanish crews from the red-hot 
decks and amid the exploding batteries and ammunition 
of the Vizcaya. The same work was done by the 
Gloucester and Harvard for the Oqnendo and Maria 
Teresa. From the water and the surf, from the 
beaches, and from the burning wrecks, at greater peril 
than they had endured all day in battle, American offi- 
cers and crews rescued their beaten foes. It was a 
very noble conclusion to a very perfect victory. The 
Spanish lost, according to their own accounts and the 
10 145 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

best estimates, 350 killed or drowned, 160 wounded, 
and 99 officers and 1,675 men prisoners, including, 
of course, those on the Furor and Pint on, as already 
given. The American loss was one man killed and one 
wounded, both on the Brooklyn. Such completeness 
I of result and such perfection of execution are as striking 
here as at Manila, and Europe, which had been disposed 
at first to belittle Manila, saw at Santiago that these 
things were not accidental, and considered the perform- 
ances of the American navy in a surprised and flatter- 
ing, but by no means happy, silence. At Santiago the 
Spaniards had the best types of modern cruisers, three 
built by British workmen in Spanish yards, and one, 
the Colon, in Italy, while the torpedo-boat destroyers 
were fresh from the Clyde, and the very last expression 
of English skill. The ships of the United States were 
heavier in armament and armor, but on the average 
much slower. The Americans could throw a heavier 
weight of metal, but the Spaniards had more quick-fire 
guns, and ought to have been able to fire at the rate of 
seventy-seven more shots in five minutes than their op- 
ponents.* According to the contract speed, the Spanish 
cruisers had a great advantage over all their American 
opponents, with the exception of the Brooklyn, and of 
the New York, which was absent at the beginning. If 
they had lived up to their qualities as set down in every 
naval register, they ought to have made a most brilliant 
fight, and some of them ought to have escaped. They 
also had the advantage of coming out under a full head 

* See the admirable article in Harper's Magazine for January 
(p. 291) upon the "Naval Lessons of the War," by H. W. Wil- 
son, author of "Ironclads in Action." 

*& f ■ 

t 



' 



SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT 

of steam, which their opponents lacked, and yet in less 
than two hours all but one were shattered wrecks along 
the shore, and in less than two hours more that one sur- 
vivor had been run down and had met the same fate. It 
is no explanation to say, what we know now to be true, 
that the Colon did not have her ten-inch guns, that the 
Vizcaya was foul-bottomed, that much of the ammu- 
nition was bad, and the other ships more or less out of 
order. One of the conditions of naval success, just as 
important as any other, is that the ships should be kept 
in every respect in the highest possible efficiency, and 
that the best work of which the machine and the organ- 
ization are capable should be got out of them. The 
Americans fulfiled these conditions, the Spaniards did 
not; the Oregon surpassed all that the most exacting 
had a right to demand; the Colon and Vizcaya did 
far less; hence one reason for American victory. It 
is also said with truth that the Spanish gunnery was 
bad, but this is merely stating again that they fell short 
in a point essential to success. They fired with great 
rapidity as they issued from the harbor, and although 
most of the shots went wide, many were anything but 
wild, for the American ships were all hit repeatedly. 
When the American fire fell upon them, the Spanish 
fire, as at Manila, slackened, became ineffective, and 
died away. Again it was shown that the volume 
and accuracy of the American fire were so great 
that the fire of the opponents was smothered, and 
that the crews were swept away from the guns. The 
overwhelming American victory was due not to the 
shortcomings of the Spaniards, but to the efficiency of 
the navy of the United States and to the quality of the 

M7 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

crews. The officers and seamen, the gunners and engi- 
neers, surpassed the Spaniards in their organization 
and in their handling of the machinery they used. 
They were thoroughly prepared ; no surprise was pos- 
sible to them ; they knew just what they meant to do 
when the hour of battle came, and they did it coolly, 
effectively, and with perfect discipline. They were pro- 
ficient and accurate marksmen, and got the utmost from 
their guns as from their ships. Last, and most import- 
ant of all, they had that greatest quality of a strong, liv- 
ing, virile race, the power of daring, incessant dashing 
attack, with no thought of the punishment they might 
themselves be obliged to take. The whole war showed, 
and the defeat of Cervera most conspicuously, that the 
Spaniards had utterly lost the power of attack, a sure 
sign of a broken race; and for which no amount of for- 
titude in facing death can compensate. No generous 
man can fail to admire or to praise the despairing cour- 
age which held El Caney and carried Cervera's fleet out 
of the narrow channel of Santiago; but it is not the 
kind of courage which leads to victory, like that which 
sent American soldiers up the hills of San Juan and into 
the blood-stained village streets of El Caney, or which 
made the American ships swoop down, carrying utter 
destruction, upon the flying Spanish cruisers. 

Thus the long chase of the Spanish fleet ended in its 
wreck and ruin beneath American guns. As one tells 
the story, the utter inadequacy of the narrative to the 
great fact seems painfully apparent. One wanders 
among the absorbing details which cross and recross the 
reader's path, full of interest and infinite in their com- 
plexity. The more details one gathers, puzzling what 

148 




1 



SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT 

to keep and what to reject, the denser seems the com- 
plexity, and the dimmer and more confused the picture. 
The historian writing calmly in the distant future will 
weave them into a full and dispassionate narrative ; the 
antiquarian will write monographs on all incidents, 
small or large, with unwearying patience ; the naval 
critic and expert will even now draw many technical 
and scientific lessons from everything that happened, 
and will debate and dispute about it, to the great ad- 
vantage of himself and his profession. And yet these 
are not the things which appeal now, or will appeal in 
the days to come, to the hearts of men. The details, 
the number of shots, the ranges, the part taken by each 
ship, the positions of the fleet — all alike have begun to 
fade from recollection even now, and will grow still 
dimmer as the years recede. But out of the mist of 
events and the gathering darkness of passing time the 
great fact and the great deed stand forth for the Ameri- 
can people and their children's children, as white and 
shining as the Santiago channel glaring under the 
search-lights through the Cuban night. 

They remember, and will always remember, that hot 
summer morning, and the anxiety, only half whispered, 
which overspread the land. They see, and will always 
see, the American ships rolling lazily on the long seas, 
and the sailors just going to Sunday inspection. Then 
comes the long thin trail of smoke drawing nearer the 
harbor's mouth. The ships see it, and we can hear the 
cheers ring out, for the enemy is coming, and the 
American sailor rejoices mightily to know that the 
battle is set. There is no need of signals, no need 
of orders. The patient, long-watching admiral has 

149 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

given direction for every chance that may befall. 
Every ship is in place; and they close in upon 
the advancing enemy, fiercely pouring shells from 
broadside and turret. There is the Gloucester fir- 
ing her little shots at the great cruisers, and then 
driving down to grapple with the torpedo-boats. There 
are the Spanish ships, already mortally hurt, running 
along the shore, shattered and breaking under the fire 
of the Indiana, the Iowa, and the Texas; there is the 
Brooklyn racing by outside to head the fugitives, and 
the Oregon dealing death-strokes as she rushes for- 
ward, forging to the front, and leaving her mark every- 
where she goes. It is a captain's fight, and they all 
fight as if they were one man with one ship. On they 
go, driving through the water, firing steadily and ever 
getting closer, and presently the Spanish cruisers, help- 
less, burning, twisted wrecks of iron, are piled along 
the shore, and we see the younger officers and men of 
the victorious ships periling their lives to save their 
beaten enemies. We see Wainwright on the Glouces- 
ter, as eager in rescue as he was swift in fight to avenge 
the Maine. We hear Philip cry out : "Don't cheer. 
The poor devils are dying." We watch Evans as he 
hands back the sword to the wounded Eulate, and then 
writes in his report: "I cannot express my admira- 
tion for my magnificent crew. So long as the enemy 
showed his flag, they fought like American seamen ; 
but when the flag came down, they were as gentle and 
tender as American women." They all stand out to us, 
these gallant figures, from the silent admiral to the 
cheering seaman, with an intense human interest, fear- 
less in fight, brave and merciful in the hour of victory. 

150 



SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT 

And far away along the hot ridges of the San Juan 
heights lie the American soldiers, who have been fight- 
ing, and winning, and digging intrenchments for forty- 
eight hours, sleeping little and eating less. There they 
are under the tropic sun that Sunday morning, and 
presently the heavy sound of guns comes rolling up the 
bay, and is flung back with many echoes from the sur- 
rounding hills. It goes on and on, so fast, so deep and 
loud, that it is like continuous thunder filling all the 
air. A battle is on ; they know that. Wild rumors be- 
gin to fly about, drifting up from the coast. They hear 
that the American fleet is coming into the harbor; then 
for an hour that it has been defeated and that the Span- 
iards have escaped ; and then the truth begins to come, 
and before nightfall they know that the Spanish fleet 
is no more, and the American soldier cheers the Ameri- 
can sailor, and is filled anew with the glow of victory, 
and the assurance that he and his comrades have not 
fought and suffered and died in vain. 

The thought of the moment is of the present victory, 
but there are men there who recognize the deeper and 
more distant meanings of that Sunday's work, now 
sinking into the past. They are stirred by the knowl- 
edge that the sea power of Spain has perished, and that 
the Spanish West Indies, which Columbus gave to Leon 
and Castile, shall know Spain no more. They lift the 
veil of the historic past, and see that on that July morn- 
ing a great empire met its end, and passed finally out of 
the New World, because it was unfit to rule and govern 
men. And they and all men see now, and ever more 
clearly will see., that in the fight off Santiago another 
great fact had reasserted itself for the consideration of 

151 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

the world. For that fight had displayed once more the 
victorious sea spirit of a conquering race. It is the 
spirit of the Jomsberg Viking who, alone and wounded, 
ringed round with foes, springs into the sea from his 
sinking boat with defiance on his lips. It comes down 
through Grenville and Drake and Howard and Blake, 
on to Perry and Macdonough and Hull and Decatur. 
Here on this summer Sunday it has been shown again 
to be as vital and as clear as ever, even as it was with 
Nelson dying at Trafalgar, and with Faragut and his 
men in the fights of bay and river more than thirty 
years before. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

Despite the depressing despatch to Washington say- 
ing that he was considering withdrawal, General Shat- 
ter, at 10 o'clock on Sunday morning, sent to General 
Toral a demand for immediate surrender, threatening 
to shell the city, although he had no siege-guns and 
nothing but light artillery to carry out his threat in case 
his demand was not complied with. General Toral 
answered at once, declining to surrender, and saying 
that he would notify the foreign consuls and the inhabi- 
tants of the proposed bombardment. Thereupon the 
foreign consuls appeared at General Wheeler's head- 
quarters, and asked that the bombardment be postponed 
until the 5th; that the non-combatants, women and 
children, and the foreign residents, be allowed to leave 
the town and pass into the American lines, to be there 
fed and cared for. General Shafter granted the respite 
until the 5th, provided that there was no firing from the 
Spanish lines. By the evening of the 3d it was known 
that Cervera's fleet had been completely destroyed, and 
the purpose of the expedition had been fully attained. 
But in effecting that purpose the army had been so far 
advanced toward Santiago that, although the purely 
military value of the place was next to nothing after 
what had happened, not to take it would have been a 

iS3 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

blow to the prestige of the United States which could 
not be accepted. If the army had never advanced 
toward Santiago, but had confined its operations to the 
capture of the Morro and other harbor defences, thus 
allowing the navy to clear the mine-fields, the fleet could 
have entered, destroyed Cervera's ships in the harbor, 
and forced the surrender of the city. In this event the 
bulk of the troops could have been placed immediately 
on the transports and despatched to Puerto Rico, the 
natural Spanish base in the Antilles, and the point 
which General Miles rightly believed from the begin- 
ning should be the main objective of the American cam- 
paign, subject only to the destruction of the cruisers 
which represented the Spanish sea power in the West 
Indies. But since the plan of attacking the shore 
batteries and clearing the channel had been abandoned, 
and the army marched straight against Santiago, it 
was no longer possible to withdraw the troops in order 
to send them to Puerto Rico, or for any other purpose. 
The capture of Santiago had become by the operations 
of our army a moral and consequently a military neces- 
sity. 

The brilliant victory of the American fleet raised 
every one's spirits, and gave assurance of the final 
triumph on land. General Shafter, who had first sent 
out the telegram intimating withdrawal, telegraphed 
General Miles later that he was master of the situation 
and could hold the enemy for any length of time, and in 
the evening, after the news from the fleet had been fully 
confirmed, cheerfully sent word that his line completely 
surrounded the town from the bay on the north of the 
city to a point on San Juan river on the south, and that 

i54 



THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

he thought General Garcia would be able to check the 
advance of Pando's column. Nevertheless the situa- 
tion of the American army was in some respects se- 
rious. The defenses of Santiago in the immediate neigh- 
borhood of the city, General Shafter said, were "almost 
impregnable." They were certainly very strong, and it 
would have cost many lives to carry them with troops 
insufficiently provided with artillery. This was a very 
grave fact, because time had become extremely im- 
portant to the American forces, and it was pressingly 
necessary to bring the siege to an end. Haste was im- 
perative, not on account of anything to be feared from 
the enemy, but through the surrounding conditions. 
The entire force of the United States, with the excep- 
tion of Duffield's brigade, had gone through the battle 
of the 2d of July, and had suffered severely in killed 
and wounded. For the next thirty-six hours they had 
been exposed to the enemy's fire, repeatedly obliged to 
repel an advance, always on the alert, and, in addition, 
constantly digging and laboring on the intrenchments. 
The tenacious, unwavering courage with which they 
clung to the advanced line, laboring and fighting, was 
as fine in its way as the daring, irrresistible rush with 
which they had swept up the slopes of San Juan. But 
courage and energy could not prevent the exhaustion 
incident to so much fighting and digging. There was 
no reserve. All the troops practically were on the line, 
with no chance for any substantial relief. The trans- 
portation was bad, so that the men were underfed and 
insufficiently tented. With their exhausting labors, and 
not fortified by food, with a hospital service which had 
in large measure broken down, the men were exposed to 

155 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

scorching tropic heats and torrential rains, all in a cli- 
mate famous for malarial fevers. It was only a ques- 
tion of a very short time when these fevers would be- 
come general, striking first the sick and wounded, who 
were insufficiently cared for and who could not be re- 
stored to health on a diet of pork and beans, and then 
the well and unwounded men in the trenches. Worst 
of all, behind the climatic diseases lurked the dread epi- 
demic of yellow fever, hidden in the cabins of Siboney, 
which ought to have been burned at once as the ma- 
rines burned the fishing villlage at Guantanamo, and 
in the hordes of refugees who were presently to come 
out of the besieged city. 

On the other side, the Spaniards were in reality much 
worse off, although it may have appeared at Havana 
and in Madrid as if they had only to hold firm and trust 
to the climate and the ravages of fever to inflict severe 
losses upon the Americans, delay them, and possibly 
force them to withdraw. The Spanish commmanders 
were in the midst of a hostile population. The Cuban 
insurgents had for some time practically shut them up 
in the city on the land side, breaking their communica- 
tions and cutting off their supplies. They believed that 
the American forces numbered fifty thousand men, and 
although they were mistaken in this, they knew that 
their opponents could easily receive unlimited re-en- 
forcements, new regiments, as a matter of fact, soon 
arriving and extending the lines rapidly around the 
doomed city. They knew, also, that Cervera's fleet 
had been destroyed, and that no relief coming oversea 
could possibly be hoped for. To draw in the outlying 
troops from other parts of the province was a work of 

156 



THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

time and difficulty, and meanwhile, with a beaten and 
discouraged army which had suffered severely in battle, 
with disease rife, and their water supply impaired, they 
were face to face with a vigorous enemy constantly in- 
creasing in numbers. Under these conditions the sur- 
render of the city was only a question of time, but how 
long that time would be was of infinite importance 
to the American army when delay meant disease and 
death. 

The first truce of two days following Toral's curt and 
useless refusal to consider surrender did not help the 
American situation, for it brought on July 5 a general 
exodus of non-combatants from the city. These un- 
happy refugees, mostly women and children, came 
pouring into the American lines at El Caney to the 
number of twenty-two thousand. They were in sad 
plight — ragged, sick, starved. They made a fresh 
strain upon the American resources, for they had to 
be fed; they brought yellow fever with them as they 
scattered through the camps, and they relieved very 
much the situation of the Spanish forces in the city. 
After their arrival there was skirmishing along the 
lines, sometimes of quite a lively character, varied by 
flags of truce and consequent intervals of repose. Our 
losses were slight, as the men were now well protected 
by intrenchments and breastworks. This condition of 
affairs lasted until the 9th, when another demand for 
surrender was made. The Spaniards, in reply, offered to 
evacuate if allowed to withdraw untouched to Holguin, 
which was declined. They then peremptorily refused 
to surrender, being encouraged in their attitude proba- 
bly by the fact that General Escario, with the Pando 

i57 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

column, consisting of 3,300 men, had come in some days 
before.* General Garcia had endeavored to stop this 
re-enforcement, and had fought an action in which the 
Spanish loss is said to have been 27 killed and 67 
wounded ; but General Escario forced his way through, 
apparently without serious difficulty, and reached the 
city in safety. Whether the arrival of these fresh 
troops was the cause or not, the surrender was declined, 
and thereupon the American lines opened with small 
guns and artillery, and continued the fire until nightfall 
of Sunday, the 10th, being supported on that afternoon 
by the eight-inch guns of the Brooklyn, Indiana, and 
Texas, which came in near shore and fired, most of 
their shells falling short. The Spaniards replied stead- 
ily, but, according to their own accounts, slowly, owing 
to their desire to economize their ammunition. The 
American losses were trivial ; the Spanish, by their own 
reports, 7 killed and 47 wounded ; but the result of the 
bombardment was neither substantial nor effective. 
The next day the Nezv York, Brooklyn, and Indiana 
came in to within 400 yards of the shore at Aguadores, 
anchored, and opened fire with their eight-inch guns 
over the coast hills, at the city they could not see, with 
a range of 8,500 yards. This time the practice was ex- 
cellent. The army officers watching the fall of the 
shells, although they could not tell exactly what hap- 
pened, saw enough to make it clear that the shots were 
effective, and that fires broke out in several places. It 
was found afterwards to have been far more destruc- 
tive than the watchers on the hills supposed. Captain 
West reported forty-six shots, but was unable to tell 
*The night of July 2. 
158 




1 J I !■: MEETING OF 111K GENERALS In ARRANGE HIE SURRENDER OF 
SANTIAGO 



THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

the result of most of them. After the surrender naval 
officers found fourteen houses wrecked by shells, and 
nineteen shells in the Calle de la Marina near the water- 
front; while Lieutenant Muller states that fifty-nine 
houses were wrecked or injured, and that no lives were 
lost, solely because the inhabitants had deserted the city. 
As General Linares said in the pathetic despatch which 
he sent to Madrid describing his hopeless and miserable 
situation. "The fleet has a perfect knowledge of the 
place, and bombards by elevation with a mathematical 
accuracy." General Shafter considered that the bom- 
bardment had been sufficiently accurate and effect- 
ive to warrant him in advancing the lines and de- 
manding again an unconditional surrender. At the 
same time he desired a continuous bombardment 
from heavier guns, and Admiral Sampson brought 
down the Oregon and Massachusetts and prepared 
to open with the 13-inch guns the next day; while 
General Miles, who had just arrived, was ready 
to land fresh troops. But neither the 13-inch guns 
nor the re-enforcements were needed. The Span- 
iards knew that the naval bombardment was effective, 
whatever doubts the officers of our own army may have 
had in regard to it. The navy, despite the long range 
and the intervening hills, had managed to supply the 
place of the lacking siege-guns, and the Spaniards had 
had enough. A truce was agreed to on July 12 ; and on 
July 13 General Miles, who had come up from the coast 
after ordering the burning of Siboney, a precaution 
which ought to have been taken two weeks before, 
joined General Shafter and General Wheeler, and go- 
ing through the lines with them, had a long interview 

J 59 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

with General Toral, commanding the Spanish forces. 
It was evident then, and is still clearer now, that the 
fight was really over, and that nothing remained but an 
arrangement of the terms of surrender. General Toral 
asked for a day to consult Madrid as to the deportation 
of the Spanish troops, which was granted. The next 
day there was another meeting of the generals, and it 
was supposed that all was arranged; but it appeared 
that there had been misunderstandings; other meet- 
ings followed, and it was not until after midnight that 
the preliminary agreement was finally signed. This was 
sent to Madrid, and being accepted there, was put into 
due form as articles of capitulation, and signed on July 
1 6. The terms of capitulation provided that all the 
Eastern District and the troops therein should be sur- 
rendered ; that the United States should transport the 
Spanish troops to Spain at its own expense; that the 
Spanish officers should retain their side arms, but that 
all other arms and ammunition of war were to be sur- 
rendered, the American commissioners recommending 
to their government, as a sop to Spanish pride, that the 
soldiers should be allowed to keep the arms they had 
so bravely defended, to which recommendation no heed 
was or could be paid. 

So the city and Eastern District of Santiago passed 
into American hands, the outward and visible sign of 
the victorious fighting of the army, as the twisted 
wrecks to the westward were of that of the navy. The 
ceremonies of surrender took place on July 17. Early 
in the morning General Shafter, with General Wheeler 
by his side, started from the American lines, followed 
by the division and brigade commanders and their 

160 



THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

staffs. They were plainly dressed, without stars or or- 
ders — h ar d fighters all — and presented a contrast to 
General Toral and his staff, who were glittering with 
decorations. It was half past nine when the two com- 
manders met and shook hands, and the American con- 
gratulated the Spaniard upon his gallant defence. Then 
a battalion of Spanish infantry marched past, piled their 
arms, and marched back again, in sign of the surrender, 
and setting the example soon to be followed by the 
rest of the army. This done, the generals and their 
staffs rode forward into the city. Along the road lay 
the carcasses of horses, and the shallow graves of sol- 
diers torn open by vultures — grim and silent witnesses 
of the work which had brought the Spaniards to defeat. 
Presently the Spanish lines were reached, and the cav- 
alcade passed through the intrenchments, wire fences, 
and barricades of paving-stones, which it would have 
cost many brave lives to force. So on through streets 
lined with Spanish soldiers, silent, but apparently re- 
lieved to have it over, and bearing the inevitable with 
cheerful philosophy. When the plaza was reached the 
generals entered the palace, while the Ninth Infantry 
and two troops of cavalry cleared the square. In the 
palace General Shafter received the head of the Church, 
gorgeous in purple robes and many decorations. Pos- 
sibly, as the archbishop, after his brief interview, took 
his way across the square through the bowing crowds, 
he may have thought upon the after-dinner speech in 
which he had so lately declared that with ten thousand 
men he would hoist the Spanish flag over the Capitol 
at Washington, and thus pondering, have found fresh 
force in the words of Ecclesiastes. The time slipped 
n i6x 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

by as the crowds waited — the natives rejoicing - , th 
Spanish soldiers cheerful, the Spanish officers an 
priests sad and dejected — until, as all watched th 
cathedral clock, the hand came round to five minute 
before twelve. Then a sharp command rang out, the in 
fantry and cavalry came to attention and stood motion 
less. The five minutes dragged on with leaden feet, an 
then at last the bells began to sound from the cathedra 
and the American flag went up on the staff over th 
palace. The band played "The Star-Spangled Banner,' 
the officers bared their heads, the troops presentee 
arms, the artillery thundered from the trenches, and al 
down the long and distant line ran the American cheer: 
— strong, vigorous, inspiring, the shout of a conquer- 
ing people. 

It was all over. Santiago had passed away fron 
Spain, and with it all Cuba, for what had been done 
there could not be hindered elsewhere, as was now very 
plain to all men. It was one of the dramatic points in 
the war. It was the moment when the American flag 
mounting proudly in the air, told the world that Spain's 
empire in America had finally and forever departed. 
Out of that harbor, famous before, more famous now, 
Grijalva and Cordova had sailed on the perilous voy- 
ages which had discovered Central America. Thence 
in the early dawn of a November morning in 1518 
Cortez had slipped away with his fleet to escape an un- 
friendly Governor, and raising afterwards at Havana 
his standard of black and gold, with a red cross flaring 
in the centre, had passed on to conquer Mexico and pour 
untold wealth into the coffers of the Spanish King. 
The last Spanish fleet had just left that harbor a des- 

162 



THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

perate fugitive, and had perished in its mad flight a few 
miles beyond the harbor mouth. Now the speech of 
the men who, three hundred years before, had hunted 
the Armada and saved English freedom was heard in 
the market place of Santiago, repeating the old mes- 
sage of liberty, grown wider and stronger than ever 
before in the hands of the great republic. The flag of 
the United States fluttered in the breezes which for 
three centuries had carried the arms and colors of 
Spain, now fallen and gone. Only outward symbols 
these, but representing many facts and many events 
worthy of much attention and consideration from those 
who think tyranny, falsehood, and bigotry are suitable 
instruments for the government of mankind. 

It is well also not to forget that while these great and 
conclusive events were happening at Santiago, while 
Sampson was shutting in Cervera with his strong and 
patient blockade, the better to crush him when he rushed 
out to fight, while the American army was advanc- 
ing from the coast, winning the hot fight at San Juan 
and taking the city in token of victory, other Ameri- 
cans in ships of war were diligently and efficiently car- 
rying steadily forward the work which was cutting off 
Cuba from the rest of the world, and making inevitable 
the surrender of the island, even as the eastern province 
had surrendered. North and south, all along that far- 
stretching and broken coast-line, American gunboats 
and cruisers kept up a ceaseless patrol. Ships at the 
western end were scarce enough, but nevertheless the 
blockade was held tight and firm around Havana and 
the ports covered by the first proclamation. To tell in 
fitting detail all the work that was done would fill many 

163 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

pages, and would be no more than the officers and sail- 
ors deserve who performed hard and often obscure duty 
with an efficiency equal to that shown by their more 
fortunate comrades in a larger and more brilliant thea- 
tre. But it is impossible here to render this justice to 
all. The work was patient and unceasing, and the in- 
cidents of fighting were of almost daily occurrence. 
Now a great blockade-runner was hunted down and de- 
stroyed, as the Eagle dealt with the Santo Domingo 
at Rio Piedras, and the Hawk, aided by the Castine, 
with another six-thousand-ton ship at Mariel, the men 
on the ships or in boats facing a heavy fire in their re- 
lentless pursuit. Blockade-running became a danger- 
ous, almost impossible, business under the conditions 
imposed by the American navy. Again it was the land- 
ing of an expedition to bring aid and supplies to Gomez, 
as was done by the Peoria and Helena convoying the 
Florida, with a fight in consequence against the bat- 
teries and block-houses at Las Tunas. Again it was the 
Dixie smashing the block-houses at the San Juan and 
Guayximico rivers, and the gunboats at Casilda. These 
are but samples of the manner in which the Spanish 
defences were harried and broken up all along the 
coast, and the efforts to get supplies to the main army 
at Havana frustrated and brought to naught. 

More serious was the affair of June 26 at Man- 
zanillo. On the morning of that day the Hist, under 
command of Lieutenant Young, the senior officer pres- 
ent, together with the Hornet and the Wompatuck, 
attacked a gun-boat near the block-house in Niguero 
Bay, and, after a sharp action, destroyed her. They 
pushed on to the harbor of Manzanillo in the after- 

164 



THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

noon, and came upon nine vessels, including four gun- 
boats and a torpedo-boat, drawn up in crescent for- 
mation, and supported by four pontoons and strong 
shore batteries. Nothing daunted, these two converted 
yachts and one tug, with their light batteries, pressed 
forward and attacked vigorously, under a heavy fire. 
The odds were strongly against them ; the Hist was hit 
eleven times; the Hornet, also struck many times, was 
disabled finally by a shot through her main steam-pipe, 
and was towed off by the Wompatuck, which received 
her share of shots, fighting her guns steadily and ef- 
fectively. The Spanish torpedo-boat was disabled, one 
gunboat sunk, as well as a sloop loaded with soldiers, 
and a pontoon was destroyed. It was a very plucky 
fight against a far superior force. The next day the 
Scorpion, under command of Lieutenant Marix, and ac- 
companied by the tug Osceola, went in and vigorously 
renewed the attack, but was inadequate to dispose of 
such odds against them. These affairs made it obvious 
that a stronger force was necessary in order to really 
destroy the Spanish ships assembled in the harbor. 
On July 1 8 the five small vessels which had already 
been engaged, re-enforced by the gunboats Helena 
and Wilmington, Commander Todd of the latter being 
the senior officer present, went in early in the morning 
and opened fire at ten minutes before eight. At the end 
of two hours and a half they had destroyed three large 
transports, the Ponton, a guard-ship, and three gun- 
boats. As they worked in closer, batteries opened from 
the shore, and soldiers with rifles, to which they replied 
effectively ; but when the shipping was disposed of, the 
American flotilla withdrew, the work to which it had 

165 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

been assigned having been performed with entire thor- 
oughness, excellent shooting, cool courage, and in the 
same spirit of completeness as had been shown to the 
world at Manila. 

Three days afterwards the Annapolis, commanded by 
Commander Hunker, supported by the Topeka, with the 
Wasp and Lcyden leading, went in through the mine- 
sown channel of Nipe bay, on the northern coast. There 
they found the gunboat Don Jorge Juan, of 935 tons 
and armed with 6-inch rifles, lying at anchor in the 
restful belief that no enemy would dare to venture past 
the mines. Unluckily the enemy inconsiderately did 
that very thing, faced the fire of the Don Jorge Juan, 
closed in, and in half an hour the Spaniard, shot to 
pieces, had surrendered and sunk. Again, three days 
later, the Nashville, under command of Commander 
Maynard, took possession of Gibara, supporting the 
Cubans who were already in the town. Thus the sea- 
ports of Cuba were falling rapidly and steadily into 
American hands, and thus the net was being drawn ever 
closer and tighter upon the main army at Havana. In 
pursuance of this policy it was determined to complete 
the work at Manzanillo, where the shipping had been 
so thoroughly destroyed, by taking the town itself, 
which, strongly held by a large force of troops and well 
defended by batteries, was a source of trouble to the 
American campaign on land, as well as a constant 
temptation to blockade-running. With this object in 
view, the Newark, under Captain Goodrich, on her way 
to the Isle of Pines to conduct certain operations 
ordered by Admiral Sampson, gathered together the 
Resolute, Suzvanee, Hist, Osceola, and the Alvarado — a 

166 




NAVAL OFFICERS IN PUERTO RICAN CAMPAIGN 



THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

recently captured Spanish gun-boat — and entered Man- 
zanillo Harbor on August 12. A demand for surrender 
under pain of bombardment was refused, and the ships 
opened upon the batteries at twenty minutes before 
four. In half an hour white flags were seen on a Span- 
ish gunboat ; the American fire stopped ; the Alvarado, 
running in under a flag of truce, was fired upon, and 
the action was immediately renewed. Cuban forces 
then appeared in the rear of the town, and opening 
fire, were supported by the ships. At half past five the 
ships anchored ; a slow fire from the Newark was kept 
up through the night, and preparations were made to 
renew the bombardment and force the surrender of the 
town the next morning. When daylight came, white 
flags were seen in Manzanillo, and the Captain of the 
Port brought off to Captain Goodrich a brief despatch, 
saying, "Protocol of peace signed by the President; 
armistice proclaimed." No more bombardment, there- 
fore, and Manzanillo was to be yielded without a strug- 
gle. The road of peace was opened again, hostilities 
were suspended, and the last shot of war from Amer- 
ican guns in Cuban waters had been fired. 



CHAPTER IX 
THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO 

The island of Puerto Rico, the easternmost and the 
most beautiful of the Greater Antilles, with its large 
population and commanding strategic position, was 
constantly in the minds of both army and navy as soon 
as war began. It was there that Admiral Sampson had 
gone to find Cervera at what seemed the most probable 
place, but the Spanish fleet was not in the harbor of San 
Juan. The noise of the bombardment died away, and 
the people of the island continued to believe that all was 
well, that Spain was triumphant and had won a great 
victory at Manila. American cruisers fluttered about 
the coast, and it was true that there seemed always to 
be a ship off San Juan. But this did not shake the 
general confidence, and there was much elation when 
the crack torpedo-boat destroyer Terror, detached at 
Martinique because out of order, came into the harbor. 
On June 22 it seemed that it would be a good thing for 
the Terror to go out, with the cruiser Isabel II, and at- 
tack the St. Paid, commanded by Captain Sigsbee of 
the Maine, just then watching the port. The St. Paul 
was only a huge Atlantic liner hastily armed and con- 
verted into an auxiliary cruiser, and probably the Span- 
iards thought her an easy prey, if only she would not 
run away. It is said that they invited their friends 

168 



THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO 

down to the shore to see the performance. The cruiser 
came out first, apparently did not like the outlook, and 
clung to the shelter of the batteries, firing ineffectively, 
while the St. Paul, apparently undisturbed, took a few 
shots to try the ranges. Then came the Terror, and as 
she steamed to the eastward the St. Paul steamed along 
outside and parallel. Then the torpedo-boat made a 
dash, and the St. Paul, instead of running away, waited 
to be torpedoed, and when the Terror got within S400 
yards, opened on her, sweeping her decks with frag- 
ments of shell and rapid-fire projectiles. It was clearly 
easier to blow Captain Sigsbee up in a peaceful harbor 
at night than in broad day, and the Terror turned 
round. Then a beautiful shot at nearly three miles dis- 
tance from the St. Paul's 5-inch gun hit her on the star- 
board side, smashed her engine, and killed the chief and 
assistant engineers, so that the dreaded boat was just 
able to struggle back and be dragged sinking to the 
beach by a couple of tugs. This disposed of that mem- 
ber of Cervera's fleet for the time being, and the pretty 
bit of shooting which was responsible for it was the 
only incident until theYosemite appeared and drove the 
Antonio Lopez ashore, and caused the At Iphonso II I '., Isa- 
bella 1 1. ,3.116. a torpedo-boat to seek shelter in the harbor. 
General Miles, from an early period of the war, was 
convinced that it would be an error to undertake a sum- 
mer campaign on a large scale in Cuba and directed 
against the principal Spanish army at Havana. He 
thought, and very justly, that the correct objective, 
from a military point of view, was Puerto Rico, which 
was the Spanish base for all operations in the West 
Indies, and where the climate was much better for 

169 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

Northern troops than was the case in Cuba. This plan 
was laid before the War Department, which was still 
considering the advisability of a general movement 
against Havana. The coming of Cervera's fleet and its 
final imprisonment in the harbor of Santiago changed 
the situation and made that city the objective of the 
highest moment. General Miles, appreciating the im- 
portance of this expedition, telegraphed on June 5, from 
Tampa, that he desired to go at its head ; but the com- 
mand was given to General Shafter, and on June 6 Gen- 
eral Miles, instead of being sent to Santiago, was asked, 
in a despatch from the Secretary of War, how soon 
he could have a sufficient force ready to go to Puerto 
Rico. General Miles replied that it could be ready in 
ten days, and there the matter seems to have dropped. 
On June 8 the Santiago expedition was ready, and on 
June 14 it sailed with 15,000 men and 800 officers, in- 
stead of the 25,000 it was expected to send. This was 
owing to a break-down in the ocean transportation, due 
to lack of knowledge of the steamships, which proved 
insufficient, and compelled the leaving behind at Tampa 
of 10,000 men who ought to have gone, and whose 
presence at Santiago would have greatly quickened the 
results and thereby saved much of the mortality caused 
by fever. The day after the Shafter expedition finally 
departed, General Miles was summoned to Washing- 
ton, and there, on June 26, an order was finally given 
to organize an expedition to operate against the enemy 
in Cuba and Puerto Rico, and General Miles was di- 
rected personally to take the command. For some little 
time before, efforts had been making to collect trans- 
ports for Puerto Rico, and this work went slowly for- 

170 




AN ANCIEN1 GATEW VY, SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO 



THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO 

ward, for everything connected with the business of 
transportation was tardy and imperfect. Then came a 
spur to the lagging transport service, which had already 
appealed to the navy for aid, and secured the help of 
vessels of war in carrying troops. It was a very sharp 
spur too, and struck home hard, being nothing less, in 
fact, that General Shafter's despatch of July 2, saying 
that he was considering withdrawal, depicting the 
strength of the inner defences of the city, and the im- 
possibility of carrying them with the force he had with 
him. General Miles replied, congratulating him upon 
the splendid fighting of his army, and said that he ex- 
pected to be with him in a week. But General Miles 
overrated the transport service. Even under the tre- 
mendous pressure then existing he did not get away un- 
til July 8, and as it was he went on the Yale, a vessel of 
the navy, with 1,500 troops on board, accompanied by 
the Columbia, and followed by the Duchesse with more 
soldiers. When he reached Santiago, on July 1 1 , how- 
ever, no time was lost, for General Miles had a good 
plan already made, and knew just what he meant to do 
— a very great advantage in affairs requiring action, 
where even a poor plan is better than none at all, and 
is always an immense advance over chaos. So General 
Miles, knowing what he wanted, arranged at once with 
Admiral Sampson — delighted to meet with a plan and 
cordially acquiescing — that everything should be pre- 
pared to land the new force on the west side of the bay, 
and either attack the harbor forts and open the way to 
the ileet, or else, if it seemed better, march on to the 
city and take the Spanish position in reverse. This 
done, General Miles landed, burned the cabins at Sibo- 

171 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

ney, and the next morning rode to the front and joined 
General Shatter. After taking part in the negotia- 
tions which resulted in the capitulation of the city, and 
issuing orders looking to the proper camping of the 
troops and their protection, so far as possible, from dis- 
ease, and especially from yellow fever, which had now 
become menacing, General Miles betook himself to the 
Yale, and telegraphed to Washington, asking permis- 
sion to proceed as soon as possible to Puerto Rico. After 
some delay the necessary authority was given. All the 
troops at Santiago were more or less infected, so that 
it was not safe to take any of them, as had been orig- 
inally planned in connection with the fresh regiments 
which had been kept on shipboard. This reduced the 
effective force which General Miles had with him to 
3,300 men, and he was obliged to rely on these alone 
until the re-enforcements, which were expected, arrived 
from the United States, to face the Spanish forces in 
Puerto Rico, amounting, it was reported, to over 
17,000 men. Tugs, launches, and lighters were ordered 
and anxiously awaited, but none came, and the expedi- 
tion finally started on July 2 1 , trusting to the navy and 
to what they could find at their destination to land the 
troops. The fleet consisted of seven transports carry- 
ing troops, and the Massachusetts, Dixie, Gloucester, 
Yale and Columbia as convoy, the last two also having 
troops on board. The plan was to land at Fajardo, on 
the eastern side of the island a little south of the cape, 
and not far from the city of San Juan. This continued 
to be the objective until the expedition started; but 
General Miles, being satisfied that Fajardo had been 
widely advertised as the landing-place, and that, owing 

172 





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THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO 

to the delays and the publicity, the Spaniards had had 
ample opportunity to concentrate at that point, very 
wisely decided that he would not go where the enemy 
expected him, but to Guanica, where nobody looked 
for him, on the southwestern coast. He also had trust- 
worthy information, which events subsequently veri- 
fied, that at Guanica he could get sugar-lighters, and 
still more at Ponce, the principal city of the island in 
the immediate neighborhood, whence a fine military 
road ran to San Juan, and that the people of that region 
were disaffected to Spain and friendly to the Amer- 
icans. Captain Higginson objected, naturally, to this 
change, because at Guanica he could not get in with his 
heavy ships to support the troops, whereas he could 
cover their landing at Fajardo. So it was first decided 
to go to Fajardo, observe the conditions, and if they 
were unfavorable, return. Later this plan too was 
changed, and the Dixie being sent to pick up the New 
Orleans at San Juan, and the transports which were 
supposed to be on their way to the original point of at- 
tack, the fleet went on direct to Guanica. They reached 
their destination a little after five o'clock on the morn- 
ing of July 25, and the Massachusetts and Gloucester, 
standing in, came to anchor at quarter before nine. The 
battle-ship could go no farther, and although it was 
clear that there were no entrance batteries, no one knew 
what batteries might be concealed inside, or what mines 
might be placed in the channel. Lieutenant-Com- 
mander Wainwright at once asked permission to go for- 
ward, and on the request being granted, the Gloucester 
ran briskly in, firing as she entered. A landing party, 
consisting of Lieutenant Wood and twenty-eight men, 

i73 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

under command of Lieutenant Huse, was put ashore, 
and, on their hauling down the Spanish flag the enemy- 
opened upon them on both sides and from the village. 
Deploying, they drove the enemy back through the vil- 
lage, and at the end of the street built a stone wall and 
strung barbed wire to meet the re-enforcements re- 
ported to be coming from Yauco. This attack and the 
fire from the Gloucester scattered the small body of 
Spanish regulars who had resisted the landing. Mean- 
time Captain Higginson, listening anxiously and atten- 
tively after the Gloucester had disappeared from sight, 
became satisfied that there were no inside batteries, and 
ordered the transports to go in. This was quickly done ; 
it was found that the men of the Gloucester had seized 
a lighter, and soldiers from Colonel Black's regiment of 
engineers were at once landed at Captain Wainwright's 
request to support the Gloucester landing party. In 
a few minutes, as soon as the naval launches could 
tow them in, the town of Guanica was in the 
hands of the American army, and the first landing in 
Puerto Rico had been successfully accomplished. The 
path was opened very swiftly and effectively by the men 
of the Gloucester, as prompt and efficient in the seizure 
of the town as they had been in the destruction of the 
Furor and Pluton. 

The next day at dawn General Garretson, with six 
companies of the Sixth Massachusetts and one company 
of the Sixth Illinois, moved out and attacked a strong 
force of Spaniards at Yauco, driving them before them 
and taking the town, which gave us possession of the 
railroad and of the highway to Ponce, for the advance 
of General Henry's brigade. That evening the Dixie 

174 







THE LANDING AT GUANU V 



THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO 

returned, and the next day General Wilson, on the 
Obdam, and General Ernst, on the Grande Duchesse, 
arrived with more troops, and the Annapolis and Wasp 
also joined the squadron. Captain Higginson was now 
strong enough to detach a force against Ponce, which 
it was most desirable to secure with the least possible 
delay, not only because it was the largest city of the 
island and the terminus of the military road, but be- 
cause it had a good harbor and excellent facilities for 
disembarking, in which Guanica was very deficient. 
Captain Davis of the Dixie was therefore ordered to 
proceed at once with the Annapolis, Wasp, and Glou- 
cester to Ponce, reconnoitre, seize lighters, and occupy 
any position necessary for landing the army. The Dixie, 
accompanied by the Annapolis and Wasp, started at 
quarter before two, and the Gloucester at half past four. 
At three o'clock the first three ships were in the chan- 
nel, and by half past five they had all anchored with- 
out resistance in the harbor. Captain Davis ordered 
the Wasp to lie in such a way that her broadside would 
command the main street of La Playa, and Lieutenant 
Merriam was sent ashore with a flag of truce to demand 
the immediate surrender of Ponce, under threat of bom- 
bardment, which was no idle menace, as the heavy 
six-inch battery of the Dixie entirely commanded 
the town, the main part of which was a mile and a 
half distant from the port. When Lieutenant Merriam 
returned, he reported that the Spanish forces had with- 
drawn from the port, and that he had been unable to 
open communications with their commander. He was 
closely followed on board by the British and German 
consuls, and several gentlemen representing the com- 

i75 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

mercial interests, who said they had authority from the 
Spanish commander to negotiate for surrender. The 
fact was that although Colonel San Martin and his 700 
Spanish regulars were quite ready to fight, their re- 
sistance would have resulted only in the destruction of 
the city by bombardment — something much disliked by 
the property owners — and the consequent general ris- 
ing of the hostile people, productive probably of much 
bloodshed and disaster to the soldiers themselves. 
Hence the readiness to allow the commercial interests 
to surrender the town. A delay was asked for, long 
enough to permit communication with the Spanish 
headquarters at San Juan, which was refused by Cap- 
tain Davis. Return to the town for further consulta- 
tion followed, and then they came back and surrendered 
the town, subject only to the condition that the Spanish 
troops should be permitted to withdraw unmolested, 
and that the municipal government should be allowed 
to remain in authority until the arrival of the army. 
This done, the Americans occupied the night by look- 
ing over all the vessels in the harbor and taking such as 
were good prize, Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright 
of the Gloucester, energetic and efficient, gathering in 
some seventy lighters, and getting them ready for the 
army. At half past five Lieutenant Merriam went in, 
followed closely by Lieutenant Haines of the Dixie, 
with the marines, and received the surrender of the 
port. The flag was raised by a cadet of the Dixie over 
the office of the Captain of the Port, the marines were 
posted, and by this formal act Ponce passed into Amer- 
ican hands. About seven o'clock the Massachusetts, 
convoying General Miles with General Wilson and the 

176 




THE BANNER OE PONCE 



THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO 

transports, now increased by two more which had just 
come up with the Cincinnati, had joined them. By half 
past seven General Wilson had landed, and in less than 
an hour Lieutenant Haines was able to withdraw his 
sentries and turn over the port to the army. Meantime 
some officers of the Dixie had driven up to the centre of 
the town, where they were received with enthusiasm by 
the people, which they soon reported at La Playa. Re- 
turning at once, they went to the City Hall, accom- 
panied by Lieutenant Haines, who released the political 
prisoners found there, and Cadet Lodge of the Dixie 
hauled down the Spanish and raised the American flag, 
the great crowd in the square cheering wildly, and then 
received -from the Mayor the municipal banner and the 
formal surrender of the city. Presently Major Flagler 
appeared with troops and took formal possession. Thus 
the whole business was quickly done without hesitation 
or delay, and the American army held the city of 
Puerto Rico as a base from which they could advance 
at will to the capital, and by which they controlled the 
whole southern coast of the island. 

Once on shore, thanks to the capture of the lighters 
and the efficient aid of the navy, General Wilson moved 
rapidly. That same afternoon he had established his 
headquarters at Ponce. Then he proceeded to organize 
the government of the city which had passed into his 
hands, and at the same time his own command, which 
was composed of General Ernst's brigade, consisting of 
the Sixteenth Pennsylvania and the Second and Third 
Wisconsin — all volunteers — a battalion of regular light 
artillery, a troop of volunteer cavalry, and a company of 

the Signal Corps. On August 3 he was able to relieve 
12 I?7 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

the brigade of their black-powder Spring-fields, and sup- 
ply them with smokeless-powder Krag-Jorgensons — a 
highly beneficial change, which ought to have been 
made years before, but for which there should be due 
gratitude, after the Santiago experience, that it was 
made at all, even toward the end of a war. So the work, 
civil and military, was driven rapidly and efficiently 
forward, and in the midst of it all the country was 
reconnoitred, and as fast as possible the outposts were 
advanced along the great road to San Juan. 

In this way, and from spies and deserters, it was 
learned that a force of the enemy, numbering 2,000, had 
taken position at Aibonito, about thirty-five miles from 
Ponce, a place of great natural strength, and indeed al- 
most impregnable. Between Aibonito and our ad- 
vanced parties lay the town of Coamo, also a very 
strong position naturally, held by 250 men. Coamo was 
capable of a very stubborn defence, and was still further 
protected by a block-house on the Banos road, which 
could open fire upon troops moving along the main 
military road. General Wilson decided, therefore, to 
turn the position. The Sixteenth Pennsylvania, under 
the command of Colonel Hidings, and guided by Col- 
onel Biddle and Captain Gardner of General Wilson's 
staff, was ordered on the evening of August 8 to move 
to the rear of the town. In the darkness, over difficult 
mountain trails and across deep ravines, they made 
their way, with difficulty and much hard marching. At 
seven in the morning of the 9th, General Ernst, with 
the other two regiments of his brigade, and supported 
by the artillery and cavalry, advanced directly upon 
the town. Captain Anderson's battery opened at once 

178 



THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO 

upon the block-house, which replied with an ineffective 
fire, and was in flames in fifteen minutes. The two Wis- 
consin regiments at the same time moved forward 
along the Banos and the military roads. As they ad- 
vanced they heard the sound of sharp firing, and knew 
that the Pennsylvania troops were engaged. The march 
was quickened, and the whole force pressed rapidly for- 
ward, reaching and entering the town to find the enemy 
gone and the intrenchments deserted. General Wilson's 
skilful disposition of the Sixteenth Pennsylvania had 
given him Coamo with hardly a struggle, and the fight 
had been made and won in the rear of the town before 
the main advance reached it. 

The flanking regiment, pushing along over the 
mountains in the darkness, had come out too far to the 
north, and had been obliged to move to the south by a 
difficult path, which made them an hour late in arriving 
at the point agreed upon. But when they reached their 
destination they found the Spaniards in a strong po- 
sition, covered by the trees and ditches, and holding 
the road. The first battalion was rapidly formed along 
two ridges parallel to the road, whence they at once 
opened fire, and a sharp skirmish ensued. Meantime 
the second battalion moved to the left, toward a posi- 
tion whence they could enfilade the road, and the Span- 
iards surrendered. The action lasted an hour. The 
Americans lost 6 men wounded. On the Spanish side 
the commander, who exposed himself with reckless 
courage, another officer, and 4 privates were killed, and 
between 30 and 40 were wounded. Five Spanish of- 
ficers and 162 men were made prisoners. 

Within five minutes after the fight Captain Clayton 
179 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

with his troop of cavalry rode through the town in 
rapid pursuit of the beaten enemy. The troopers pushed 
on fast, preventing, except in one instance, the de- 
struction of the bridges, and carrying the American ad- 
vance forward until they came within range of the 
strong positions of El Penon and Assomante, where 
batteries were placed which swept the road. To take 
these defences by direct assault, it was obvious, would 
involve a heavy loss of life to the limited forces General 
Wilson had at his disposal, and he accordingly resolved 
to again turn the enemy by a flanking movement on the 
right. Before doing so, however, General Wilson de- 
termined to make a reconnoissance with artillery, and 
our batteries opened on the Spanish positions at one 
o'clock on the 12th of August. We apparently silenced 
their batteries, but as we slackened they opened again 
with a vigorous fire, and once more, as at Santiago, 
black powder furnished the enemy a fine target, while 
the smokeless powder made it difficult to get their range 
or exact place. We lost 2 men killed, and 2 officers and 
3 men wounded, and demonstrated the strength of the 
Spanish position. General Wilson, before beginning to 
turn the Spaniards, sent in a demand for surrender, 
which was naturally and quite curtly refused. Then, 
just as General Ernst was starting on the flank move- 
ment which would have forced Aibonito to surrender 
like Coamo, word came that the peace protocol with 
§pain had been signed and hostilities suspended. So 
the movement along the military road into the heart of 
the island and across to San Juan, which had been 
pushed so skilfully and successfully, came to a stop, and 
did not begin again until Spain had surrendered on a 

180 




GENERALS IN PUERTO RICAN CAMPAIGN 



THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO 

larger scale and it was able to go forward to the capital 
without resistance. 

Other movements were in progress while General 
Wilson was operating along the main military road. 
General Brooke, with the brigade commanded by Gen- 
eral Hains, reached Guanica on July 31, and going 
thence to Ponce, was ordered to Arroyo, about thirty- 
six miles east of Ponce, the port of the large town of 
Guayama, and near the point where the coast begins to 
turn and trend toward the north. Arroyo had surren- 
dered to the little Gloucester and the Wasp on August 
1, but on the arrival of the army the old story of the 
inefficient transport service — no lighters, no boats, no 
means of getting the soldiers on shore, always desirable 
things to have in military expeditions of this character 
— was repeated, and then, as usual, came the appearance 
of the navy, and the navy got the troops on shore, to 
the great relief of the general in command. Once 
landed, there was little delay. On August 4 General 
Hains was ordered to move on Guayama, and on the 
following morning he advanced with the Fourth Ohio, 
holding the Third Illinois in reserve. Meeting the en- 
emy about a mile east of Guayama, our men drove the 
Spaniards before them and through the streets, had a 
sharp skirmish with them on the other side, in which 
four men were wounded, and in the evening, still ad- 
vancing, took and held two strong positions on the out- 
skirts of the town. The position was held until the 8th, 
when a reconnoissance was made by Colonel Coit, with 
about no men, along the road running north from 
Guayama. Pushing forward, the party had advanced 
about five miles when they ran into the Spaniards, came 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

under a heavy fire, and had five men wounded Falling 
back steadily, they were met and supported by the rest of 
the regiment, and easily checked and drove the Span- 
iards back. The reconnoissance had developed the fact 
that the enemy were in force and held strong positions 
on the north. General Brooke therefore determined to 
turn the position. He waited until the 13th in order to 
get two troops of cavalry and four light batteries, and 
then sending General Hains with one regiment to make 
a detour and reach the enemy's rear, he advanced with 
the rest of his force along the road directly against the 
Spanish position. He moved slowly, in order to give 
time to the flanking regiment to reach its destination, 
and when sufficient time had elapsed he brought his 
guns within range and unmasked them. Just as the 
men were about to open fire, a message came in from 
Ponce announcing the signing of the protocol and that 
all was over. General Brooke retired to camp at Guay- 
ama, and there waited until, as one of the commission- 
ers, he rode over the hills to receive the surrender of the 
island, watch the departure of the soldiers of Spain, 
and become himself the first American Governor of 
Puerto Rico. 

On the same day that General Brooke received his 
orders for Arroyo, General Schwan arrived, and on 
August 6 received orders from General Miles to organ- 
ize an expedition at Yauco and proceed against Maya- 
guez, a large town, the centre of a sugar district in the 
extreme west of the island, and thence, swinging to the 
right, to advance by Lares to Arecibo, the principal city 
on the north coast. On August 9 the expedition was 
ready. It consisted of the Eleventh infantry and two 

182 



THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO 

light batteries, all regulars. They marched twelve miles 
in intense heat and over a bad road to Sabana Grande, 
where they were joined by Captain Macomb with a 
troop of the Fifth cavalry, also regulars. Giving his 
men a good night's rest, General Schwan started at 
eight o'clock. Having provided himself with guides 
and spies, and from the beginning having made every 
arrangement to secure all possible information, General 
Schwan soon had news that the enemy, whose force was 
reported to be superior in numbers to his own, had 
marched out from Mayaguez to contest the American 
advance. The cavalry and the advance-guard were or- 
dered, therefore, to exercise great care; they were 
drawn nearer to the brigade, and then the whole force 
pressed rapidly and steadily forward along the San 
German road. As they drew nearer to Mayaguez they 
came into a country intersected by two rivers and their 
tributaries. The road runs along the valley of the Rio 
Grande, through flat lands widening out here and there 
to a thousand yards, fenced with wire and crossed by 
creeks and streams, some running swiftly and with a 
considerable depth of water — altogether a rather dif- 
ficult country for troops to operate in, and susceptible 
of a strong defence. As the Americans approached the 
little village of Hormigueros, Spanish scouts opened fire 
ineffectively from behind the hedges near some sugar- 
mills. On went the cavalry, and the Spanish skir- 
mishers fled, pursued by the troopers, who rode along 
under shelter of a railroad embankment, keeping up a 
steady fire and getting control of a covered wooden 
bridge. Just beyond this point it had been intended 
to camp, but General Schwan determined, although his 

183 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

men had marched thirteen miles in the heat, to finish 
with the enemy, now that he had them in his near 
neighborhood, and in order to gain possession of an im- 
portant iron bridge on the main road. The soldiers re- 
sponded cheerfully and readily. The whole force 
pressed on, and when within four hundred yards of the 
bridge the enemy opened with a light fire, and then 
heavily with volleys, at the main body of troops. The 
artillery was brought up. There was difficulty in decid- 
ing the position of the enemy, thanks to their smokeless 
powder, but soon the direction was obtained from the 
course of the Spanish bullets. Then the artillery 
opened, and the whole command moved forward. Un- 
able to cross a creek, the advance made its way over a 
bridge. The Catlings went forward with the infantry, 
concentrating their fire and supported by the cavalry. 
Still forward, and they were over the iron bridge, and 
masters of the approach to Mayaguez. The rest of the 
artillery came up again, the infantry pressed forward, 
the enemy gave way in all directions, and the Amer- 
icans occupied the Spanish position and camped there 
for the night. Again had it been shown that the Span- 
iards could not stand the steady onset of the American 
troops. They had equal numbers, knowledge of the 
country, and the advantage of position. They fired 
heavily as at Guasimas as soon as the Americans came 
within range, and then as the Americans came on, open- 
ing with all arms and going at them without flinching, 
the Spaniards, nearly all regulars in this case, gave way 
and fled. The action was over at six o'clock. The 
American loss was I killed and 15 wounded; the Span- 
ish, 15 killed and about 35 wounded. The skirmish 

184 



THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO 

was well and skilfully fought, and illustrated as per- 
fectly as a much larger affair the inability of the Span- 
iards to either attack, take the initiative, or make a firm 
stand in the open. 

The next morning, August 1 1, by half past eight, the 
American scouts were in Mayaguez, an hour later the 
cavalry, and then came General Schwan and his staff 
and the infantry, with bands playing and colors fly- 
ing. The Spaniards had gone, the town gently yielded 
itself, the Mayor declared himself subject to the or- 
ders of the American general, and the people crowded 
the streets and cheered the American troops. The bri- 
gade then went into camp near the town, and the cav- 
alry were ordered to keep in touch with the retreating 
enemy. Following the easterly road to Lares, the cav- 
alry drove some Spaniards before them, but it was soon 
discovered that the main body had taken the western 
road, and the next morning Colonel Burke started in 
pursuit with about seven hundred men all told. The 
morning was intensely hot, and the afternoon brought 
a drenching rain, but the troops kept steadily on, and 
encamped for the night at the forks of the Las Marias 
and Maricao roads. Here news came that the Span- 
iards, with a force variously estimated at 1,200 to 2,500 
men, intended to make a stand at Las Marias. As Col- 
onel Burke's one desire was to reach them, he was off 
at daylight. The utmost speed was made, but the road 
in places was so bad and so heavy that the artillery 
could only be got along by the infantry hauling the 
guns. This caused delay, and there was much anxiety 
and bitter disappointment when it was reported that 
the enemy had abandoned Las Marias and were fleeing 

185 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

toward Lares. Then word came that seven hundred 
were still on the hither side of the Rio Grande, which 
at that season was running deep and full. The Amer- 
icans hurried through the town, and presently the cav- 
alry came up with the fugitives, and then the engage- 
ment began. A large number of Spaniards had, as re- 
ported, failed to cross the river, and they replied with 
volleys to our fire. By some means the artillery was 
dragged up, the guns opened, and our infantry fol- 
lowed. The Spaniards gave way in all directions, now 
thoroughly demoralized. Many were drowned in try- 
ing to ford the stream, and the American skirmishers, 
advancing rapidly, picked up more than 50 prisoners, 
as well as 200 rifles and large quantities of ammuni- 
tion, which strewed the road. The American loss was 
only 6 wounded ; 5 Spaniards were buried by our men 
in addition to those lost in the river, and many more 
were wounded. General Schwan now had the enemy 
broken and in full flight. Lares was within his grasp, 
and a clear line to the principal northern town of Are- 
cibo. And then came the fatal message announcing the 
signature of the protocol, and "no troops ever suspended 
hostilities with a worse grace." But a suspension it 
had to be, and this expedition, which had marched and 
fought with so much spirit and such restless energy, 
stopped like the rest. 

Not far from them another command was brought 
in like manner to a stand-still. General Stone, with a 
small party, had pushed along a trail considered impas- 
sable, by way of Ad juntas and Utuado, and had made 
a practical road through the centre of the western re- 
gion, along which General Henry marched with his 

186 



a a 




THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO 

command. In a day or two more they would have been 
able to head off the Spanish detachments retreating be- 
fore General Schwan, and would have effected a junc- 
tion with the latter, thus gaining complete control of all 
the west, and at the same time of the northern towns, 
and of the railroad on the coast. But they too were 
stopped, and thus the Puerto-Rican campaign came to 
an end. 

The operations of the American army in Puerto Rico 
have been described in some detail, not on account of 
the engagements which occurred, for they were hardly 
more in any instance than sharp skirmishes, but be- 
cause the result of the campaign was of great impor- 
tance, and the manner in which the operations were 
conducted, and the behavior of the troops, merit con- 
sideration. There has been an impression that the 
Puerto-Rican campaign was little more than a parade, 
and it has even been spoken of contemptuously as a 
"picnic," owing probably to the too prevalent notion 
that military operations must be estimated solely by the 
losses, or, as a British admiral of the last century is 
said to have put it, in somewhat brutal phrase, "by the 
butcher's bills." The number of killed and wounded is 
undoubtedly a test of the severity of fighting, of the 
force of an attack, and of the strength of the resistance. 
But a campaign as a whole must be judged, if it is to 
be judged fairly, by larger and different standards. 
Malplaquet and Oudenarde were important and bloody 
battles, but their direct effect upon the final results of 
the war was but small. Washington forced Howe out 
of Boston without an action, and with the loss of 
hardly a man, yet the military and political results were 

187 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

enormous; the feat was so admirable that the last 
historian* of the Revolution says it gave Washington 
at once a place in history, and compares it with Napo- 
leon's performance at Toulon in making his future 
fame. 

In nineteen days the different divisions under the 
command of General Miles had overrun nearly the en- 
tire western half of Puerto Rico, and had made it evi- 
dent that in another fortnight they would have swept 
over the whole island and cooped up the Spaniards in 
San Juan, if they had not actually gained possession of 
the capital itself. The success of the American troops 
was so rapid and complete, and their future was so 
clearly assured, that a claim to the island had been es- 
tablished of such an undeniable character that, when it 
came to signing the protocol, there was no possibility of 
withholding from the United States the cession of 
Puerto Rico. Thus the object of the campaign was 
completely achieved, which, after all, will always weigh 
heavily in making up the final judgment of history. 
Coming next to the actual operations of the campaign, 
it is found that there was the same lack of means for 
disembarking troops, the same defective transportation 
service, as in Cuba. These difficulties were overcome 
by the assistance of the navy, and with their boats or 
the lighters they had captured. The men were rapidly 
and skilfully handled at separated points, showing that 
the two services worked well together; and although 
many of the soldiers arrived in poor condition from the 
camps in the United States, with a consequent prone- 



*Sir George Trevelyan. 
1 88 



THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO 

ness to suffer from the climatic diseases, they were so 
well managed that every division was enabled to push 
steadily and rapidly forward, making hard marches, 
very often through difficult country, and carrying out 
successfully everything which was demanded from 
them. Last and most important of all, there was an 
intelligent plan throughout, which, in its execution, 
was swiftly and comprehensively taking possession of 
the entire island. Each movement of troops was so ar- 
ranged as ultimately to support and fit in with every 
other. The engagements which took place were all 
marked by the same qualities. General Wilson, Gen- 
eral Schwan, and General Brooke all fought their 
troops with skill. They reconnoitred their country, 
they knew what they meant to do, they had plans which 
proved their own soundness when carried into execu- 
tion. The strong positions were turned by judicious 
flanking movements, and when the positions were not 
strong the direct onset drove the Spaniards back in con- 
fusion, as at Hormigueros. In every action or skirmish 
the troops behaved admirably, and their advance was 
constant and unchecked, so that the general plan de- 
veloped steadily from the beginning, and showed its 
merits in its results. It is quite true that the popula- 
tion was friendly, and received the American troops 
with acclamation, a condition which smooths away 
many troubles in any campaign. But this was equally 
true of Cuba, and does not impair the excellence of the 
operations in the eastern island, or diminish the im- 
portance of the general result. To this campaign we 
owe the island of Puerto Rico, and the manner in which 

189 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

it was carried forward through many difficulties re- 
flects the highest credit on the generals who com- 
manded, and upon the discipline, quality, and courage 
of the soldiers, both regulars and volunteers. 




ON I HI. ADJ1 MAS TRAIL 



CHAPTER X 
THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA AND THE CAPTURE OF GUAM 

Admiral Dewey employed the first two days after his 
victory in making all fast, seizing the arsenal at Cavite 
and the islands at the harbor mouth, and announcing 
a blockade of the port of Manila, lying somewhat help- 
less just now before his guns. Then, having prudently 
cut the cables, he sent to Washington, by way of boat 
to Hong-kong, a laconic despatch, telling of his victory 
in a few simple sentences, and in figures as dry as the 
multiplication table. It had one great merit — exact 
t ru th — a quality much lost and clouded in the Span- 
ish reports which had gone to Madrid, and from which 
alone the world knew anything of the doings in the dis- 
tant East on May I. Yet the victory had been so abso- 
lute, the destruction of Montojo's squadron so utter and 
complete, that even the Spanish could not hide the facts 
with language, an exercise in which they have great 
proficiency. The truth tore its way through the thin 
phrases ; it broke the pompous sentences, and made it- 
self sufficiently visible to Europe. To the great powers 
there it came with a shock. They were not pained by 
the unhappy lot of Spain, for that they regarded with 
all the philosophy which had just manifested itself so 
attractively in regard to poor Greece. The downfall of 
a broken, bankrupt nation, they bore well enough ; and 

191 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

although they were surprised and annoyed by the 
swiftness, accuracy, and fighting efficiency of the 
Americans, they were prepared to belittle the whole af- 
fair, and to pretend that it was no such great matter, 
after all. But what shocked and alarmed them very 
seriously indeed was that a new power, known to be 
of great wealth and strength, had suddenly swept down 
on Manila, toppled over in ruin the harmless remains 
of Spanish power, and in one morning had risen up 
master of a great port and city, and a disagreeable fac- 
tor of unlimited possibilities in the East, where they 
were having a "question" and starting in to divide the 
vast Empire of China. This was obviously objection- 
able, and ought to be stopped. It became clear at once 
to several imperial and many diplomatic minds that 
something should be done. There was much running 
about, much sending of cipher despatches, many grave 
unofficial conversations and representations, and a gen- 
eral urgency to set the concert of Europe, which had 
performed so beautifully in the Cretan business, to 
playing again. And then it was found that the most 
important performer, the great sea power of the world, 
would not take part. It appeared that these people who 
had flung Spain'"s fleet to destruction spoke the English 
tongue ; that as long as they sent their grain across the 
ocean to Great Britain, England had a base on the 
Atlantic, and could defy the world ; that England 
rather wanted them as neighbors in the East, and had 
no mind to be aught but friendly to them. So England 
would not play her part, and without her fleets, still 
more with those fleets hostile, there could be no concert 
of Europe ; and that harmonious body sank into silence 

192 




GEORGE DEWEY 



THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA 

after this attempt at turning up, and was never heard 
of in the Philippines. Many results came from this 
English action. The people of the United States knew 
instinctively what had happened, although all details 
were kept quite obscure ; they valued the friendly deed, 
which was not to be forgotten ; and they saw in a flash 
the community of interests which bound them to their 
kinsmen over-seas. So the two great English-speaking 
nations drew together — a very momentous fact, well 
understood and much disliked on the Continent of Eu- 
rope, and something destined to have serious effect on 
the world's history in the future. The more immediate 
and direct outcome of England's refusal to interfere — 
as well as her evident intention to let no one else inter- 
fere in what was going on in the Philippines — was that 
Admiral Dewey was left with a free hand to work out 
the situation which he had himself created. 

He had sprung in a few hours into the ranks of the 
world's great admirals. It was now to be seen whether 
the victorious seaman was also a commander in the 
widest naval sense, and at the same time a statesman 
and diplomatist. The conditions were full of peril. He 
was seven thousand miles from home, the enemy held 
the city in his front, he had no troops to aid him, and 
he knew that unfriendly eyes were watching him nar- 
rowly, while he could not know at first that the concert 
of Europe had broken down, and that England was the 
friend of the United States. 

The war-ships of other powers began to collect at 
Manila — French, English, Japanese, and German, the 
latter finally reaching five in number, and including two 
armored vessels. What was their meaning and intent? 

r 3 193 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

— a question very important to Admiral Dewey, and 
demanding much thought. As they watched him, it 
quickly became apparent that in England and Japan he 
had friends and sympathizers. In France an ill-wisher 
was soon discovered, but nothing more. The ill wishes 
of the French indeed never took the form of overt ac- 
tion, but we can learn their feelings from the diary of 
a naval lieutenant at Manila, thoughtfully published in 
the Revue de Paris. The diarist was much disturbed 
that Europe did not intervene. He writes mournfully 
that the European powers were doing no more than 
watching fate, which was true enough. His mind was 
filled with dark suspicions of England and of the 
Anglo-Saxon, and he thought that America ought 
promptly to be shut out from the East. He belittles 
Dewey's victory, but blames the Spaniards for allow- 
ing him to win it, which is, of course, one way of look- 
ing at that event. Such a fact ought not to have been, 
and yet it was. The explanation of it is that we had 
English gunners, deserters, picked up in Hong-kong 
— a dear old falsehood which has done much hard serv- 
ice, never harder than in this case, for Dewey's crews, 
except for a few Chinamen, were practically all Amer- 
ican. But the thought soothes the French diarist, who 
has never heard of Truxtun and L'Insurgente, or of 
some American shooting at French frigates just a hun- 
dred years ago. Then comes the conventional cry that 
the Americans care only for dollars, are treacherous, 
mean, braggarts (this last a heinous offence in French 
contemplation), and, saddest of all, have no nobility 
of soul. And the philosopher, as he reads, wonders 
about the nobility of soul shown in the Dreyfus case 

194 







11' / i !5S' ■.©gfsg |L - 







THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA 

and some of its attendant incidents, and thinks how 
differently the phrase is interpreted in different coun- 
tries. But the lieutenant's diary is none the less in- 
structive, and, joined to many much louder manifes- 
tations by Paris newspapers and Frenchmen generally, 
causes Americans to draw some conclusions as to 
French friendship not soon to be forgotten. Still what- 
ever they felt or thought, the Frenchmen did nothing 
serious while they watched fate, and hostile feelings 
certainly troubled Admiral Dewey little enough. But 
there was one power present who pushed her hostility 
from thoughts and words to action. This power was 
Germany. She had no especial claim to be there, no 
large or peculiar interests, but she sent more ships than 
any other power, kept on meddling, and went to the 
verge of war. The Germans broke through Dewey's 
regulations, which he had the right to make, and he 
called them sharply to order. They would violate the 
rules by moving about at night, and then the American 
search-lights fell with a glare upon them, and followed 
them about in a manner which checked and annoyed 
them. One German ship put out her lights and tried 
to slip in at night, but a shell across her bows brought 
her to. Another made herself offensive by following 
and running close up to our transports when they first 
arrived. A German ship went up to Subig bay and 
prevented the insurgents from taking the Isla Grande. 
So the Raleigh and Concord went up too, stripped for 
action, and as they went in the Irene went out, and 
the Americans took Isla Grande. Very trying all this 
to a man charged with great responsibilities and seven 
thousand miles from home. There must be no haste, 

i95 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

no rashness, nothing that could give his opponents a 
hold, and yet there must be no yielding, and no threat 
except with action behind it, and on a provocation 
which the whole world would justify. Every annoy- 
ance, every improper movement, was quickly checked. 
The diplomacy was perfect. Then came the sufficient 
provocation, and the teeth were shown. To the vigi- 
lant admiral the opportunity came at last when one of 
the German vessels was proved to have landed provi- 
sions in Manila. Let us read what follows, as it is 
told by Mr. Stickney, an eye-witness. 

"Orderly, tell Mr. Brumby I would like to see him," said Ad- 
miral Dewey, one forenoon. 

"Oh, Brumby," he continued, when the flag-lieutenant made his 
appearance on the quarter-deck, "I wish you to take the barge and 
go over to the German flag-ship. Give Admiral von Diederich 
my compliments, and say that I wish to call his attention to the 
fact that vessels of his squadron have shown an extraordinary 
disregard of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse, and that 
finally one of them has committed a gross breach of neutrality in 
landing provisions in Manila, a port which I am blockading." 

The Commodore's voice had been as low and as sweetly modu- 
lated as if he had been sending von Diederich an invitation to 
dinner. When he stopped speaking, Brumby, who did not need 
any better indication of the Commodore's mood than the unusu- 
ally formal and gentle manner of his chief, turned to go, making 
the usual official salute, and replying with the customary, "Ay, ay, 
sir." 

"And, Brumby," continued the Commodore, his voice rising and 
ringing with the intensity of feeling that he felt he had repressed 
about long enough, "tell Admiral von Diederich that if he wants 
a fight, he can have it right now !" 

Thereupon the German admiral became sorry for 
what had happened, and, it appeared, did not know 
what his captains had been doing — a sad reflection 
upon German discipline. But it seemed that, although 

196 




ELWELL S. OTIS 
Major-General in command of the American forces in the Philippines 



THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA 

he had two armored ships, and Dewey none, he did not 
desire a fight, and the meddling abated sensibly. Then 
much later, in a manner to be described hereafter, when 
the Monterey came in, with her heavy armor and big 
guns, it was found that important interests required 
the presence of the German war-ships elsewhere. Why 
the Germans behaved as they did, manifesting every 
possible dislike and hostility without doing anything 
effective, and breeding a strong and just enmity toward 
them in the United States, is difficult to understand. 
To the higher and more refined statesmanship of Eu- 
rope it may have seemed wise. To the ruder and simp- 
ler American mind it seems stupid and profitless, and, 
in any event, Americans will not forget it. But every 
one can admire the manner in which Admiral Dewey 
mixed tact with firmness, and in the midst of jealous 
and meddling neutrals steered his course without an 
error, and never relaxed for a moment his iron grip 
on the great bay he had conquered and the city which 
lay beneath his guns. 

To keep the sympathy and support of the friendly 
powers and hold at bay the hostile nations were diffi- 
cult and perplexing tasks, trying to nerves, temper, and 
wits. But this was not all. The war in Cuba had in 
due course lighted up the flames of insurrection in the 
Philippines, where Spanish tyranny and extortion, 
supplemented by the oppression, cruelty, corruption, 
and outrages of the powerful monastic orders, had 
been heaping up the material of revolt. To this mass 
of explosives the troubles of Spain in Cuba had applied 
the torch. The black robed bodies of the hated monks 
floating down the Pasig river were grim signals of the 

197 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

coming storm. Rebellion broke out in the back country 
and in the provinces of Luzon, and a guerrilla war- 
fare began to desolate the country. The Spaniards met 
the outbreak vigorously and repressed it savagely, 
shooting down their prisoners by scores to make a holi- 
day spectacle for the crowds on the Luneta. The fight- 
ing dragged along, exhausting to the Spaniards and 
without substantial gain to the rebels, until July, 1897, 
when the insurgent chiefs surrendered, on condition 
that certain reforms should be made and that a sum of 
money should be paid over to the families of those who 
had been killed in the war or ruined by it. Spain, as 
usual, broke her word, as she had done with the Cubans 
in 1878. The reforms were not made, and only a part 
of the money was ever paid. Emilio Aguinaldo and 
the other leaders withdrew to Hong-kong in Septem- 
ber 1897, bringing with them $400,000, which they 
had received from the Spanish government. The in- 
surrection was over, although there was fitful fighting 
here and there; but the chiefs had retired to a safe 
haven and were helpless at Hong-kong. Such was the 
situation which Admiral Dewey found when war was 
declared. The insurgent chiefs, however, stimulated 
by the approach of trouble between the United States 
and Spain, put themselves in communication with Mr. 
Wildman, our consul at Hong-kong, and opened ne- 
gotiations with him. They declared that they desired 
annexation to the United States, above all independ- 
ence of Spain and relief from Spanish rule, and wished 
to aid the Americans in all possible ways. Admiral 
Dewey took the obvious course of encouraging them, 
which from a military point of view was entirely sound. 

198 



THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA 

He caused Aguinaldo to be brought over, and pro- 
tected his landing on May 19. So little response came 
at first to Aguinaldo's appeal to his countrymen that 
he wished to turn round and return to Hong-kong, 
and was kept only by much pressure. Gradually at 
first, and then rapidly, the natives began to come in; 
Admiral Dewey furnished arms from the arsenal at 
Cavite, and the insurgents had presently a respectable 
force. They soon found that, with the Spanish sea 
power destroyed and an American fleet in possession of 
Manila bay, the situation was widely different from 
that in which they had struggled alone, desperately and 
helplessly against the forces of Spain. They began 
to win victories, to cut off detached bodies of Spanish 
troops and take outlying towns. With victory their 
numbers rapidly increased, and they were soon able, 
under cover of the American war-ships, to surround 
Manila. So far all went well, and the insurgent forces 
and their operations put Manila even more securely at 
Admiral Dewey's mercy. Then the difficulties began. 
The insurgents forgot that they owed their position 
entirely to the American fleet, and that but for the 
American war-ships the chiefs would have been vege- 
tating in exile at Hong-kong, and their followers hew- 
ing wood and drawing water for the Spaniards, as of 
yore. Aguinaldo, who had never adjusted his rela- 
tions to the universe, began to regard himself as a gov- 
ernment and a nation, and started to plan for a dicta- 
torship. Admiral Dewey, who had most carefully 
avoided recognizing the insurgents or treating them as 
allies, was obliged to hold them constantly under con- 
trol. He forced them to conduct their war in a civi- 

1.99 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

lized manner ; he insisted upon and secured the humane 
treatment of their Spanish prisoners, and he kept a 
watchful eye upon their intrigues with foreign powers, 
which they almost at once began. 

Taken altogether, it was a most difficult position, 
and required all the best talents of the statesman and 
diplomatist. But the admiral proved himself to be 
both in high degree, and kept the whole situation al- 
ways in hand, never losing the mastery for a moment. 
So the slow days wore by. Very slow and very anxious 
they must have been to a victorious sailor suddenly 
charged with vast responsibilities, with hostile Eu- 
ropean powers on one side, and dangerous and untrust- 
worthy supporters on the other. Very often must he 
have thought of the seven thousand miles which sepa- 
rated him from home as he paced the deck, counting 
the days which lay between him and the coming of re- 
enforcements. For the re-enforcements were very slow 
in starting, owing to the great delay in getting trans- 
ports and in mobilizing the troops at San Francisco. 
So deliberate did the movements seem, so many were 
the announcements of departure, only to be followed 
by postponement, that the country began to grow res- 
tive, and there were mutterings about the apparent 
abandonment of Dewey and the fate of Gordon at 
Khartoum. 

But the delays which undoubtedly existed were due 
to the surprise of Dewey's victory, to the magnitude 
of its results, and to the unreadiness of the military 
organization to meet such an emergency. Admiral 
Dewey had asked on May 13 for 5,000 men, and needed, 
of course, fresh ammunition and naval re-enforcements 

200 




HENRY GLASS 



THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA 

as well. Three weeks elapsed after the eventful 1st 
of May before the cruiser Charleston left San Fran- 
cisco, and then she went without the troops. The three 
transports the City of Pekin, Australia, and City of 
Sydney finally got off on May 25, carrying the First 
California and Second Oregon regiments of volun- 
teers, five companies of the Fourteenth Infantry United 
States regulars, a detachment of California artillery — 
in all, 1 15 officers and 2,386 enlisted men — under Gen- 
eral Anderson, the division commander. They joined 
the Charleston at Honolulu, where she was waiting 
for them, and started thence on June 4. As soon as they 
were clear of the land Captain Glass of the Charleston 
opened the sealed orders brought to him by the Pekin, 
and found that he was directed to stop at the Ladrones 
on his way to Manila and capture the island of Guam. 
The course was then shaped toward the first land seen 
by Magellan, after his long wandering over the wastes 
of the Pacific, and on June 20, at daylight, the Ameri- 
can ships were off the island. They looked in at the 
port of Agana, the capital, found no vessels there, nor 
any sign of a Spanish force, and so proceeded to the 
other port of San Luis d'Apra, where rumors at Hono- 
lulu had placed a Spanish gunboat and soldiers. When 
they reached the harbor, shut in by Apepas Island and 
the peninsula of Orote, the Charleston suddenly disap- 
peared from the sight of the watching eyes on the troop- 
ships. She had plunged boldly in, following the deep, 
narrow, and tortuous channel hedged by coral reefs. 
Against the gray and green of the cliffs, with sudden 
rain squalls coming and going, the lead-colored cruiser 
could not be made out from the transports. At last 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

something white was discovered moving against the 
cliffs. Then the white spots were discovered to be the 
boats on the superstructure of the Charleston, and it 
was apparent that the cruiser was going steadily in. 
Presently she made out the masts of a vessel beyond 
Apepas, and the spirits of the crew rose at the hope of 
an action. Then they rounded the end of the island, 
and disappointment fell upon them when they dis- 
covered that the longed-for enemy was only a peace- 
ful Japanese brigantine. No fight there. On the 
cruiser crept through the dangerous waters, past old 
Fort St. Iago. No sound, no movement, no enemy 
there. All as quiet, one would think, as in Magellan's 
day. On again, and now the Charleston was opposite 
Fort Santa Cruz, and opened sharply with her three- 
pounders. The guns cracked, the shells whistled over 
the fort, a dozen shots were fired, there was no reply, 
and in five minutes the only action seen by Guam was 
over. The Charleston slipped along a little further, 
ever more slowly, and at last stopped. Soon boats put 
off from the shore, and the captain of the port and 
some other Spanish officers came on board the Charles- 
ton. They began to apologize in the best Spanish man- 
ner for their inability to return the American "salute." 
"What salute?" said Captain Glass. It appeared that 
they referred to the shelling of Fort Santa Cruz. 
"Make no mistake," said Captain Glass, "I fired no 
salute. Our countries are at war, and those were 
hostile shots." Poor Spanish officers, stranded far 
away in the dim Pacific! They had heard no news of 
war, and now they were prisoners. Then Captain 
Glass demanded the Governor, who was at Agana, and 



THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA 

paroled his suddenly acquired prisoners to go ashore 
and get him. This brought a pause in the operations, 
and the three transports were convoyed in and an- 
chored near the cruiser. As evening drew on a mes- 
sage arrived from the Governor, stating that the mili- 
tary regulations of Spain forbade his going aboard an 
enemy's ship, and that he would be happy to see the 
American commander at his office. This characteristic 
exhibition of pompous Spanish etiquette and of piteous 
inability to recognize facts made the American captain 
hesitate between anger and amusement. But good- 
nature and the sense of humor prevailed, and word was 
sent to the Governor that the captain or some officer 
representing him would call on the following day. The 
next morning Lieutenant Braunersreuther went ashore 
with only four sailors, but with two Oregon companies 
and fifty marines in the background making ready to 
follow. Before the soldiers and marines could be 
landed, however — a somewhat slow piece of work — 
Lieutenant Braunersreuther appeared, his task com- 
pleted, and the Spanish Governor and his staff pris- 
oners in the whale-boat. The poor Spaniards had faced 
the inevitable, and bowed to the inexorable argument 
of an overwhelming force. The Governor had written 
an order to the commandant of the troops to bring 
them down and surrender them, had then penned a 
melancholy letter to his wife, and in deep dejection 
had followed his captors to the Charleston. After 
they had been assigned to quarters Captain Glass went 
ashore and inspected Fort Santa Cruz, and there on 
the southeast corner of the terre-plein the flag was 
hoisted. As it climbed slowly to the top of the staff 

203 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

the national salute rang out, gun after gun, from the 
cruiser, and the air was rilled, as the crash of the re- 
ports died away in echoes, with the music of the regi- 
mental bands on the troop-ships. Then all was done, 
and the flag which had risen first on the distant Atlan- 
tic coast floated out before the afternoon breeze of these 
remote islands which were henceforth to know new 
masters. The ceremony done, the practical work 
which the flag symbolized was soon finished. At four 
o'clock the two companies, one of Spanish regulars, 
and one of native Chamorros, came down to the boat- 
house where Lieutenant Braunersreuther, backed by 
his bluejackets and forty marines, received the sur- 
render. The Spanish troops were all disarmed, the 
regulars were taken on board the ships as prisoners, 
and the Chamorros, perfectly overjoyed at the over- 
throw of Spain, as is the case with all who have called 
Spain master, were left behind. The little play, in 
which comedy and tragedy had mingled closely, was 
over. The moss-grown, picturesque old forts, the 
slender Spanish garrison, the whole civil government 
of Spain, had passed into the power of the United 
States. There were scenes which seemed to recall the 
fantastic conceptions of comic opera, and bring only 
laughter to the onlookers. Yet behind the absurdity 
was the pathos of the helpless yielding Spaniards, and 
the stern historic fact that the first possession in the 
Pacific which Magelian had given to the Spain that 
dominated and frightened Europe had passed away for- 
ever from the Spain which had ceased to rule, and be- 
come a part of the Western republic, whose very exist- 



204 




ill' »MAS M. ANDERSON 



THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA 

ence depended on the denial of all that Charles V and 
Phillip II, represented among men. 

On June 22 the Charleston steamed away with her 
prisoners, followed by the transports. In the early 
afternoon of Tuesday, June 28, they were off Cape 
Engano, and in a short time were joined by the Balti- 
more, sent out to meet them. Two days more and they 
were running into Manila bay. As they passed Cor- 
regidor, three German vessels were lying near by, and 
the Kaiserin Augusta, a large armored cruiser, got up 
steam and followed close to the Australia, hung to her 
until the flag-ship was reached, and then broke out the 
American flag and saluted. The whole movement was 
offensive, and to be offensive without doing anything to 
support it is not only ill-bred, but stupid. So the per- 
formance of the Kaiserin Augusta went down in the 
American books charged to the German account, and 
the ships went on. Before them lay the French ships, 
sulky and suspicious, the Japanese, the trim black Eng- 
lish ships, with the "old red ensign" looking very 
friendly and very welcome to the American troop- 
ships. And then came the ships flying the flag they 
loved, and which they had come so far to serve. There 
was the victor fleet near together off Cavite, and the 
salutes rang out from the Olympia and the Charleston. 
Support had come at last, and Dewey had a new cruiser 
and troops of the United States at his back. It must 
have been a great relief to feel that the long separation 
from home was over, and that the Pekin and her con- 
sorts were but the first in a long line of re-enforcements 
now fairly started from the United States. The moral 
effect of the arrival of General Anderson and his troops 

205 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

was great, although in actual numbers the force was a 
small one, but it was put to immediate use. The sol- 
diers were quickly landed and established at Cavite, 
which had been in American possession since the bat- 
tle of May I. Then the admiral faced the situation 
again. There was still the hostility of the European 
powers to be met. German enmity was still shown in 
a way which bordered on intolerable insolence. The 
American troops had been barely a week in their new 
quarters when Admiral Dewey was obliged to drive 
the Irene from Subig bay and stop German interfer- 
ence at that point with the insurgents. On the 
other hand were the insurgents themselves, massed 
round Manila, and inflated by the victories won and 
the prisoners captured from outlying Spanish forces. 
It was the 15th of July when Aguinaldo, destitute of 
either loyalty or gratitude, forgetting the hand which 
had raised him up, and swelling with a sense of his 
own importance, felt it necessary to establish a govern- 
ment, of which he duly apprised Admiral Dewey. The 
government consisted simply of himself as dictator, but 
he showed his Latin blood by accompanying the fact 
of his own dictatorship with high-sounding proclama- 
tions, and a constitution in many paragraphs, which he 
apparently made himself, and which was therefore cer- 
tainly new, and to him probably satisfactory. The 
cloud of words which he emitted was of little moment, 
but the fact of his dictatorship and his assumption of 
autocratic power added to the perils of the situation. 
Altogether the conditions were menacing enough. In 
the front was Spain, an open and public enemy, com- 
paratively easy to deal with. On either hand were the 

206 




FRANCIS V. GREENE 



THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA 

war-ships of unfriendly powers watching sullenly and 
eagerly for an error, for a sign of weakness, for the 
least excuse for interference. All around Manila were 
the insurgents, supporters in theory, but untrustworthy, 
treacherously led, and capable at any moment of ac- 
tions which might endanger our relations with other 
powers, or of intriguing with those same powers 
against us. 

So the days dragged by, the admiral, cool, firm, and 
vigilant, always ready, and making no mistakes, and 
then, two days after Aguinaldo's announcement of his 
own greatness, came a great and signal relief. On July 
17 the second expedition, under General Greene, which 
had left San Francisco on June 25, arrived. General 
Greene came on the China, and the three other trans- 
ports — the Senator, Colon, and Zealandia — came in 
soon after. They brought the First Nebraska, the 
First Colorado, the Tenth Pennsylvania, and the Utah 
artillery — all volunteers— -eight companies of regulars, 
and a detachment of engineers, in all 158 officers and 
3,428 enlisted men. This raised the total force at Ma- 
nila to more than 6,000 men, and greatly strengthened 
the American position. The net about the Spaniards 
holding the Philippine capital was beginning to draw 
tighter. 

This second expedition had stopped at Wake Island 
— a barren sand strip, but with possible value for future 
cables — had then looked in at Guam, and now, on a 
peaceful Sunday, rapidly disembarked on the shores 
of Manila bay. Thus re-enforced, the American troops 
were moved forward, and the camp established between 
the beach and the Manila road, about two miles from 

207 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

Malate. This brought the lines very near the Spaniards 
and the Malate fort. There was a false alarm one night, 
produced by some Spanish shots at the insurgents, but, 
on the whole, the Spaniards kept quiet enough, having a 
proper respect, no doubt, for the war-ships frowning 
upon them from a very reasonable range. But events 
were moving faster now than in the long dreary time 
which followed the battle of May I. The second ex- 
pedition had scarcely time to settle down in their camps 
when, on July 25, General Merritt, one of the most dis- 
tinguished officers in the army, arrived on the Newport. 
To him had been confided the command of all the 
American forces in the Philippines — both those already 
there and those which were still to come. He had in- 
tended to bring with him the third expedition, but, im- 
patient of delay, had sailed with his staff on the New- 
port, on June 27, and pushed on alone at the highest 
speed attainable. When he arrived, he found General 
Anderson with headquarters at Cavite, and some troops 
holding the town, and General Greene encamped with 
his brigade near Paranaque. On the north flank Gen- 
eral Greene was within 3,200 yards of the outer de- 
fences of Manila, which ran from old Fort San An- 
tonio south of the Malate suburb, with more or less de- 
tached forts to the eastward, and to the swamps on the 
Spanish left. The queer feature of the situation was 
that between our lines and those of the Spaniards the 
insurgents, who had established scattered posts all about 
the city, had entrenched themselves within 800 yards 
of the old powder-magazine fort. Thus in the direct 
line of the American advance lay the forces of their 
would-be allies. In order to make that advance it was 

208 



EXPLANATION: 

■o==a=o Americans 
,,,,„. o Filipinos 
.Spaniards 




MAI' OF THE BATTLE OF MANILA 



THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA 

necessary to get this intervening line out of the way. 
General Merritt, as clear on this point as Admiral 
Dewey, was wisely determined that he would recognize 
the insurgents in no way which could possibly involve 
the government of the United States. He was equally 
determined that he would have no military operations 
which depended in any degree upon them, and no joint 
military movements, the difficulties and perils of which 
he plainly foresaw. He therefore opened no communi- 
cations with Aguinaldo, who had now reached such a 
point of pompous self-importance that he had not come 
to see the American commmander-in-chief upon the 
latter's arrival. This made it all the easier for General 
Merritt to ignore him, which was desirable, but did not 
clear the insurgent line away from the American front. 
The difficulty was solved by General Greene's inducing 
the insurgent brigade commander to move to the 
right, which did not commit us to anything, and gave 
us what we wanted — an unobstructed control of the 
roads necessary for the forward movement. With this 
point gained, General Greene, on July 29, advanced and 
took possession of the insurgent trenches with a bat- 
talion of regulars, another from the Colorado regi- 
ment, and a portion of the Utah battery. Finding the 
trenches weak and of bad construction, General Greene 
ordered another line constructed 100 yards further to 
the front, which was rapidly done during the night by 
the Colorado men. The line of intrenchments was 
short, not more than 270 yards in length, and on the 
right was protected only by some scattered barricades 
of the insurgents. Facing it, at close quarters now, 
were the stone fort, heavy intrenchments with seven 
14 209 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

guns, a block-house, which flanked the Americans on 
the right — all manned by regular soldiers, with abun- 
dant reserves in the city near at hand. The position 
was by no means a safe one, and the Spaniards, 
disturbed by the American advance, now begin- 
ning to press upon them, undertook to break up 
the intrenchments before they should be further 
strengthened or extended, and drive their approaching 
enemies back. They kept up a desultory firing upon 
our lines, as they had done with the insurgents, but it 
had been entirely harmless, and so long as our men kept 
under cover the bullets had spent themselves vainly 
against the earthworks or flown high and wide through 
the air. On the night of July 31, however, a serious 
and concerted effort was made to force our lines back. 
The night was intensely dark, a tropical storm was rag- 
ing, and the rain was falling in torrents. In the black- 
ness and noise of the storm it was almost impossible 
to know just what happened. The Tenth Pennsylva- 
nia was in the trenches, and when the Spanish fire in- 
creased in volume they began to reply to it, exposing 
themselves in doing so. Then their outposts came in 
with a report of a Spanish advance, and although the 
outposts of regulars staid where they were through the 
night, there can be little doubt that the enemy came for- 
ward, and also tried to flank us from the block-house 
and on our exposed right. No circumstances could be 
imagined more trying for new troops, with an unseen 
enemy firing heavily, an utter impossiblity of seeing 
or hearing anything, and a welter of confusion caused 
by storm and darkness. But the Pennsylvanians fired 
vigorously, and their reserves, brought up through the 







>.-■: 



j 



THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA 

zone of fire in rear of the firing line, suffered not a lit- 
tle. The Utah and regular artillery stood their ground « 
undisturbed, served their guns steadily and efficiently, 
and held the Spaniards in check. Nothing could have 
been better than their behavior. General Greene, in- 
formed of what was occurring by some excited and not 
over-accurate messengers, sent forward to the trenches 
the California regiment and the Third artillery, sup- 
ported by the First Colorado, who were to stop just out 
of range. The Californians and the artillery suffered 
in crossing the open ground in rear of the trenches, but 
went steadily forward, and by the time they reached 
the firing line the Spanish fire was slackening and the 
attack had been repulsed. The firing, which soon 
after ceased, was renewed in the morning about nine 
o'clock, but was without effect. In this night assault 
the American loss reached 10 killed and 43 wounded, 
but despite the most trying conditions, after the first 
excitement and confusion our men stood their ground 
coolly; and the heavy fire of the infantry, and espe- 
cially of the Utah and regular artillery, proved too 
much for the Spaniards, whose attempt failed com- 
pletely. Many Spanish dead and wounded were car- 
ried into Manila, but what their actual loss was it is im- 
possible to determine, as even their wild official reports 
are lacking in this instance. 

The Americans naturally held their line, but General 
Greene, feeling that the right flank could no longer be 
left as it was, weak and exposed, opened a new line of 
trenches, which were rapidly extended for 1,200 yards 
from the bay to the Pasay road. This was a strong line 
and well protected on both flanks, but the work both of 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

making the trenches and of holding them was severe in 
the extreme. The incessant rain washed away the para- 
pets, which could only be sustained by bags of earth. 
In the trenches themselves there were two feet of water, 
but the men worked away effectively and rapidly with- 
out complaint. They had also, as an accompaniment 
to their labors, constant firing from the Spanish lines. 
Sometimes it was heavy and concerted. At other times 
it was desultory, but any man working in the trenches 
who showed his head above the parapet was likely to 
be shot. When the firing became heavy the Utah bat- 
tery would reply ; and if it was thought that the Span- 
iards were coming out, the infantry would join in. The 
heaviest firing came on August 5, when the Spaniards 
opened at seven o'clock and kept it up until ten, and the 
Americans replied vigorously and effectively. Our loss 
was 3 killed and 7 wounded, but beyond this the whole 
of the Spanish firing was utterly futile. It was their 
appproved method of conducting war in Cuba, and, as 
it now seemed, everywhere else ; but although it had no 
results, and was pitifully useless as a substitute for fight- 
ing, it was none the less annoying to men in trenches 
who were not yet ready to advance, because the com- 
manders meant to take the city, if possible, without reg- 
ular assault. So it was decided to put a stop to the 
Spanish firing, and word was sent, on August 7, that if 
there was not an end to it the ships would bombard. 
Thereupon silence fell upon the Spanish lines, and no 
more shots were fired in the American direction until 
the general and final advance began, a week later. 

At no time would the Spaniards have failed to com- 
ply with any reasonable request backed by a suggestion 






%\W< 




* t+ 




THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA 

of bombardment, but now the threat had a deeper mean- 
ing than ever before. The third expedition, which fol- 
lowed General Merritt, arrived on July 31, the day of 
the fight at Malate, and brought nearly 5,000 officers 
and men — a powerful re-enforcement. But the arrival 
which was most impressive, and which at once changed 
the situation in a very important manner, occurred on 
August 4. The new-comer was eagerly expected, and 
every American was on the lookout for the arrival 
which meant so much. Officers in the yard of the ar- 
senal at Cavite heard the men on the walls cry out : 
"There she comes !" "There's the Monterey!" Hastily 
climbing up, they looked forth toward the harbor en- 
trance, and it was true — there indeed was the Monterey. 
Leaving San Diego on June 1 1 she had toiled across the 
Pacific slowly, not being built for such wide seafaring, 
and here she was at last safe and sound. Lying low 
in the water, she was not very fair to see; but she was 
clad in armor, and four 12-inch guns looked out from 
her turrets, altogether a very formidable ship for the 
smooth waters of Manila bay. To Admiral Dewey, 
facing armored ships with nothing but unarmored 
cruisers, and quite prepared to give a good account of 
himself against any odds, the coming of the Monterey 
was worth many regiments, and the balance of naval 
power began to come down toward his side. The 
meaning of the Monterey was easily understood — and 
by others than the Americans. The morning after her 
arrival, officers looking at the line of foreign war-ships 
thought there had been some change. They counted, 
and found that in truth there had been a change, for 
one or two of them had slipped off in the night. So 

213 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

they gradually departed until only a proper force for 
observation remained, and the German squadron, with 
its interference and ill-concealed threats and insolence, 
was reduced to suitable proportions. The Monterey 
had demonstrated once more Nelson's famous saying — 
that his fighting-ships were the best negotiators in Eu- 
rope. 

With all danger of foreign meddling gone, with more 
than ten thousand soldiers on shore, and with the Mon- 
terey lying low and menacing alongside the American 
cruisers, Admiral Dewey and General Merritt felt that 
the time had come to bring matters to a conclusion and 
take possessionofthe city, which had been won on theist 
of May. On August 7 the American commanders no- 
tified the Spanish general-in-chief that after the expira- 
tion of forty-eight hours they might attack the defences 
of Manila, and that they sent the notice in order to ena- 
ble non-combatants to leave the city. Augustin the tru- 
culent, the maker of the proclamation which described 
Dewey and his men as the "excrescences of civilization" 
who were about to cast down altars and carry off wives 
and virgins, had slipped away under orders from Ma- 
drid, it is said, when the decisive moment drew near ; 
with German aid getting safely off, and leaving Gen- 
eral Jaudenes to face the inevitable. That officer now 
replied to the American communication, expressing his 
thanks, but declaring that he was unable, owing to the 
presence of the insurrectionary forces, to find a place 
of refuge for the women and children under his care. 
It was a manly letter, not without a note of pathos hid- 
den under the polite and ceremonious words. His op- 
ponents were quite as anxious as he to avoid extremi- 

214 




WESLEY MERRITT 



THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA 

ties if they could ; and so, two days later, they again 
wrote to General Jaudenes, asking for the surrender of 
Manila. They pointed out the hopelessness of his sit- 
uation which made surrender consistent with honor, 
the useless sacrifice of life which an attack and bom- 
bardment would cause, and expressed the earnest de- 
sire to spare the women and children and the wounded 
from all the perils which might ensue. The Governor- 
General, who, it is reported, had been appointed be- 
cause Augustin wanted to surrender unconditionally, 
replied with a refusal of the American demands, and 
then asked for time to consult his government. This 
General Merritt and Admiral Dewey very properly re- 
fused. Through the Belgian consul they sent a mes- 
sage that if the heavy batteries along the water-front 
kept silent they would not shell the city, but Manila 
they meant to have. It was also clear that the Span- 
iards were really ready to surrender, but that their 
honor or their politics or something demanded a fight 
and a show of force. They so clung to shams and so 
shrank from realities that, although they meant to sur- 
render, they were determined to have an attack made 
upon them ; and the American general, equally deter- 
mined to have an end to the business, ordered an attack 
on August 13. 

The ships left their anchorage at Cavite early in the 
morning. As they got under way and the Olympia 
moved off, the English band on the Immortalite struck 
up "See, the Conquering Hero Comes," and then, as 
the battle-flags broke out on the fighting fleet, the Eng- 
lish band played the "Star-Spangled Banner," and the 
cheers of the American seamen rang strong and clear 

215 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

across the water. As the American ships drew away, 
the English followed them a little further out, and when 
they came to their old anchorage near the Pasig river, 
the French and Germans got under way too. The Ger- 
man flag-ship steamed down behind the Concord, so 
that a high shot from Manila aimed at the latter might 
easily have struck her, and thereupon the Immortalite 
came in between the German and the American, and 
stopped. The hint was not lost. The Germans and 
French remained near Manila, while the English and 
Japanese were grouped on the American side ; and with 
this arrangement the closing act of the drama went for- 
ward. 

It was after nine o'clock when the Olympia, followed 
by the Petrel and Raleigh, and with the Callao near in, 
opened on the Malate forts. For the first few minutes 
the shots fell short. Then the squalls of mist and rain 
passed away, the range, which was now seen to be er- 
roneous, was readjusted, and what General Merritt 
called "a hot and accurate fire of heavy shells and rapid- 
fire projectiles" was poured upon the forts. The 
Utah battery also opened, and at half past ten the 
ships, on signal, ceased firing, the infantry were let 
loose, and the skirmish-line of General Greene's brigade 
rushed into the powder-magazine fort and the trenches, 
which they found deserted. Up went the American 
flag, and, as the troops went forward, they were met by 
a second line of defence and a sharp fire. The Ameri- 
cans replied with volleys, subduing the Spanish fire, 
and then advanced steadily through the streets of Ma- 
late, with only some straggling shots from the direc- 
tion of Paco. Passing through Malate and then Er- 

216 




RESISTANCE I l' 1 »M THE HOUSES IN MAL \ I E 



THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA 

mita, they emerged on the open space at the Luneta, to 
see the white flag over the walled city. As General 
Greene rode forward under a heavy fire he came upon 
a thousand Spanish troops — those who had been shoot- 
ing from the Paco road, but had now stopped. Detain- 
ing their commander, General Greene sent the Span- 
ish soldiers into the walled city, and then halted his men 
in such a position that, if there were any more fighting, 
he might be in a position to rush the gates. 

Meantime General MacArthur, advancing along the 
Pasay road, had encountered a sharper resistance and 
met with a more serious loss ; for the Spaniards there, 
well out of range of the ships, made a better stand. 
After an artillery engagement which silenced two 
Spanish guns in the Spanish battery, and hearing the 
cheers of Greene's men on the left, the brigade ad- 
vanced and had a sharp action at the village of Singa- 
lon, where the enemy vigorously defended a block- 
house. The ground was difficult and the advance slow ; 
but the men were well handled and fought well, so that 
at the end of an hour and a half the Spanish, yielding 
before the steady pressure, retreated; the Americans 
followed, and, passing through the Paco district, en- 
tered the city. • 

In this advance of the two brigades upon the city 
General Greene lost i killed and 6 wounded, and General 
MacArthur 4 killed and 37 wounded. What loss their 
opposition suffered does not appear to have been ascer- 
tained or reported. But the price paid was not a heavy 
one for the great city which fell into the hands of the 
Americans and which the Spanish would not yield 
without an actual attack. It is obvious, from the fig- 

217 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

ures, that the resistance was neither serious nor pro- 
longed, and there is no doubt that it might have been 
both. The Spanish had 13,000 good troops, nearly all 
regulars, and 22,000 stand of arms. Their intrench- 
ments, supported by block-houses and forts, were excel- 
lent and formidable, while in front of the old city and 
on the Luneta they are said to have had more than sev- 
enty heavy modern rifled guns. Here was abundant 
material for a desperate defence, which, if made, would 
have cost the Americans many lives and the utter de- 
struction of the city. 

No such defence was attempted, and the reasons are 
obvious. In the first place, the Spaniards had been de- 
prived of any hope of final escape by the victory of May 
1, and by the manner in which Admiral Dewey firmly 
held and controlled the bay, thus cutting them off from 
all prospect of assistance. In the second place, they 
were well aware that if they forced the final test the 
American fleet, now strengthened by the Monterey, 
would wreck and destroy the city, and that under those 
conditions the American troops could not be withstood. 
They might kill many of their foes, they would lose 
many themselves, and the end would always be the 
same. But there was another and still more convincing 
reason than any of these. The long years of tyranny, 
oppression, and torture were ready at last to exact their 
compensation. All about Manila were the insurgent 
bands, with bitter wrongs to avenge, half-civilized peo- 
ple raised now into very deadly activity by the coming 
of the new conqueror, and watching eagerly for the op- 
portunity to settle certain long outstanding accounts. 
These native people wanted to kill and plunder. A de- 

218 



THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA 

termined resistance meant a bombardment with a fierce 
assault by the American troops, and when they rushed 
in, there behind them, uncontrollable in the confusion 
of a stormed and shattered city, would come the insur- 
gents with pillage, bloodshed, and fire in their train. 
The Spaniards shrank from such a prospect, for they 
knew the insurgents, and they also knew what they 
had done to these people now in arms. The only es- 
cape was through the Americans, who would protect 
them and the city and curb the insurgents. So the 
white flag went up soon after the naval fire ceased, and 
then Lieutenant Brumby, representing the admiral, and 
Colonel Whittier, representing the general, went in and 
held a conference. General Greene went in also at the 
head of his troops, and General Merritt came ashore. 
They passed through the plaza, crowded with Span- 
ish soldiers, found General Jaudenes in a chapel of the 
cathedral, and there the capitulation was signed and the 
city surrendered. The Oregon troops brought up by 
water from Cavite landed through the surf and 
marched up the Luenta. While they were advancing, 
Lieutenant Brumby and his men hauled down the Span- 
ish standard from the big flag-staff in front of the walls. 
As the great banner came down, the Americans were 
silent and the crowd looked on wondering, some of 
the Spaniards among them shedding tears. Then there 
rose in its place a flag brought from the Olympia. Up 
it went, and then broke out before the breeze, the sun 
coming through a rift in the clouds and shining bright 
upon it. The marching Oregon troops saw it, their 
cheers rang out, and their band sent the strains of ''The 
Star-Spangled Banner" floating down the promenade. 

219 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

The ships saw it too, and the national salute pealed out 
from the guns of the Olympia. The emblem of what 
had been done was at last in place. Meantime, the real- 
ities were going on elsewhere in the surrounded city, 
where General Merritt, in the palace of a long line of 
Spanish governors, was taking possession of the treas- 
ure and the arms, and preparing the way for the gov- 
ernment of Manila. Other realities were the entrance 
of Greene's and MacArthur's men through streets lined 
with Spanish soldiers, neither sullen nor revengeful, but 
glad that it was all finished, and that the days of use- 
less fighting and of wasted lives were over. Still other 
realities were the American troops posted at the bridges 
and approaches to the city, holding back the insurgents, 
forbidding their entrance entirely, determined that 
there should be no pillage, no slaughter, no burning, 
nothing to dim or sully the fine record which had run 
on without fleck or stain from the May day of the vic- 
tory. It was all very simple. There was very little 
pomp and parade. The navy of the United States were 
masters of the great bay. The soldiers of the United 
States — the highly trained regulars, the hardy volun- 
teers from the States of the West and Northwest 
where half a century ago was only wilderness — held 
the city. Their general was in the palace, their flag 
fluttered on the Luenta. That was all. Yet under the 
simple facts were many meanings. The empire which 
Magellan had found for Spain in the East had passed 
away forever. Unfit to rule, she had been expelled at 
last from the Western Hemisphere. Unfit to rule, the 
war which she had drawn down upon her own head 
had driven her also from the East, and a new flag and 



t 







THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA 

a new power in their onward march had risen up in 
the Orient. The youngest of nations had come again 
to the edge of that marvelous region, the cradle of the 
race, whence the Aryans had moved westward so very 
long ago. 



CHAPTER XI 
HOW PEACE CAME 

More fortunate than the generals and the troops of 
Puerto Rico, Admiral Dewey and General Merritt, 
thanks to distance and a severed cable, were able to 
complete their work and set the final crown upon their 
labors by taking Manila before the order reached them 
to cease hostilities. That order, when it came, found 
them masters of the great Eastern city they had fought 
to win. In Puerto Rico the news stayed Schwan's cav- 
alry in pursuit of the Spaniards, Brooke's gunners with 
the lanyards in their hands, and halted the other col- 
umns in their march over the island. In Cuba it saved 
Manzanillo, just falling before the guns of Goodrich 
and his little squadron, and checked the movements 
which were bringing port after port into American pos- 
session. It stopped also the departure of a fleet which, 
by its existence and intention, was a potent cause of the 
coming of peace. Even before the battle of the 3d of 
July the department at Washington was making ready 
to send a fleet consisting of the Iozva, Oregon, Yankee, 
Yosemite, and Dixie, under Commodore Watson in the ' 
flag-ship Newark, direct to Spain, primarily to fight the 
fleet of Admiral Camara, which had wandered help- 
lessly across the Mediterranean with vague outgivings 
about going to Manila, but which merely went through 

222 



HOW PEACE CAME 

the Suez Canal, and then turned round and came back 
again. But after the battle of July 3 the preparations 
of Commodore Watson's squadron were pushed more 
energetically than ever, re-enforcements were prepared, 
and it was known that it was to cross the Atlantic in 
any event, and carry war to the very doors of Spain's 
coast cities. This fact was soon as well known in Eu- 
rope as in America. Presently it became clear that 
Watson's fleet was no pretence, but a very grim reality ; 
that it was nearly in readiness; and finally that it was 
on the very eve of departure. What American ships 
and seamen could do had just been shown at Manila 
and Santiago, and there was no reason to suppose that 
they would be less effective on the Spanish coast. Spain 
did not like the prospect, and some of her neighbors 
were as averse as she to the sound of American guns in 
the Mediterranean, not heard in those waters now for 
nearly a century. It would be something new, some- 
thing which might disturb concerts and Bunds and other 
excellent arrangements, and must not be permitted. 
It became clear to the diplomatic mind that Spain must 
make peace and make it at once, on any terms. Hence 
arose what is politely called pressure, although poor 
Spain did not need much pressing. The war which she 
had forced — no one knows exactly for what reason — 
for what she called her pride or her point of honor, had 
resulted in a series of rapid, crushing, and unbroken 
defeats. She had expected, perhaps, to make a stand, 
to win a fight, somewhere ; but her whole system, her 
entire body politic, was rottener than any one dreamed, 
and the whole fabric went to pieces like an egg-shell 
when struck by the hand of a vigorous, enterprising 

225 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

enemy. Her sea power was shattered and entirely gone 
in the Pacific and in American waters. Manila bay 
was in the hands of Dewey, and the surrender of the 
city waited only for his demand. Cuba could not be re- 
lieved ; Santiago province was in American hands, and 
the rest of the island would go the same way as fast as 
the United States could land troops and capture ports. 
Puerto Rico was half gone, and the American columns 
were marching as rapidly as possible to complete con- 
quest of the island. And then there in the background 
was Watson's fleet, very imminent now, and likely to 
be off Cadiz or Barcelona in a fortnight. 

Clearly it was high time for peace, and on July 22 
the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, Minister of State, 
transmitted through M. Cambon a letter to the Presi- 
dent, asking if it were not possible to terminate hostili- 
ties, and confessing to the defeats which Spain had suf- 
fered, and the unequal character of the struggle in 
which she was engaged. This letter reached the Presi- 
dent on July 26, and four days later Mr. Day, Secre- 
tary of State, made reply. He said that the President 
was anxious to end the war, and disposed to deal most 
generously with a brave adversary. He then laid down 
the American conditions, which were absolutely essen- 
tial by their preliminary acceptance to any negotiations 
for a peace. These terms were — first, relinquishment 
by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over Cuba, and the 
immediate evacuation of that island ; second — the Pres- 
ident, in a spirit of generosity, not wishing to demand 
any pecuniary indemnity — the immediate cession to 
the United States of Puerto Rico, all other West Indian 
islands, and an island in the Ladrones to be selected by 

224 



HOW PEACE CAME 

the United States ; third, that the United States should 
hold and occupy the city and bay of Manila pending 
the conclusion of a treaty of peace which should deter- 
mine "the control, disposition, and government of the 
Philippines." On August 7 the Duke of Almodovar 
del Rio replied, accepting with many words, but still 
accepting, the first two conditions, and answering the 
third demand in a manner which might be taken as an 
acceptance or not, but which was evidently designed to 
open up discussion and controversy. But Mr. Day had 
had recently a thorough if brief schooling in Spanish 
diplomatic correspondence, and he had no idea of in- 
volving himself or his government in further debate of 
any kind. Spain was to accept our demands or war 
was to go on. The day of words, of phrases, and of 
language generally had passed away in the smoke of 
war, and now, if war was to cease, it was to be Yes or 
No. So, with admirable decision and great cleverness 
and ability, Mr. Day decided that the Spanish note 
was a plain acceptance of our terms, and nothing else. 
He accordingly wrote to M. Cambon, on August 10, 
and to this effect, added that any lack of explic- 
itness in the Duke's note being due undoubtedly, 
to errors in transmission, or in the translation of 
the cipher, he proposed to end all doubts and avoid 
all misunderstandings by inviting M. Cambon to 
sign, on behalf of Spain, a protocol embodying 
in precise terms the three demands of the letter 
of July 30, and three other articles providing for 
the method of evacuating Cuba and Puerto Rico, for 
the appointment of commissioners to negotiate a treaty 
of peace, and for the cessation of hostilities on the sign- 
r 5 225 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

ing of the protocol. No room any more for explanations 
and notes and arguments. War or the protocol, that 
was the choice. Spain at last had been brought, by her 
refusal to admit truth, face to face with an ugly reality 
from which there was no escape. Shams and false- 
hoods and large language were of no use here before 
the fact which could not be hidden any longer, and she 
authorized M. Cambon to sign the protocol. The sign- 
ing took place at Washington, on August, 12, and hos- 
tilities ceased. 

This was the practical end of active war, but it was 
only a truce or an armistice. The war was not ended 
or over, and could not be until a treaty was concluded. 
For this work, under the provisions of the protocol, the 
President appointed Mr. Day, who resigned the Secre- 
taryship of State, Senator Davis of Minnesota, Sena- 
tor Frye of Maine, Senator Gray of Delaware, and the 
Honorable Whitelaw Reid commissioners on the part 
of the United States, to negotiate a treaty of peace at 
Paris. The Spanish government appointed a like com- 
mission, headed by Don Eugenio Montero Rios, the 
president of the Senate, and a very learned and able 
lawyer of high distinction. The commissioners of both 
governments met in Paris on October I, and exchanged 
their powers. The negotiations then began, and lasted 
until December 10, when the treaty was signed. The 
Spaniards struggled hard and resisted stoutly. All Eu- 
rope was with them in sympathy, and especially France 
and Germany. The Americans were doing their work 
in a hostile atmosphere, with no friendly nation near 
except England, and they did it in a way which added 
another triumph to the annals of American diplomacy. 

226 




J I LES CAMBON 
The French Ambassador who signed the peace protocol on behalf of Spam 



HOW PEACE CAME 

They were all men of the highest distinction, of experi- 
ence, and tried ability, and they not only met the Span- 
ish arguments strongly and thoroughly^ but they con- 
ducted their difficult task without stumbling or error. 
There was a contest over the Cuban and other debts, 
which called forth much discussion, and a most suc- 
cessful parrying of all the Spanish efforts to secure for 
those debts some recognition or some acceptance by 
the United States. There was also discussion on some 
minor points, but the question upon which the real con- 
flict turned, and which soon overshadowed everything 
else, was the Philippines. Dewey's victory had come 
with the shock of a great surprise as well as the splen- 
dor of a great glory. No one had dreamed that the war 
meant the entrance of the United States into the Orient. 
But there the flag was, there it fluttered victorious, and 
the stream of events, so much more powerful than hu- 
man plannings when they are the outcome of world 
forces, moved relentlessly on. Dewey must be sup- 
ported and relieved. So a ship and some troops 
went to him. Then it was clear that they were 
inadequate, and more ships and more troops followed 
across the Pacific. They could not be there for nothing. 
Manila must be taken, and so it was taken before news 
of the protocol could reach that distant place with its 
cut cable. Hostilities ceased, and we held Manila in 
our grasp. No one would have consented to give up 
that city and its noble harbor — the prize and pearl of 
the East. But if we were to retain Manila, the scene of 
Dewey's victory, which the American people would 
never surrender, were we to hold it alone and nothing 
else, surrounded by territory in other hands, with all 

227 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

the burdens and perils which such a situation implied. 
We must hold Manila, and if Manila, then the only pos- 
sible thing was to hold the island of Luzon as well. 
That was as far as the President or the mass of the 
American people had gone when the commissioners 
sailed for Paris in September. Some members of the 
commission were utterly opposed to the retention of 
the Philippines or any considerable portion of any one 
of them. But when they settled down to work, when 
the inexorable demand for action came upon them, 
when they could no longer speculate upon possibilities 
without responsibility, as their fellow-citizens at home 
could do, then the question broadened and deepened, 
and began to settle itself and burn away all doubts, as 
great questions have a way of doing. The stream of 
events was running on in the same inevitable fashion. 
Those who had rejoiced in the rush of the current, and 
those who tried to stem it, alike went with it. The 
forces which had been let loose by the Spanish war 
were world forces, and they presented their arguments 
with the grim silence and the unforgiving certainty of 
fate. Will you go away and leave the Filipinos to 
Spain, they asked, leave them to a tyranny and oppres- 
sion tenfold worse than that in Cuba which carried you 
into the war? Clearly impossible. Will you force 
Spain out of the islands, and then, having destroyed 
the only government and the only sovereignty which 
have ever existed there, will you depart yourselves and 
leave the islands to anarchy and bloodshed, to sangui- 
nary dictatorship, and to the quick seizure of European 
powers and a possible world-wide war over the spoils ? 
Again clearly impossible. Again no thoroughfare. 

228 



HOW PEACE CAME 

Again a proposition which no strong, high-spirited peo- 
ple could entertain. Will you, then, call in the other 
powers of the earth to help you settle the question of 
these islands, determine their destiny, and establish a 
government for their people? Once more, no. Such a 
solution is incompatible with decent pride and honest 
self-respect, and could lead only to mischief and con- 
fusion, to wars and rumors of wars. What then will 
you do ? Is there aught you can do but replace the sov- 
ereignty you have dashed down, and with your own 
sovereignty meet the responsibilities which have come to 
you in the evolution of the time, and take yourselves 
the islands you have won? Quite clearly now the an- 
swer comes that no other course is possible. The 
American commissioners heard in all this, as the great 
master of music heard in the first bars of his immortal 
symphony, "the hand of fate knocking at the door." 
Some of them had always believed in this outcome, 
some had not, but all became absolutely convinced that 
there was but one road possible, and so they demanded 
all the Philippines from Spain, and made the demand 
an ultimatum. The Spaniards struggled hard. They 
disputed our right to make the demand under the terms 
of the protocol ; they argued and resisted ; they threat- 
ened to break off the negotiations; and then they 
yielded, because they could do nothing else. This done, 
the treaty was soon made, and it was an admirable in- 
strument, a masterpiece in every respect. No loop-hole 
was left for any claim for debts or aught else; no words 
could be found which could be strained to bind the 
United States in any way in the future. The Ameri- 



229 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

can commissioners came home with a triumphant 
treaty, a very fit result of an entirely victorious war. 

Much dispute and opposition have arisen among peo- 
ple successful in war in times past, and will rise again, 
over treaties of peace, but such opposition has always 
proceeded on the ground that the victor nation received 
too little. The treaty of the United States with Spain, 
signed in Paris on December 10, 1898, has the unique 
distinction of having excited opposition and attack 
among the victors because it secured too much and was 
too triumphant. An organization called by the strange 
name of the Anti-Imperialist League was formed in the 
Eastern States. Some men who had once been emi- 
nent in politics gave their names to its support, and oth- 
ers who felt that they ought to be eminent in politics 
gave it their services. A vigorous crusade was begun, 
but the popular response in the way of the easily signed 
petition was surprisingly small for the good sense of 
the American people made two points clear to them. 
One was that a peace treaty ought to be ratified, the 
other that they had won these new possessions, and 
had no doubt that they could trust themselves to deal 
with them honestly, ably, and for their own truest and 
best interests, as well as for those of the people of all 
the islands. A failure in the field of popular discussion 
before the people and in the newspapers, the fight 
against the treaty was transferred to the Senate of the 
United States. 

The constitutional provision which requires a vote 
of two-thirds of the Senate to ratify a treaty simpli- 
fies the work of opposition to ratification. It seemed 
incredible at first that a treaty of peace could possibly 

230 



w 5? 




fei^^lMEV 



HOW PEACE CAME 

be defeated. Party lines were not drawn on the ques- 
tion, and it was at first supposed that resistance to the 
ratification of the treaty would be confined to a very 
few Senators, who had been opposed to the movement 
in favor of the Cubans, as well as to the entrance into 
war, and were now consistently opposed to its re- 
sults. But as time went on the necessities of factions 
in the Democratic party developed an opposition which 
included a majority of the Democratic Senators, and 
this made the minority formidably large — nearly one- 
third of the Senate, if not in excess of it. It is not need- 
ful to trace in detail the course of the debate, which 
from the side of opposition proceeded on three lines — 
lack of constitutional power to acquire and hold the 
Philippines, the violation of the principles of the Dec- 
laration of Independence involved in doing so, and 
sympathy and admiration for the Filipinos, feelings as 
profound as they were rapid in growth. - The friends of 
ratification took the very simple ground that the treaty 
committed the United States to no policy, but left them 
free to do exactly as seemed best with all the islands, 
that the American people could be safely intrusted with 
this grave responsibility, and that patriotism and com- 
mon-sense alike demanded the end of war and the re- 
establishment of peace, which could only be effected by 
the adoption of the treaty. "-'..The contest was earnest 
and bitter, the canvass energetic to a degree never seen 
in the Senate, and the result close. When the Senate 
went into executive session on Monday, February 6, 
with the time for the vote fixed for three o'clock, the 
treaty had only 58 sure votes, 60 being needed for rati- 
fication; the opposition had 29 sure votes, and the re- 

231 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

maining 3 were doubtful. At half past two one of the 
doubtful voters was declared to be for the treaty, mak- 
in S 59- J ust before three o'clock another vote was 
promised, and the third doubtful vote was given to the 
treaty after the roll had been called. The final vote 
stood 57 to 27 — including the pairs, 61 to 29, just two- 
thirds and one vote to spare. It had been a heated 
struggle. Opinion as to the outcome had fluctuated, 
even among those best informed, down to the last mo- 
ment. Yet as one looks back when all is done, it 
seems clear that no other result was possible. The re- 
sponsibility which had come to the American people 
with the flash of Dewey's guns on May 1 could not be 
avoided, and the American people were too strong, too 
high-spirited, too confident, to run away from it. The 
hand of fate was knocking at the door of the Senate as 
it had knocked at the door of the American commis- 
sioners in Paris. To that knock all doors fly open, 
and to the stern visitant without but one answer could 
be given. 

Nothing remained after the end of the conflict in the 
Senate but the exchange of ratifications, which took 
place on April 11, 1899, and so the war ended. Its 
causes lie far back in the history and character of na- 
tions. Its immediate results were as striking as they 
were important and full of meaning. What the more 
distant outcome of these results will be in the future 
years no man can tell. We can only say with certainty 
that they will be far reaching and momentous. The 
war was brief, but it served to let loose forces which 
had long been gathering strength, and to complete 
movements which had been going on for centuries. For 

232 




~3sjp-~*» 



- 




THE CATHEDRAL, MANILA 



HOW PEACE CAME 

three hundred years the conflict between the English- 
speaking people on the one side, and the French and 
Spanish on the other, for the control of the New World, 
had been in progress. France went down in 1760, the 
last vestige of Spanish power was swept away by the 
war of 1898. The result was inevitable, and the Eng- 
lish-speaking people owned at last one-half of the New 
World, and had shut out Europe from all control in 
the other half or in the great islands of the West 
Indies.* 

Thus were the immediate object and purpose of the 
war achieved in fulfilment of the irresponsible conflict 
of centuries between races, systems, and beliefs inher- 
ently antagonistic. But war is a fire, and when it be- 
gins no one can tell where it will stop or what it will 
burn away. The only thing we can be quite sure of is 
that war, once entered upon, cannot be limited, and 
may produce results of which no man dreamed at the 
outset. This war, merely as such, was not only short, 
but was far from being a large or extensive one. Yet 
it suddenly made clear many things not realized before, 
and brought forth unimagined results. For thirty 
years the people of the United States had been binding 
up the wounds and trying to efface the scars of their 
great and terrible Civil War. They knew that they had 
done much, they felt that the old passions had softened 
and were dying. The war came, and in the twinkling 
of an eye, in a flash of burning, living light, they sud- 
denly saw that the long task was done, that the land 
was really one again without rent or seam, and men 

*The remaining Danish, Dutch, and French possessions are too 
small to constitute an exception to the general proposition. 

233 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

rejoiced mightily in their hearts with this knowledge 
which the new war had brought. 

For thirty years the people of the United States had 
been absorbed in the development of their great her- 
itage. They had been finishing the conquest of their 
continent, and binding all parts of it together with the 
tracks and highways of commerce. Once this work 
was complete, it was certain that the virile, ambitious, 
enterprising race which had done it would look abroad 
beyond their boundaries and seek to guard and extend 
their interests in other parts of the world. The work 
was done, but they did not realize it. Even the Venezu- 
ela intervention, a pure manifestation of the new spirit 
and the new time, did not make it clear to them. Then 
the war note rang through the land, and with dazzled 
eyes at first, and then with ever clearer and steadier 
gaze, they saw that in the years of isolation and self- 
absorption they had built up a great world power, that 
they must return to the ocean which they had tem- 
porarily abandoned, and have their share in the trade of 
every country and the commerce of every sea. Suddenly 
came the awakening to the great fact that they had 
founded an empire on their Western coasts, that they 
held one side of the Pacific, and could not longer be in- 
different to the fate of the other side in the remote East. 
Now they read with instructed vision the prophecy of 
Seward, which foretold that the future course of trade 
and empire would lie in the Pacific. They knew at last 
that the stream of Eastern trade, which for centuries 
had flowed to the West, building up great cities and en- 
riching nations as it passed from Byzantium to Venice, 
from Venice to Portugal, and from Portugal to Hol- 

234 



HOW PEACE CAME 

land and to London, was now to be divided, and in part, 
at least, to pour eastward over the Pacific. Now men 
saw that the long connection, ever growing closer, with 
the Hawaiian Islands had not been chance; that the 
culmination of the annexation movement in the very 
year of the Spanish War was not accident, but that it 
all came from the instinct of the race, which paused in 
California only to learn that its course was still west- 
ward, and that Americans, and no one else, must be 
masters of the cross-roads of the Pacific. 

But while the United States had moved so slowly for 
half a century toward Hawaii, the work of one May 
morning carried them on to the Philippines and made 
them an Eastern power. Whatever the final disposition 
of the islands, whether we hold and govern much or 
little, our flag is there, our footing has been made, and 
in the East we shall remain, because we are entitled to, 
and will surely have, our share of the great commerce 
with the millions of China, from whom we shall refuse 
to be shut out. 

One other great result of the war, like the last a 
world result. We found in the trial of war who were 
our enemies in Europe, and we saw that they were 
many. We also found who our friend was, not as a 
matter of sentiment or community of speech and 
thought, but on the firm and solid ground of common 
interests. In the brief crash of the short-lived Spanish 
war the English-speaking people came together. In the 
light of those eager, hurrying days we saw that the 
English fleets made any attack on Dewey, even by com- 
bined Europe, impossible; and England saw that so 
long as the United States was her friend her base on the 

235 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

Atlantic was secure, her food-supply safe, and that all 
Europe in arms could not harm her. Very plain also 
did it become to all men that in the East, where Eng- 
land had been so long, and where we had just entered, 
the interests of both nations were identical in preserv- 
ing China for equal trade to all. 

All these things the war made clear and certain. 
What these new conditions may come to mean in the 
future no one now can safely say. But if that future 
is to bring the struggle which many men peering into 
the darkness foresee — a conflict between the Slav and 
so much of Europe as he can drag with him on the one 
side, and the English-speaking man on the other; be- 
tween the military socialism of Russia and Germany 
and the individualism and freedom of the United States 
and England ; between the power of the land and the 
sea power — then the future historian will date the open- 
ing of this new epoch and of this mighty conflict, at 
once economic and social, military and naval, from the 
war of 1898, which in three months overthrew the em- 
pire of Spain in the Antilles and the Philippines. 



APPENDIX A 

RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS DEMANDING WITHDRAWAL 
OF SPAIN FROM CUBA. 

Joint resolution for the recognition of the independ- 
ence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Gov- 
ernment of Spain relinquish its authority and govern- 
ment in the island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land 
and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and di- 
recting the President of the United States to use the 
land and naval forces of the United States to carry 
these resolutions into effect. 

Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have ex- 
isted for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so 
near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of 
the people of the United States, have been a disgrace 
to Christian civilization, culminating as they have, in 
the destruction of a United States battle ship, with two 
hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on 
a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and can not 
longer be endured, as has been set forth by the Presi- 
dent of the United States in his message to Congress 
of April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, 
upon which the action of Congress was invited : There- 
fore, 

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

237 



APPENDIX 

First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and 
of right ought to be, free and independent. 

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to 
demand, and the Government of the United States does 
hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once 
relinquish its authority and government in the island 
of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from 
Cuba and Cuban waters. 

Third. That the President of the United States be, 
and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the 
entire land and naval forces of the United States, and 
to call into the actual service of the United States the 
militia of the several States, to such extent as may be 
necessary to carry these resolutions into effect. 

Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims 
any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, ju- 
risdiction, or control over said island except for the 
pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when 
that is accomplished, to leave the government and con- 
trol of the island to its people. 

Approved, April 20, 1898. 

DECLARATION OF WAR. 

Chap. 189. — An Act Declaring that war exists be- 
tween the United States of America and the Kingdom 
of Spain. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Represent- 
atives of the United States of America in Congress 
assembled, First. That war be, and the same is hereby, 
declared to exist, and that war has existed since the 
twenty-first day of April, anno Domini eighteen hun- 

238 



APPENDIX 

dred and ninety-eight, including said day, between the 
United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain. 

Second. That the President of the United States 
be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the 
entire land and naval forces of the United States, and 
to call into the actual service of the United States the 
militia of the several States, to such extent as may be 
necessary to carry this act into effect. 

Approved, April 25, 1898. 



APPENDIX B 

PROCLAMATION OF THE PRESIDENT 

By the President of the United States of America: 

A PROCLAMATION. 

Whereas, by a joint resolution passed by the Con- 
gress and approved April 20, 1898, and communicated 
to the Government of Spain, it was demanded that said 
Government at once relinquish its authority and gov- 
ernment in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land 
and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters; and 
the President of the United States was directed and 
empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of 
the United States, and to call into the actual service of 
the United States the militia of the several States to 
such extent as might be necessary to carry said resolu- 
tion into effect ; and 

Whereas, in carrying into effect said resolution, the 
President of the United States deems it necessary to 
set on foot and maintain a blockade of the north coast 
of Cuba, including all ports on said coast between Car- 
denas and Bahia Honda and the port of Cienfuegos 
on the south coast of Cuba : 

Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of 
the United States, in order to enforce the said resolu- 
tion, do hereby declare and proclaim that the United 

240 



APPENDIX 

States of America have instituted, and will maintain a 
blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including ports 
on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and 
the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba, 
aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States 
and the law of nations applicable to such cases. An 
efficient force will be posted so as to prevent the en- 
trance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. Any 
neutral vessel approaching any of said ports, or at- 
tempting to leave the same, without notice or knowl- 
edge of the establishment of such blockade, will be duly 
warned by the commander of the blockading forces, 
who will endorse on her register the fact, and the date, 
of such warning, where such endorsement was made; 
and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter any 
blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the 
nearest convenient port for such proceeding against her 
and her cargo as prize, as may be deemed advisable. 

Neutral vessels lying in any of said ports at the time 
of the establishment of such blockade will be allowed 
thirty days to issue therefrom. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
and caused the seal of the United States to be 
affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington, this 22d day of 
April, A. D. 1898, and of the Independence 

[seal] of the United States, the one hundred and 

twenty-second. 

William McKinley. 
By the President : 
John Sherman, 

Secretary of State. 



16 



241 



APPENDIX 

[No. 5.] 
By the President of the United States, 

A PROCLAMATION. 

Whereas a joint resolution of Congress was ap- 
proved on the twentieth day of April, 1898, entitled 
"Joint Resolution For the recognition of the independ- 
ence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Gov- 
ernment of Spain relinquish its authority and govern- 
"ment in the island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land 
"and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and 
"directing the President of the United States to use the 
"land and naval forces of the United States to carry 
"these resolutions into effect," and 

Whereas, by an act of Congress entitled "An Act to 
"provide for temporarily Increasing the Military Es- 
tablishment of the United States in time of war and 
"for other purposes," approved April 22, 1898; the 
President is authorized, in order to raise a volunteer 
army, to issue his proclamation calling for volunteers to 
serve in the army of the United States. 

Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of 
the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me 
by the Constitution and the laws, and deeming sufficient 
occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth and 
hereby do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate num- 
ber of 125,000, in order to carry into effect the purpose 
of the said Resolution ; the same to be apportioned, as 
far as practicable, among the several States and Ter- 
ritories and the District of Columbia, according to pop- 

242 



APPENDIX 

ulation, and to serve for two years, unless sooner dis- 
charged. The details for this object will be immedi- 
ately communicated to the proper authorities through 
the War Department. 

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and 
caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. 
Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-third 
day of April, A. D., 1898, and of the Inde- 
[seal] pendence of the United States the one hun- 
dred and twenty-second. 

William McKinley. 
By the President : 
John Sherman, 

Secretary of State. 



[No. 6.] 
By the President of the United States of America, 

A PROCLAMATION. 

Whereas by an Act of Congress approved April 25, 
1898, it is declared that war exists and that war has 
existed since the 21st day of April, A. D. 1898, includ- 
ing said day, between the United States of America and 
the Kingdom of Spain; and 

Whereas, it being desirable that such war should be 
conducted upon principles in harmony with the present 
views of nations and sanctioned by their recent prac- 
tice, it has already been announced that the policy of 
this Government will be not to resort to privateering, 
but to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris ; 

Now, Therefore, I, William McKinley, President of 
243 



APPENDIX 

the United States of America, by virtue of the power 
vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, do here- 
by declare and proclaim : 

1. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the 
exception of contraband of war. 

2. Neutral goods, not contraband of war, are not 
liable to confiscation under the enemy's flag. 

3. Blockades in order to be binding must be effec- 
tive. 

4. Spanish merchant vessels, in any ports or places 
within the United States, shall be allowed till May 
21, 1898, inclusive, for loading their cargoes and de- 
parting from such ports or places; and such Spanish 
merchant vessels, if met at sea by any United States 
ship, shall be permitted to continue their voyage, if, on 
examination of their papers, it shall appear that their 
cargoes were taken on board before the expiration of 
the above term; Provided, that nothing herein con- 
tained shall apply to Spanish vessels having on board 
any officer in the military or naval service of the enemy, 
or any coal (except such as may be necessary for their 
voyage), or any other article prohibited or contraband 
of war, or any despatch of or to the Spanish Govern- 
ment. 

5. Any Spanish merchant vessel which, prior to 
April 21, 1898, shall have sailed from any foreign port 
bound for any port or place in the United States, shall 
be permitted to enter such port or place, and to dis- 
charge her cargo, and afterward forthwith to depart 
without molestation ; and any such vessel, if met at sea 
by any United States ship, shall be permitted to con- 
tinue her voyage to any port not blockaded. 

244 



APPENDIX 

6. The right of search is to be exercised with strict 
regard for the rights of neutrals, and the voyages of 
mail steamers are not to be interfered with except on 
the clearest grounds of suspicion of a violation of law 
in respect of contraband or blockade. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington, on the twenty-sixth 

day of April, in the year of .our Lord one 

thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, 

[seal] and of the Independence of the United 

States the one hundred and twenty-second. 

William McKinley. 

By the President : 

Alvey A. Adee, 

Acting Secretary of State. 



By the President of the United States, 

A PROCLAMATION. 

Whereas an Act of Congress was approved on the 
twenty-fifth day of April, 1898, entitled "An Act De- 
claring that war exists between the United States of 
America and the Kingdom of Spain," and 

Whereas, by an Act of Congress entitled "An Act to 
provide for temporarily increasing the Military Estab- 
lishment of the United States in time of war and for 
other purposes," approved April 22, 1898; the Presi- 
dent is authorized, in order to raise a volunteer army, 
to issue his proclamation calling for volunteers to serve 
in the army of the United States. 

245 



APPENDIX 

Now, Therefore, I, William McKinley, President of 
the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me 
by the Constitution and the laws, and deeming sufficient 
occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth and 
hereby do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate num- 
ber of 75,000 in addition to the volunteers called forth 
by my proclamation of the twenty-third of April, in the 
present year ; the same to be apportioned, as far as prac- 
ticable, among the several States and Territories and 
the District of Columbia, according to population, and 
to serve for two years, unless sooner discharged. The 
proportion of each arm and the details of enlistment 
and organization will be made known through the War 
Department. 

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and 
caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. 
Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-fifth 
day of May, in the year of our Lord one 
thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, 
[seal] and of the Independence of the United 
States the one hundred and twenty-second. 
William McKinley. 
By the President : 

William R. Day, 

Secretary of State. 



By the President of the United States of America, 

A PROCLAMATION. 

Whereas, for the reasons set forth in my Proclama- 
tion of April 22, 1898, a blockade of the ports on the 

246 



APPENDIX 

northern coast of Cuba, from Cardenas to Bahia 
Honda, inclusive, and of the port of Cienfuegos, on the 
south coast of Cuba, was declared to have been insti- 
tuted ; and 

Whereas, it has become desirable to extend the 
blockade to other Spanish ports : 

Now, Therefore, I, William McKinley, President of 
the United States, do hereby declare and proclaim that, 
in addition to the blockade of the ports specified in my 
Proclamation of April 22, 1898, the United States of 
America has instituted and will maintain an effective 
blockade of all the ports on the south coast of Cuba, 
from Cape Frances to Cape Cruz, inclusive, and also of 
the port of San Juan, in the island of Porto Rico. 

Neutral vessels lying in any of the ports to which the 
blockade is by the present Proclamation extended, will 
be allowed thirty days to issue therefrom, with cargo. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, 
and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-seventh 
day of June, A. D., 1898, and of the Inde- 

[seal] pendence of the United States the one hun- 
dred and twenty-second. 

William McKinley. 
By the President : 
J. B. Moore, 

Acting Secretary of State. 



APPENDIX C 

peace protocol of august 12, 1 898, and corres- 
pondence. 

Message 

OF THE 

Government of H. M. the Queen Regent of 
Spain,, Submitted by H. Exc. Mr. J. Cambon, 
Ambassador of the French Republic, to Wil- 
liam McKinley, President of the United 
States of America. 

Madrid, July 22, 1898. 
Mr. President: 

Since three months the American people and the 
Spanish nation are at war because Spain did not con- 
sent to grant independence to Cuba and to withdraw 
her troops therefrom. 

Spain faced with resignation such uneven strife, and 
only endeavored to defend her possessions with no 
other hope than to oppose, in the measure of her 
strength, the undertaking of the United States, and to 
protect her honor. 

Neither the trials which adversity has made us en- 
dure nor the realization that but faint hope is left us 
could deter us from struggling till the exhaustion of 
our very last resources. This stout purpose, however, 

248 



APPENDIX 

does not blind us, and we are fully aware of the re- 
sponsibilities which would weigh upon both nations in 
the eyes of the civilized world were this war to be con- 
tinued. 

This war not only inflicts upon the two peoples who 
wage it the hardships inseparable from all armed con- 
flict, but also dooms to useless suffering and unjust sac- 
rifices the inhabitants of a territory to which Spain is 
bound by secular ties that can be forgotten by no nation 
either of the old or of the new world. 

To end calamities already so great and to avert evils 
still greater, our countries might naturally endeavor to 
find upon which conditions the present struggle could 
be determined otherwise than by force of arms. 

Spain believes this understanding possible, and 
hopes that this view is also harbored by the Govern- 
ment of the United States. All true friends of both 
nations share no doubt the same hopes. 

Spain wishes to show again that in this war, as well 
as in the one she carried on against the Cuban insur- 
gents, she had but one object : the vindication of her 
prestige, her honor, her name. During the war of in- 
surrection it was her desire to spare the great island 
from the 'dangers of premature independence; in the 
present war she has been actuated by sentiments in- 
spired rather by ties of blood than by her interests and 
by the rights belonging to her as mother country. 

Spain is prepared to spare Cuba from the continua- 
tion of the horrors of war if the United States are, on 
their part, likewise disposed. 

The President of the United States and the Ameri- 
can people may now learn from this message the 

249 



APPENDIX 

true thought, desire, and intention of the Spanish na- 
tion. 

And so do we wish to learn from the President of 
the United States upon which basis might be estab- 
lished a political status in Cuba and might be termi- 
nated a strife which would continue without reason 
should both Governments agree upon the means of paci- 
fying the island. 

In the name of the Government of H. M. the Queen 
Regent I have the honor to address this message to 
your excellency, with the expression of my highest 
consideration. 

Due d'Almodovar del rio, 

Ministrc d'Etat. 



Department of State, 

Washington, July jo, 1898. 
Excellency : 

The President received on the afternoon of Tues- 
day, the 26th instant, from the hand of his excellency 
the Ambassador of France, representing for this pur- 
pose the Government of Spain, the message signed by 
your excellency as minister of state in behalf of the 
Government of Her Majesty the Queen Regent of 
Spain, and dated the 226. instant, as to the possibility 
of terminating the war now existing between the 
United States and Spain. 

The President received with satisfaction the sugges- 
tion that the two countries might mutually endeavor to 
ascertain the conditions on which the pending strug- 
gle may be brought to an end, as well as the expres- 

250 



APPENDIX 

sion of Spain's belief that an understanding on the sub- 
ject is possible. 

During the protracted negotiations that preceded the 
outbreak of hostilities the President earnestly labored 
to avert a conflict, in the hope that Spain, in considera- 
tion of her own interests, as well as those of the Span- 
ish Antilles and the United States, would find a way 
of removing the conditions which had, for half a cen- 
tury, constantly disturbed the peace of the Western 
Hemisphere and on numerous occasions brought the 
two nations to the verge of war. 

The President witnessed with profound disappoint- 
ment the frustration of his peaceful efforts by events 
which forced upon the people of the United States the 
unalterable conviction that nothing short of the re- 
linquishment by Spain of a claim of sovereignty over 
Cuba which she was unable to enforce would relieve a 
situation that had become unendurable. 

For years the Government of the United States, out 
of regard for the susceptibilities of Spain, had by the 
exercise of its power and the expenditure of its treasure 
preserved the obligations of neutrality. But a point 
was at length reached at which, as Spain had often been 
forewarned, this attitude could no longer be maintained. 
The spectacle at our very doors of a fertile terri- 
tory wasted by fire and sword, and given over to deso- 
lation and famine, was one to which our people could 
not be indifferent. Yielding, therefore, to the demands 
of humanity, they determined to remove the causes in 
the effects of which they had become so deeply involved. 
To this end the President, with the authority of Con- 
gress, presented to Spain a demand for the withdrawal 

251 



APPENDIX 

of her land and naval forces from Cuba, in order that 
the people of the island might be enabled to* form a 
government of their own. To this demand Spain re- 
plied by severing diplomatic relations with the United 
States, and by declaring that she considered the action 
of this Government as creating a state of war between 
the two countries. 

The President could not but feel sincere regret that 
the local question as to the peace and good government 
of Cuba should thus have been transformed and en- 
larged into a general conflict of arms between two great 
peoples. Nevertheless, having accepted the issue with 
all the hazards which it involved, he has, in the exercise 
of his duty, and of the rights which the state of war 
confers, prosecuted hostilities by land and sea, in order 
to secure at the earliest possible moment an honorable 
peace. In so doing he has been compelled to avail 
himself unsparingly of the lives and fortunes which his 
countrymen have placed at his command; and untold 
burdens and sacrifices, far transcending any material 
estimation, have been imposed upon them. 

That as the result of the patriotic exertions of the 
people of the United States the strife has, as your ex- 
cellency observes, proved unequal, inclines the Presi- 
dent to offer a brave* adversary generous terms of 
peace. 

The President therefore responding to your excel- 
lency's request, will state the terms of peace which will 
be accepted by him at the present time, subject to the 
approval of the Senate of the United States hereafter. 

Your excellency in discussing the question of Cuba 
intimates that Spain has desired to spare the island the 

252 



APPENDIX 

dangers of premature independence. The Government 
of the United States has not shared the apprehensions 
of Spain in this regard, but it recognizes the fact that 
in the distracted and prostrate condition of the island, 
aid and guidance will be necessary, and these it is pre- 
pared to give. 

The United States will require: 

First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of 
sovereignty over or title to Cuba and her immediate 
evacuation of the island. 

Second. The President, desirous of exhibiting sig- 
nal generosity, will not now put forward any demand 
for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless he cannot be 
insensible to the losses and expenses of the United 
States incident to the war or to the claims of our citi- 
zens for injuries to their persons and property during 
the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, re- 
quire the cession to the United States and the imme- 
diate evacuation by Spain of the island of Porto Rico 
and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain 
in the West Indies, and also the cession of an is- 
land in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United 
States. 

Third. On similar grounds the United States is en- 
titled to occupy and will hold the city, bay, and harbor 
of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace 
which shall determine the control, disposition, and 
government of the Philippines. 

If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their en- 
tirety commissioners will be named by the United 
States to meet similarly authorized commissioners on 
the part of Spain for the purpose of settling the de- 

253 



APPENDIX 

tails of the treaty of peace and signing and delivering 
it under the terms above indicated. 

I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your excel- 
lency the assurances of my highest consideration. 

William R. Day. 

His Excellency the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, 

Minister of State, etc. 



Message of His Excellency the Duke of Almo- 
dovar Del Rio, Minister of State of Spain, Sub- 
mitted by His Excellency Mr. J. Cambon, Am- 
bassador of the French Republic, to Honor- 
able William R. Day, Secretary of State of 
the United States. 

[Translation.] 

Madrid, August yth, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State : 

The French ambassador at Washington, whose good 
offices have enabled the Spanish Government to address 
a message to the President of the United States, has 
forwarded by cable your excellency's reply to this doc- 
ument. 

In examining the arguments used as a preamble to 
the specification of the terms upon which peace may 
be restored between Spain and the United States, it 
behooves the Spanish Government to deduct from the 
order of events that the severance of diplomatic rela- 
tions with the United States had no other purpose than 

254 



APPENDIX 

to decline the acceptance of an ultimatum which Spain 
could only consider as an attempt against her rightful 
sovereignty over Cuba. 

Spain did not declare war ; she met it because it was 
the only means of defending her rights in the Greater 
Antilles. Thus did the Queen and the United States 
see fit to transform and enlarge the purely local ques- 
tion of Cuba. 

From this fact your excellency draws the conclusion 
that the question at stake is no longer only the one 
which relates to the territory of Cuba, but also that the 
losses of American lives and fortunes incident to the 
war should in some manner be compensated. 

As to the first condition, relating to the future of 
Cuba, the two Governments reach similar conclusions 
in regard to the natural inability of its people to es- 
tablish an independent government ; be it by reason of 
inadequate development, as we believe, or on account 
of the present distracted and prostrate condition of the 
island, as your excellency states, the fact remains that 
Cuba needs guidance. The American people are will- 
ing to assume the responsibility of giving this guidance 
by substituting themselves to the Spanish nation, whose 
right to keep the island is indisputable; to this intima- 
tion we have nothing to oppose. The necessity of with- 
drawing from the territory of Cuba being imperative, 
the nation assuming Spain's place must, as long as this 
territory shall not have fully reached the conditions 
required to take rank among other sovereign powers, 
provide for rules which will insure order and protect 
against all risks the Spanish residents, as well as the 
Cuban natives still loyal to the mother country. 

255 



APPENDIX 

In the name of the nation the Spanish Government 
hereby relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over or 
title to Cuba, and engages to the irremeable evacua- 
tion of the island, subject to the approval of the Cortes 
— a reserve which we likewise make with regard to the 
other proffered terms — just as these terms will have 
to be ultimately approved by the Senate of the United 
States. 

The United States require, as an indemnity for or 
an equivalent to the sacrifices they have borne during 
this short war, the cession of Porto Rico and of the 
other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in 
the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in 
the Ladrones, to be selected by the Federal Govern- 
ment. 

This demand strips us of the very last memory of 
a glorious past, and expels us at once from the pros- 
perous island of Porto Rico and from the Western 
Hemisphere, which became peopled and civilized 
through the proud deeds of our ancestors. It might, 
perhaps, have 'been possible to compensate by some 
other cession for the injuries sustained by the United 
States. However, the inflexibility of the demand 
obliges us to cede, and we shall cede, the island of Porto 
Rico and the other islands belonging to the Crown of 
Spain in the West Indies, together with one of the 
islands of the archipelago of the Ladrones, to be se- 
lected by the American Government. 

The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our 
understanding, to be quite indefinite. On the one hand, 
the ground on which the United States believe them- 
selves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor, and the 

256 



APPENDIX 

city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of 
peace, can not be that of conquest, since in spite of the 
blockade maintained on sea by the American fleet, 
in spite of the siege established on land by a native 
supported and provided for by the American admiral, 
Manila still holds its own, and the Spanish standard 
still waves over the city. On the other hand, the whole 
archipelago of the Philippines is in the power and under 
the sovereignty of Spain. Therefore the Government 
of Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of Ma- 
nila should constitute a guaranty. It is stated that 
the treaty of peace shall determine the control, dispo- 
sition, and government of the Philippines; but as the 
intentions of the Federal Government by regression 
remain veiled, therefore the Spanish Government must 
declare that, while, accepting the third condition, they 
do not a priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over 
the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree 
as to such reforms which the condition of these posses- 
sions and the level of culture of their natives may ren- 
der desirable. 

The Government of Her Majesty accepts the third 
condition, with the above mentioned declarations. 

Such are the statements and observations which the 
Spanish Government has the honor to submit in reply 
to your excellency's communication. They accept the 
proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Cortes 
of the Kingdom, as required by their constitutional 
duties. 

The agreement between the two Governments im- 
plies the irremeable suspension of hostilities and the 
designation of commissioners for the purpose of set- 
17 257 



APPENDIX 

tling the details of the treaty of peace and of signing 
it, under the terms above indicated. 

I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your excel- 
lency the assurances of my highest consideration. 

Almodovar del Rio. 



Department of State, 
Washington, August 10, 1898. 
Excellency: 

Although it is your understanding that the note of 
the Duke of Almodovar, which you left with the Presi- 
dent on yesterday afternoon, is intended to convey an 
acceptance by the Spanish Government of the terms 
set forth in my note of the 30th ultimo as the basis on 
which the President would appoint commissioners to 
negotiate and conclude with commissioners on the 
part of Spain a treaty of peace, I understand that 
we concur in the opinion that the Duke's note, doubt- 
less owing to the various transformations which it has 
undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission 
by telegraph and in cipher, is not, in the form in which 
it has reached the hands of the President, entirely ex- 
plicit. 

Under these circumstances it is thought that the 
most direct and certain way of avoiding misunder- 
standing is to embody in a protocol, to be signed by 
us as the representatives, respectively, of the United 
States and Spain, the terms on which the negotiations 
for peace are to be undertaken. 

I therefore inclose herewith a draft of such a proto- 
258 



APPENDIX 

col, in which you will find that I have embodied the 
precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of the 
30th ultimo, together with appropriate stipulations for 
the appointment of commissioners to arrange the de- 
tails of the immediate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico, 
and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the 
West Indies, as well as for the appointment of com- 
missioners to treat of peace. 

Accept, excellency, the renewed assurances of my 

highest consideration. 

William R. Day. 

His Excellency M. Jules Cambon, etc. 



PROTOCOL. 



William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United 
States, and His Excellency Jules Cambon, ambassador 
extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of 
France at Washington, respectively possessing for this 
purpose full authority from the Government of the 
United States and the Government of Spain, have con- 
cluded and signed the following articles, embodying 
the terms on which the two Governments have agreed 
in respect to the matters hereinafter set forth, having 
in view the establishment of peace between the two 
countries, that is to say : 

Article i. Spain will relinquish all claim of sover- 
eignty over or title to Cuba. 

Article 2. Spain will cede to the United States the 
island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Span- 

259 



APPENDIX 

ish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island 
in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United States. 

Article 3. The United States will occupy and hold 
the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the con- 
clusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the 
control, disposition, and government of the Philippines. 

Article 4. Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, 
Porto Rico, and other islands under Spanish sover- 
eignty in the West Indies; and to this end each Gov- 
ernment will, within ten days after the signing of this 
protocol, appoint commissioners, and the commissioners 
so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing 
of this protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of 
arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid 
evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands; 
and each Government will, within ten days after the 
signing of this protocol, also appoint other commis- 
sioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing 
of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, for 
the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details 
of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and other 
islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies. 

Article 5. The United States and Spain will each 
appoint not more than five commissioners to treat of 
peace, and the commissioners so appointed shall meet 
at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed 
to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, 
which treaty shall be subject to ratification according 
to the respective constitutional forms of the two coun- 
tries. 

Article 6. Upon the conclusion and signing of this 
protocol hostilities between the two countries shall be 

260 



APPENDIX 

suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as 
soon as possible by each Government to the com- 
manders of its military and naval forces. 

[Signed at Washington, August 12, 1898.] 



Department of State, 
Washington, August 10, 1898 
Excellency : 

I have the honor to say, as I assured you orally this 
morning, that upon the suspension of hostilities be- 
tween the United States and Spain, as the result of the 
signing and sealing of the protocol upon the terms of 
which we have agreed, it is the purpose of this Govern- 
ment to take prompt and efficient means to aid the in- 
troduction of food supplies into the ports of Cuba. 

Accept, excellency, the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

William R. Day. « 

His Excellency Mr. Jules Cambon, etc. 



William R. Day, 

Secretary of State: 
You are hereby authorized to sign, on the part of 
the United States, the protocol of this date embody- 
ing the terms on which the United States and Spain 
have agreed to treat of peace. 

William McKinley. 
Executive Mansion, 

Washington, August 12, 1898. 
261 



APPENDIX 

[Translation.] 

Embassy of the French Republic 

in the United States, 
Washington, August 12, 1898. 

Mr. Secretary of State : I have the honor to in- 
form you that I have just received, through the inter- 
mediation of the department of foreign affairs at Paris, 
a telegram, dated Madrid, August 11, in which the 
Duke of Almodovar del Rio announces to me that, by 
order of Her Majesty the Queen Regent, the Spanish 
Government confers upon me full powers in order that 
I may sign, without other formality and without delay, 
the protocol whereof the terms have been drawn up by 
common accord between you and me. The instrument 
destined to make regular the powers which are thus 
given to me by telegraph will be subsequently addressed 
to me by the post. 

His excellency the minister of state adds that in ac- 
cepting this protocol and by reason of the suspension 
of hostilities which will be the immediate consequence 
of that acceptance, the Spanish Government has pleas- 
ure in hoping that the Government of the United States 
will take the necessary measures with a view to re- 
strain (empecher) all aggression on the part of the 
Cuban separatist forces. 

The Government of the Republic having, on the other 
hand, authorized me to accept the powers which are 
conferred upon me by the Spanish Government, I shall 
hold myself at your disposition to sign the protocol at 
the hour you may be pleased to designate. 

262 



APPENDIX 

Congratulating myself upon thus cooperating with 
you toward the restoration of peace between two na- 
tions, both friends of France, I beg you to accept, Mr. 
Secretary of State, the fresh assurances of my very 
high consideration. 

Jules Cambon. 

Hon. William R. Day, 

Secretary of State of the United States, etc., Wash- 
ington. 



No. 94.] Department of State, 

Washington, August 15, 1898. 

Excellency : I have the honor to make formal ac- 
knowledgement of the note you addressed to me, un- 
der date of the 12th instant, informing me of your re- 
ceipt, through the medium of the department of foreign 
affairs at Paris, of a telegram, dated Madrid, August 
11, in which the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, minister 
of state of Spain, by order of Her Majesty the Queen 
Regent, conferred upon you full powers to sign, with- 
out other formality and without delay, the protocol al- 
ready drawn up by you and me, leaving the documen- 
tary confirmation of your said full powers to follow by 
mail ; and adding that, the Government of the Republic 
having authorized you to accept the powers so con- 
ferred upon you by the Spanish Government, you were 
ready to sign the protocol at such time as I might des- 
ignate. 

The signing of the protocol on the afternoon of the 
1 2th instant by you and me, in the presence of the Pres- 
ident, followed by the immediate action of the Presi- 
dent in issuing his proclamation suspending hostilities, 

263 



APPENDIX 

in accordance with the appropriate stipulation of that 
protocol, testified in a most gratifying manner the full 
recognition by this Government of the powers con- 
ferred upon you, and, I am glad to believe, marked the 
first and most effective step toward the happy restora- 
tion of peace between the United States and Spain. It 
is especially gratifying to the President and to this Gov- 
ernment that you, as the honored representative of the 
French Republic, allied to our American commonwealth 
by the unbroken ties of more than a century of close 
friendship and to the Kingdom of Spain by propinquity 
and intimate association, should have been thus instru- 
mental in contributing to this auspicious result. 

Referring to the observation contained in your note 
relative to the internal order of Cuba during the sus- 
pension of hostilities, I may remark that the forces of 
the United States, in proportion as they occupy Cuban 
territory in the course of the evacuation thereof by 
Spain and its delivery to the arms of the United States 
under the terms of the protocol, will, it is believed, be 
adequate to preserve peace and order, and no doubt is 
entertained of their ability to restrain any possible in- 
jury to the inhabitants of the island in the country 
which shall by degrees come under their control. 

Be pleased, Mr. Ambassador, to accept the renewed 
assurances of my highest consideration. 

William R. Day. 



[Translation.] 

The French ambassador, referring to his communica- 
tion of the 1 2th instant, has the honor to inform the 

264 



APPENDIX 

Secretary of State of the United States, that he has just 
received, through the department of foreign affairs at 
Paris, the full powers which had been conferred upon 
him, in the name ot the King of Spain, by Her Majesty 
the Queen Regent, to enable him to sign the preliminary 
protocol of the negotiations for the establishment of 
peace between Spain and the United States. 

Mr. J. Cambon requests the Hon. William R. Day to 
please to find inclosed the said document, and avails 
himself of the occasion to renew the assurances of his 
highest consideration. 

Washington, August 30, 1898. 

Hon. Wm. R. Day, 

Secretary of State of the United States, etc., Wash- 
ington. 



[Translation.] 
DON ALFONSO XIII 

BY THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION, KING 
OF SPAIN, AND IN HIS NAME AND DURING HIS MINOR- 
ITY. 

DONA MARIA CRISTINA, 

QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM. 

Whereas it has become necessary to negotiate and 
sign at Washington a protocol in which the prelimina- 
ries of peace between Spain and the United States of 
America shall be settled, and as it is necessary for me 
to empower for that purpose a person possessing the 

265 



APPENDIX 

requisite qualifications : Therefore, I have decided to 
select, after procuring the consent of His Excellency 
the President of the French Republic, you, Don Julio 
Cambon, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary 
of the French Republic in the United States of Amer- 
ica, as I do, by these presents, select and appoint you 
to proceed, invested with the character of my plenipo- 
tentiary to negotiate and sign with the plenipotentiary 
whom His Excellency the President of the United 
States of America may designate for that purpose the 
aforesaid protocol. And I declare, from the present 
moment, all that you may agree upon, negotiate, 
and sign in the execution of this commission ac- 
ceptable and valid, and I will observe it and exe- 
cute it, and will cause it to be observed and exe- 
cuted as if it had been done by myself, for which 
I give you my whole full powers in the most am- 
ple form required by law. In witness whereof I 
have caused these presents to be issued, signed by my 
hand, duly sealed and countersigned by the under- 
signed, my minister of state. Given in the palace at 
Madrid, August n, 1898. 

[l. s.] Maria Cristina. 

Juan Manuel SancheZ y Gutierrez de Castro 

Minister of State. 



APPENDIX D 



THE TREATY OF PEACE 



The United States of America and Her Maj- 
esty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the Name of 
Her August Son Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to end 
the state of war now existing between the two coun- 
tries, have for that purpose appointed as Plenipotentia- 
ries: 

The President of the United States, 
William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William 
P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid, citizens 
of the United States ; 

And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, 
Don Eugenio Montero Rios, President of the Sen- 
ate, Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, Senator of 
the Kingdom and ex-Minister of the Crown, Don Jose 
de Garnica, Deputy to the Cortes and Associate Jus- 
tice of the Supreme Court, Don Wenceslao Ramirez 
de Villa-Urrutia, Envoy Extraordinary and Minis- 
ter Plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Ce- 
rero, General of Division : 

Who, having assembled in Paris, and having ex- 
changed their full powers, which were found to be in 
due and proper form, have, after discussion of the 
matters before them, agreed upon the following ar- 
ticles : 

267 



APPENDIX 

Article I 

Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and 
title to Cuba. 

And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to 
be occupied by the United States, the United States 
will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and 
discharge the obligations that may under international 
law result from the fact of its occupation, for the pro- 
tection of life and property. 

Article II 

Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto 
Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty 
in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Ma- 
rianas or Ladrones. 

Article III 

Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago 
known as the Philippine islands, and comprehending 
the islands lying within the following line: 

A line running from west to east along or near the 
twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the 
middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one 
hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred 
and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longi- 
tude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred 
and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longi- 
tude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees 
and forty-five minutes (4° 45') north latitude, thence 
along the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes 
(4 45') north latitude to its intersection with the me- 
ridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees 

268 



APPENDIX 

and thirty-five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich, 
thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred 
and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (119° 35') 
east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven de- 
grees and forty minutes (7° 40') north, thence along 
the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes 
(7 40') north to its intersection with the one hundred 
and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude 
east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the inter- 
section of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north 
latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) 
degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and 
thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) 
degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the 
point of beginning. 

The United States will pay to Spain the sum of 
twenty million dollars ($20,000,000), within three 
months after the exchange of the ratifications of the 

present treaty. 

Article IV 

The United States will, for the term of ten years 
from date of the exchange of the ratifications of the 
present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise 
to the ports of the Philippine islands on the same terms 
as ships and merchandise of the United States. 

Article V 

The United States will upon the signature of the 
present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost the 
Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the cap- 
ture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of 
the soldiers in question shall be restored to them. 

269 



APPENDIX 

Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of 
the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, 
as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those 
agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to ar- 
range for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other is- 
lands in the West Indies, under the protocol of August 
12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provi- 
sions are completely executed. 

The time within which the evacuation of the Phil- 
ippine islands and Guam shall be completed shall be 
fixed by the two Governments. Stands of colors, tin- 
captured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, 
with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammuni- 
tion, livestock, and materials and supplies of all kinds, 
belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the 
Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. 
Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, 
in the fortifications and coast defences, shall remain in 
their emplacements for the term of six months, to be 
reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the 
treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, 
purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory 
agreement between the two Governments on the subject 

shall be reached. 

Article VI 

Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, 
release all prisoners of war, and all persons detained 
or imprisoned for political offences, in connection with 
the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the 
war with the United States. 

Reciprocally, the United States will release all per- 
sons made prisoners of war by the American forces, 

270 



APPENDIX 

and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish 
prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and 
the Philippines. 

The Government of the United States will at its own 
cost return to Spain and the Government of Spain will 
at its own cost return to the United States, Cuba, Porto 
Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation 
of their respective homes, prisoners released or caused 
to be released by them, respectively, under this article. 

Article VII 

The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all 
claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every 
kind, of either Government, or of its citizens or sub- 
jects, against the other Government, that may have 
arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in 
Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the 
present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for 
the cost of the war. 

The United States will adjudicate and settle the 

claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this 

article. 

Article VIII 

In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, 
and III of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and 
cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the West In- 
dies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine Ar- 
chipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, 
structures, public highways and other immovable prop- 
erty which, in conformity with law, belong to the pub- 
lic domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain. 

And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or 
271 



APPENDIX 

cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding par- 
agraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property 
or rights which by law belong to the peaceful posses- 
sion of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipali- 
ties, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or 
civic bodies, or any other associations having legal ca- 
pacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid 
territories renounced or ceded, or of private individ- 
uals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may 
be. 

The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case 
may be, includes all documents exclusively referring 
to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may ex- 
ist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any docu- 
ment in such archives only in part relates to said sov- 
ereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished when- 
ever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be recipro- 
cally observed in favor of Spain in respect of docu- 
ments in the archives of the islands above referred to. 

In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the 
case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown 
of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the of- 
ficial archives and records, executive as well as judicial, 
in the islands above referred to, which relate to said 
islands or the rights and property of their inhabitants. 
Such archives and records shall be carefully preserved, 
and private persons shall without distinction have the 
right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated 
copies of the contracts, wills and other instruments 
forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which 
may be contained in the executive or judicial archives, 
be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid. 

272 



APPENDIX 

Article IX 

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing 
in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty 
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in 
such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in 
either event all their rights of property, including the 
right to sell or dispose of such property or of its pro- 
ceeds ; and they shall also have the right to carry on 
their industry, commerce and professions, being subject 
in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other 
foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they 
may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain 
by making, before a court of record, within a year from 
the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, 
a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegi- 
ance; in default of which declaration they shall be held 
to have renounced it and to have adopted the national- 
ity of the territory in which they may reside. 

The civil rights and political status of the native in- 
habitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United 
States shall be determined by the Congress. 

Article X 

The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain 
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured 
in the free exercise of their religion. 

Article XI 

The Spaniards residing in the territories over which 
Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sover- 
eignty shall be subject in matters civil as well as crim- 

273 



APPENDIX 

inal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country 
wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws gov- 
erning the same; and they shall have the right to ap- 
pear before such courts, and to pursue the same course 
as citizens of the country to which the courts belong. 

Article XII 

Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the ex- 
change of ratifications of this treaty in the territories 
over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty 
shall be determined according to the following rules : 

i. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between 
private individuals, or in criminal matters, before the 
date mentioned, and with respect to which there is no 
recourse or right of review under the Spanish law, 
shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due 
form by competent authority in the territory within 
which such judgments should be carried out. 

2. Civil suits between private individuals which 
may on the date mentioned be undetermined shall be 
prosecuted to judgment before the court in which they 
may then be pending or in the court that may be sub- 
stituted therefor. 

3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned 
before the Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of 
the territory which by this treaty ceases to be Spanish 
shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judg- 
ment ; but, such judgment having been rendered, the 
execution thereof shall be committed to the competent 
authority of the place in which the case arose. 



274 



APPENDIX 

Article XIII 

The rights of property secured by copyrights and 
•patents acquired by Spaniards in the island of Cuba, 
and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other ceded ter- 
ritories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications 
of this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish 
scientific, literary and artistic works, not subversive of 
public order in the territories in question, shall continue 
to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the 
period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the 
exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. 

Article XIV 

Spain shall have the power to establish consular of- 
ficers in the ports and places of the territories, the sov- 
ereignty over which has been either relinquished or 
ceded by the present treaty. 

Article XV 

The Government of each country will, for the term 
of ten years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other 
country the same treatment in respect of all port 
charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light 
dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own mer- 
chant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade. 

This article may at any time be terminated on six 
months' notice given by either Government to the other. 

Article XVI 

It is understood that any obligations assumed in this 
treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are 

275 



APPENDIX 

limited to the time of its occupancy thereof ; but it will 
upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any 
Government established in the island to assume the 
same obligations. 

Article XVII 

The present treaty shall be ratified by the President 
of the United States, by and with the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the 
Queen Regent of Spain ; and the ratifications shall be 
exchanged at Washington within six months from the 
date thereof, or earlier if possible. 

In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentia- 
ries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed 
our seals. 

Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of Decem- 
ber, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hun- 
dred and ninety-eight. 

[seal] William R. Day, 

[seal] Cushman K. Davis, 

[seal] William P. Frye, 

[seal] Geo. Gray, 

[seal] Whitelaw Reid. 

Hecho por duplicado en Paris a diez de Diciembre 
del ano mil ochocientos noventa y ocho. 

[seal] Eugenio Montero Rios, 

[seal] B. de Abarzuza, 

[SEAL] J. DE GARNICA, 

[seal] W. R. de Villa Urrutia, 

[seal] Rafael Cerero. 

276 



